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Foreword
Intellectual and artistic pursuits have long benefited from the
generosity and support of members of society who have rec-
ognized the importance of curiosity, exploration, and the search
for new ideas and new knowledge. The University of Kentucky
has been fortunate to have shared in the generosity offered by
a large number of the Commonwealth's citizens. The Blazer
Lecture Series, supported since 1949 by the Paul G. and Geor-
gia M. Blazer Fund, is an example of this contribution to the
intellectual life of the faculty and students at the university and
to the surrounding community. In the almost four decades since
the Blazer Lecture Series was founded, the University of Ken-
tucky has been able to present such distinguished speakers as
Henry Steele Commager, the noted historian; Barry Bingham,
Sr., of the Louisville Courier Journal; Henry Cabot Lodge,
ambassador and senator; and President Gerald Ford.
The continued generosity and interest of the Blazer family
have allowed us in recent years to have as lecturers Dr. William
DeVries, noted heart surgeon, and Dr. Daniel Boorstin, Li-
brarian of Congress. Now, beginning with the lectures deliv-
ered in the spring of 1987, the College of Arts and Sciences
at the university, in cooperation with the University Press of
Kentucky, is pleased to be able to share these lectures through
the publication of an annual monograph.
The 1987Blazer Lectures were given by Dr. WarrenE. Miller
at the Lexington campus on March 9 and 10, 1987, as part of
a conference on Ideology and Polarization in American Poli-
tics. Dr. Miller is professor of political science at Arizona State
University, a former president of the American Political Sci-
x FOREWORD
ence Association, and director of one of the most respected
on-going collections of social science data in the United States,
the National Election Studies.
The College of Arts and Sciences is pleased to share the
ideas of such a noted scholar through our first Blazer Lecture
monograph. Our pleasure is doubled by the thought that we
are fortunate enough to have the support of three generations
of a distinguished Kentucky family who recognize the impor-
tance of intellectual pursuits in the humanities and the social
sciences.
Michael A. Baer, Dean
College of Arts and Sciences
University of Kentucky
Preface
The exploration of public attitudes is a pursuit of endless
fascination—and frustration. Depiction of the distribution
of opinions within the public, identification of the quali-
ties of opinion, isolation of the odd and of the obvious
correlates of opinion, and ascertainment of the modes of
opinion formation are pursuits that excite human curi-
osity. Yet these endeavors are bootless (for the political
scientist) unless the findings about the preferences, aspi-
rations, and prejudices of the public can be connected
with the workings of the governmental system.—V.O.
Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961)
In the concluding chapter of Public Opinion and American
Democracy, V.O. Key, Jr., thus anticipated the motive for
writing Without Consent. Key spent a fruitful and influential
year with us at the Survey Research Center in 1959-1960. In
that year he set aside the embryonic work that was posthu-
mously published as The Responsible Electorate, did a begin-
ning-to-end editing of the manuscript for The American Voter,
persuaded Miller and Stokes to make the constituency, not
constituents, the unit of analysis for their "forthcoming" work
on congressional representation, and began what was to be the
last major work of his career, Public Opinion and American
Democracy. Although we at Michigan were already striving
to place our own work on mass electoral behavior in the tra-
dition identified with Lippmann and Key, Key's presence did
much to affirm our intention to move to studies of the inter-
action and interdependence of various separable components
of the political process.
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In the ensuing years we actually made only limited attempts
to reach beyond the American voter at home, although many
of us participated in studies of mass-elite linkages and inter-
actions in other polities, particularly in western Europe. But
in 1972, the Center for Political Studies undertook the first of
what have now been three national data collections focused
exclusively on American political elites. In 1973, 1981, and
1985 senior staff members of the Center carried out more or
less elaborate post-election studies of delegates to the national
nominating conventions of both major political parties.
The present volume is the third in a sequence reporting this
research done by the Center. The series of books was inau-
gurated with Jeane Kirkpatrick's volume on political elites, a
book focused on the rise of The New Presidential Elite in 1972.
The next in the sequence, ten years later, was the Miller/Jen-
nings volume that presented the presidential Parties in Tran-
sition. Without Consent is a sequel to the first two. But it is
less a "part of an unfolding series" or a "natural consequence"
of the first two, than a direct product of the general line of
thought associated with scholars from Lippmann to Key who
have been concerned with the connection between public opin-
ion and democracy.
Without Consent adds to the portfolio of work Key deemed
essential to answer the "fundamental question of how it is that
democratic governments manage to operate at all." It really
fits in a sequel of learning first about the citizenry, then about
the elite, and finally about their interaction. In Key's words,
writing in 1960:
Analytically it is useful to conceive of the structure of a democratic
order as consisting of the political activists and the mass of peo-
ple. . . . The data [pertaining to citizens' attitudes] tell us almost
nothing about the dynamic relations between the upper layer of ac-
tivists and mass opinion. The missing piece of our puzzle is this elite
element of the opinion system. That . . . political influential both
affect mass opinion and are conditioned in their behavior by it is
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obvious. Yet systematic knowledge of the composition, distribution
in the social structure, and patterns of behavior of this sector of the
political system remains far from satisfactory.
The longer one frets with the puzzle of how democratic regimes
manage to function, the more plausible it appears that a substantial
part of the explanation is to be found in the motives that actuate the
leadership echelon, the values that it holds, in the rules of the political
game to which it adheres . . . and perhaps in some of the objective
circumstances, both personal and institutional, in which it functions.
Without Consent offers a limited view of elite motives and
values, but it explores more extensively than most studies the
impact of the rules of the game and the consequences of ob-
jective circumstances for the linkage of mass and elite policy
preferences. Although it is difficult to reconstruct even per-
ceived causal influences, there is little question but that close
contact with V.O. Key at the time of our writing The American
Voter, the first analyses from the Miller/Stokes study of
congressional representation, and of the first drafts of Public
Opinion and American Democracy fixed the concern with
mass-elite linkages as a part of my personal research agenda.
Even more, Key's preoccupation with reintroducing politics
and political institutions into the micro-analysis of political
behavior reaffirmed an earlier conviction that the behavioral
mode could address many topics of political analysis central
to understanding the actual functioning of a democratic system
of politics and government.
Without Consent is only a limited instance of the empirical
study of mass-elite linkages embedded in the processes of elec-
toral politics and democratic government in the United States.
I hope that it will be followed by other studies of elite-mass
interactions in other settings.
To whatever degree the book represents progress toward
Key's goal, it also represents the indispensable contribution of
a host of colleagues. First and foremost it reflects the insights
into the nature of politics and research on politics provided by
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Kent Jennings and Barbara Farah. All three of us participated
in the design of the 1981 and 1985 studies. Barbara directed
the collection of data in 1981 and provided invaluable con-
sultation on the execution of the 1985 data collection. The
direct responsibility for that collection was in the hands of
Debra Dodson, now research associate at the Center for the
American Woman in Politics, Rutgers University. The data,
along with those from 1972 and 1980, are all available for
further analysis through the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.
As will become evident to the reader, the analytic mode of
this book was anticipated in Parties in Transition, written with
M. Kent Jennings. Indeed, had our work schedules not dictated
otherwise, the present volume would have benefited from
Kent's continuing interest in the study of political elites and
mass-elite linkages. Absent that contribution, Without Consent
is still the beneficiary of his central role in both the 1981 and
the 1985 studies.
Building on Debra Dodson's preparation of data files, David
Malin, graduate assistant in the Political Science Department
at Arizona State University, responded to the innumerable cu-
riosities that precede a large-scale data analysis and produced
a host of imaginative and yet precise manipulations of the data.
His diligence and efficiency ultimately made it possible to carry
out complete replications of a large-scale data management
project, using both the 1981 and the 1985 data collections, in
a remarkably short time. Thanks to his tenacity and his un-
derstanding of a great many specific analytic objectives, I am
confident that the analytic shortcomings of the book are mine
in concept, not his in execution.
Given my slightly antiquarian work ways, the real challenge
en route to the final manuscript was provided by my penchant
for oral dictation or indecipherable handwriting. Linda Morgan
coped with both with good humor and great efficiency, aided
by Nancy Brennan and Judy Ottmar. Their work, in turn, was
followed by the manifold contributions of the University Press
of Kentucky.
Preface xv
All of us were supported in our joint endeavor by a number
of sponsoring institutions. The Russell Sage Foundation made
the initial contribution with a grant that underwrote a large
fraction of the costs of data collection. The balance of those
costs, along with others entailed in data preparation, were car-
ried by the Center for Political Studies. The third of the in-
advertent partners was my home institution, Arizona State
University, which made it possible for Linda Morgan, David
Malin, and me to complete a complicated but rewarding task
in record time. As Dean Baer's Foreward indicates, the Uni-
versity of Kentucky and the Blazer family fund were partners
in an indispensable fourth source of support.
Finally, a fifth institution, that of marriage, provided a wife
whose contributions were only grudgingly those of the mun-
dane connubial order, but most generously those of a profes-
sional colleague. As a student of politics, research scholar, and
teacher, she provided not only helpful consultation and in-
sightful advice but reassurance that the final product at least
warranted the strain that writing always imposes on our many
other institutional relationships.

Introduction: The Study
of Presidential Politics
in America
As the end of the twentieth century approaches, the more cyn-
ical of the commentators describing the political American
scene are prone to repeat the caricature of the American presi-
dential selection process as the "selling of a president." With
politics entering the era of high technology in mass commu-
nications, the serious process of democratic self-government
is often portrayed as one involving only the imagemakers, two
or more malleable candidates for an elective office, and the
gullible electorate. In the early days of each election-year
cycle, "name recognition" and trial heat comparisons of can-
didate popularity are the name of the game, and the role of
the campaign consultant in the packaging of candidates scarcely
diminishes before the ultimate first Tuesday.
Nevertheless, it takes little in the way of close observation
to understand that much more is involved in our national poli-
tics than the personal popularity of candidates for public office.
One need only note the hundreds of millions of dollars con-
tributed to election campaign funding to conclude that a great
many individual contributors think the outcome will make a
very substantial practical difference. Those who finance poli-
tics apparently recognize that whatever one's philosophy about
the desirable level of governmental intervention in the everyday
lives of citizens, the world of the late twentieth century is
inevitably one in which either action or inaction on the part
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of our government can make a very real difference in deter-
mining who within the society receives what rewards.
The extensive literature reporting systematic analyses of
mass electoral behavior supports the inference that this con-
clusion is shared by millions of voters. Between the early 1950s
and the late 1980s, the quality of mass electoral decision-
making underwent marked change. It would be going too far
to say that issue voting came to dominate the voters' choices;
however, the evidence does suggest that the net outcome of
most of the elections of the 1970s and 1980s was determined
by voters' policy preferences and their assessment of incum-
bents' performance in office.1
With the advent of television and the evolution of modern
campaign technology, citizen responses to the problems of self-
government have changed dramatically during the four decades
following World War II. Although the war clearly intruded on
many aspects of American national development, the full-scale
renewal of national politics after the war largely extended,
unchanged, the party-dominated politics of the immediate pre-
war period. Eisenhower's first election was notable because of
the personal presence of a national hero, but his presidency
did little to alter the dominant role of party in shaping electoral
decisions. Thirty years later, however, candidates had chal-
lenged parties as the focus of voter interests. Nowhere was this
more true than in the domain of issue voting.
In the first Eisenhower-Stevenson contest, voters' concerns
about policy were almost always expressed in their evaluation
of the political parties, virtually never in popular assessments
of the presidential candidates. By the late 1970s that had all
changed; it was the candidates, not the parties, who were as-
sociated with issue preferences.2 With the parties no longer
the ubiquitous guide, helping the voter transform concerns with
either domestic or foreign problems into policy preferences
and hence electoral choices, the process of casting a vote rooted
in policy preferences became more and more complex.
There was no diminution of popular concern with issues of
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the day but rather a shift in the basis upon which voters made
their choices. Indeed, by the 1980s it was commonplace for
the political analyst and commentator to note that national
decisions at the polls were heavily influenced, even domi-
nated, by voters' assessments of presidential performance. Not
only were presidential approval ratings the stuff of daily news
analysis and speculation, but in every election from the Gold-
water-Johnson contest on, presidential performance and the
judgments levied on each incumbent administration provided
a major explanation for the determination of the White House's
next occupant.3 Although party, in the form of the voter's self-
identified partisanship, continued to be the most important single
determinant of voters' choices, policy preferences and perfor-
mance evaluations associated with presidential contenders were
of undeniable importance in election results in the 1980s; this
was particularly evident in the election and reelection of Ronald
Reagan.
The utility of this book rests in substantial part on the con-
clusion that policies and issues, and their symbolic represen-
tations, play a major role in the determination of national
electoral outcomes. And even if party remains the most salient
single cue for the issue voter, while the relevance of candidate-
based factionalism waxes and wanes, issues have a continuing
generic importance in their own right in the American process
of selecting a president. Consequently, it is neither simply an
old-fashioned adherence to notions of responsible party gov-
ernment nor fear of the "mischiefs of faction" that motivates
concern with the linkages connecting the policy preferences of
the mass electorate to the authoritative decisions of the leaders.
This book gives short shrift to the study of candidates' per-
sonalities and personal images. It does not even have much to
say about the origins of partisan differentiation with regard to
the issue preferences of the voters. This is not a book on voting
behavior. It does attend to the relative importance of party,
issues, and candidate, but is primarily concerned with the cir-
cumstances which enhance or inhibit the sharing of policy pref-
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erences and related symbolic attitudes among leaders and
followers in American society.
The Objective of the Study
This study is an inquiry into some of the ways in which the
authoritative allocation of values through decisions taken near
the peak of the pyramid of political power come to reflect the
predispositions and preferences of the mass electorate that
makes up the pyramid's base.
However old-fashioned the metaphor of the pyramid of
power, it does provide a useful image of the structured manner
in which popular power in a democratic society is connected
to a handful of individuals who ultimately make and implement
governmental decisions in the name of popular sovereignty. In
our rough translation of the metaphor, the broad base of the
pyramid is provided by the tens of millions of citizens who
are eligible to participate in the electoral process. The voters,
in turn, can be arrayed in successive strata ranging from rela-
tively indifferent participants to those who are more and more
intensely involved in the electoral process. As one moves above
the broadest base, made up of voters who are otherwise inactive
in politics, to those who are informal participants in the cam-
paign and then on to formally defined activists, the numbers
associated with each stratum shrink rapidly. Immediately above
the upper levels of informal rank-and-file participants are the
strata made up of those members of the elite who populate
local power constellations—precinct and ward politicians, con-
tenders for local office, and those who occupy the organiza-
tional positions in the townships, towns, and cities—followed
by county and then state activists. Near the top are the more
rarefied strata of those preoccupied with national and, ulti-
mately, presidential politics.
As with most metaphors, the limited usefulness of the pyra-
mid image becomes more and more apparent as one tries to
Introduction 5
draw into it more and more systematic information. We know
that many voters are not much interested in national politics;
therefore, we cannot presume that the mass base is really a
homogeneous foundation for the rest of the pyramid. Moving
vertically up the axis of the pyramid, however, one presumably
encounters larger and larger proportions of smaller and smaller
strata whose members are more and more preoccupied with
presidential politics. In fact, little is known about the empirical
regularities that integrate or differentiate lower and middle and
upper elites along dimensions of status, power, activity, and
national focus.
In any event, the political process of choosing the nation's
leaders clearly involves hundreds of thousands of citizens who
make up a political mid-elite that plays a vital role throughout
the entire presidential selection process. This study is particu-
larly concerned with those in the upper reaches of the pyramid
who are most deeply involved in the mobilization and allo-
cation of resources in the early stages. It is centered on the
universe of sometime convention delegates who typically pre-
cede, and subsequently follow, their stints as nominators with
roles as presidential campaign activists.
Given the origins of this program of research on convention
delegates, it would be less than forthright to pretend that those
of us involved in the investigation deliberately chose to study
delegates as the ideal representatives of political elites. None-
theless, this inquiry (as well as the earlier study reported in
Parties in Transition)4 was prompted by the belief that dele-
gates who have been or later become campaign activists are
exceptionally important contributors to subsequent decisions
by nominated candidates—and elected presidents—concern-
ing matters of public policy. We believe that they include many
influentials who participate in shaping subsequent Administra-
tion policy. In the role of political influentials they link the
president and his office to the partisan base that provided elec-
toral support at the polls.
In the absence of systematic evidence on the point, we would
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argue, alternatively, that delegate campaigners may be the
president's analogue of the congressman's "primary constitu-
ency" as defined and described by Richard Fenno.5 In that role
they would be less important as independent contributors to
policy decisions but more important as the presumed repre-
sentatives of the public opinion that links the candidate and
the candidate's mass base of popular support. As participants
in presidential politics who have some base of local support,
they may be used by the inner circles of leadership as the
sounding board for public opinion.
This inquiry is not directed at determining the extent to
which convention delegates actually play these imputed roles.
Such a study should have a high place on the priority list for
future research, but it has not yet been done and is no part of
this book. Therefore I presume, but do not demonstrate, that
as political activists in community, state, and nation, those
who have come to our attention for other reasons connect the
top and the bottom of the pyramid of political power in ways
that go well beyond the episodes that are the presidential elec-
tions themselves—in short, that the universe of convention
elites is made up of political actors who are of continuing
importance to the ongoing politics of the nation.6
Since the advent of survey research as an integrated collec-
tion of methods for large-scale social inquiry, more attention
has been given to the nature of the base of the political pyramid
than to those elements that connect the base to the apex. Indeed,
mass electoral behavior is too often taken to define the essence
of presidential politics.There are, of course, notable excep-
tions: some scholars with a grand sweep cover the whole range
of actors and activities that make up the presidential parties;7
others concentrate on the organizational infrastructure of po-
litical parties.8 A few produce sophisticated syntheses of the
entire process and separate the central phenomena from the
often more colorful epiphenomena.9 Nevertheless, it is the vot-
ers who have received the most persistent scrutiny, with large-
scale programmatic studies mounted every biennium to depict
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the values and beliefs, hopes and fears, that lead to citizens'
decisions to participate—or not—on behalf of a particular can-
didate or set of party candidates.
Perhaps because of the costs and logistic challenges con-
fronting comparable inquiries into the study of political elites,
there has been only a limited, if growing, accretion of infor-
mation about them. It has been still rarer to have research
resources concentrated on an inquiry into the nature of the
interconnectedness of the mass base of presidential politics and
a population of partisan activists.10 This book is directed at
the latter task; it is about some of the institutions that link the
issue preferences and ideological predispositions of rank-and-
file citizens to the preferences or predispositions of the mid-
level leaders of the presidential parties. As already noted, this
is not a book primarily about the process of choosing a presi-
dent; it is therefore not directly about decisions in elections or
about nominating conventions. Although it may have many
implications for our understanding of the dynamics of these
and other institutions that contribute to the political process,
it is essentially a static analysis of some of the more persistent
similarities and differences that unite or divide two strata of
participants.
This study is one of similarities and differences in ideo-
logical predispositions that are reflected when ordinary citizens
and mid-level political elites locate themselves as liberal, mod-
erate, or conservative participants in partisan politics—where
they are also identified as Republicans and Democrats. It is a
book about the congruence of policy or issue preferences
among the masses and the elites as those preferences are central
to the disagreements between presidential parties or among
party factions. It is about agreement and disagreement in at-
titudes toward the political groups that have come to symbolize
the political values that are controlled by the authoritative acts
of government. The book is not about the evolution of these
predispositions, preferences, or attitudes toward symbolic
groups; it is about political circumstances and conditions that
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appear to enhance or inhibit similarities in such predispositions
and preferences among political elites and ordinary citizens.
Because our elites are made up of sometime delegates to
national nominating conventions, and because the national con-
ventions are institutionalized occasions for representatives of
the mass population to participate—however directly or in-
directly—in the presidential selection process, the book is
about representation. I will have more to say about the dele-
gates' roles as self-conscious representatives of mass opinion;
for the moment, it is enough to note that not much of the
literature analyzing delegates to nominating conventions con-
siders their representation of anything other than support for
candidates.11 Indeed, some of the critics of the party reforms
of the 1970s have castigated delegates who declare some pur-
pose other than that of choosing the party standard-bearer who
is most likely to produce electoral victory in November. None-
theless, the very concept of mass-elite linkage used here is
precisely intended to address the interconnectedness of political
attitudes that constitute at least part of the content of political
representation.
The Setting and Design of the Study
The portion of this investigation dealing with political elites
was preceded by two earlier and related inquiries. The first
was launched in 1972, billed as a study of women in American
politics. After some two years of discussion and planning, the
two national party nominating conventions of that year were
selected as sites for what was expected to be the first of a series
of national studies of the emergence of women as full par-
ticipants in national politics. Although the 1972 study was a
thoroughgoing intellectual, organizational, and technical suc-
cess—four senior scholars collaborated in designing and exe-
cuting a complex and marvelously rich set of data collections—
very little was learned that was unique to new roles for women
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in politics. Instead, a great deal was learned about the people
Jeane Kirkpatrick named "The New Presidential Elite."12
After an eight-year lapse, a sequel to the 1972 data collection
was completed following the 1980 elections. The two data
collections were used as the basis for a second volume which
built on the tradition begun by McClosky in 1956 when his
study of convention delegates was used to analyze mass-elite
agreements on questions of public policy preference.13 This
second volume, Parties in Transition, also picked up Kirk-
patrick's interest in the circulation of political elites and a
corollary interest in party factionalism.14
The present study of delegates to the 1984 conventions, more
than either earlier study, was designed with the present analysis
of mass-elite linkages clearly in mind. This was feasible be-
cause of the well-established and funded plans for the 1984
National Election Study of the mass electorate.
The plan to use the 1984 study of convention delegates as
a vehicle for explorations of mass-elite linkages was not unique
to the data collections that provide the primary base for this
book. A substantial section on mass-elite relationships was
central to our report based on the 1972 and 1980 data collec-
tions. Indeed, the early analyses for that volume led us to
anticipate with greater clarity the need for complementarity in
the 1984 data collections. The present volume is the product
of that planning.
The data were produced by a self-administered questionnaire
mailed to a universe of convention delegates that included all
participants in the earlier two studies as well as delegates to
the 1984 conventions. The questionnaire was assembled with
the well-defined plans for the issue content of the 1984 National
Election Study (NES) of the electorate clearly in mind. The
consequence of this anticipation is a substantially enriched ar-
ray of completely comparable data for both the sample of the
mass electorate and the universe of convention delegates.
Of course, in order to take maximum advantage of the op-
portunity to do a 1984 study of mass-elite linkages pertaining
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to policy, we had to design the delegate study content to match
the issue content of the 1984 election campaign as reflected in
the 1984 NES study. The cost of that closer integration was a
considerable discontinuity between the specific issue and policy
content of the 1980 and 1984 studies of convention delegates.
Our 1980 delegate study had permitted us to examine five
different sets of items measuring political attitudes: a single-
item measure of ideological self-designation (liberal, moder-
ate, conservative); a five-item liberal/conservative index of
policy preferences; and three indices of attitudes toward po-
litically relevant groups, including six "New Left" groups, five
traditional political groups, and two groups central to the new
themes of moral assessment. Given the need for data to meet
other study objectives, the match with 1980 NES data was only
partial, and the five measures became three when we turned
our attention to the relationship between attitudes of party elites
and party followers.
Because the content for the 1984 delegate study was shaped
by independent decisions defining the content of the NES sur-
vey of the electorate, there are only eight discrete items
(embedded in four of the five 1980 indices) that are directly
comparable in the 1980 and 1984 mass-elite studies. On the
other hand, the 1984 measures rest on a somewhat larger array
of items quite strictly comparable on both the elite and the
mass level. The bulk of the 1984 analysis rests on the same
single-item indicator of ideological predisposition and five
multi-item measures of policy preference or symbolic political
values. The single-item self-designation of ideological position
provides direct continuity with 1980. A second measure is
based on a combination of social-issue questions touching on
race, gender, and moral issues, such as abortion and gender
equality. As a direct counterpart, a third indicator reflects at-
titudes toward various New Politics groups concerned with the
new social issues: the Moral Majority, gay rights groups, the
women's movement, and Blacks. A fourth measure, focusing
on foreign policy and defense, is a composite of attitudes on
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three questions of public policy central to the 1984 election.
The fifth examines domestic issues in a series of six questions
pertaining to desired spending levels for such domestic pro-
grams as health, education, and science and technology. The
sixth is an indicator of political values resting once more on
attitudes toward politically relevant groups—this time, groups
involved in traditional party politics: labor unions, business
interests, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conser-
vatives. The composition of the six measures is specified in
Appendix B.
The interpretation of our data analyses in 1984 was facili-
tated by the strict comparability of measurement procedures
followed in assessing each of these six indicators of politically
relevant values both at the mass and the elite level. Substantial
care was taken to ensure that both rank-and-file members of
the electorate and the members of our political elite were asked
precisely the same questions or exposed to the same stimuli.
Each measure of preferences in a given policy domain is based
on the same set of items for both populations of political actors.
To facilitate comparisons among the composite indicators, each
indicator, as well as the ideological self-designation item, has
been transformed alternative to 100 as the most conservative
score.
In sum, our measures of ideological predispositions, issue
preferences, and attitudes toward symbolic political groups
were created in highly comparable fashion for the entire elec-
tion studies sample of the 1984 electorate and for the universe
of activists who were delegates in 1980 or 1984 and who were
active participants in the 1984 presidential campaign. With the
1984 study as a base line for comparison, we have recon-
structed all the measures from the 1980 data collections and
have carried out parallel analyses for the 1980 and 1984 dele-
gates who were activists in 1980 and the 1980 NES national
sample of citizens.
In the original 1980 delegate analysis, presented in Parties
in Transition, the ideological structure of American presiden-
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Table 1. Mean Scores on Issue Index, 1980
Issue index
Number of cases
Issue index
Number of cases
Elite Candidate Preference
DEMOCRATS
22 29 35
295 602 295
REPUBLICANS
61 — 70
386 — 184
44
610
—
—
Groups
47
178
81
571
Mass
49
842
59
527
Source: Warren E. Miller and M. Kent Jennings, Parties in Transition
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 226, 228.
Index scores range from 0 (liberal) to 100 (conservative). See Parties in
Transition for definitions of the candidate preference groups.
tial politics was observed to be strongly affected by three sets
of elements common to the structure of electoral competition.
The first and most important of the sets is made up of the two
political parties as each is represented on both mass and elite
levels. Interparty differences on both levels were observed in
1980 and reassessed in 1984. The 1980 observations were then
extended to include intraparty differences created by factional
competition within the elites in the struggles for party lead-
ership and nomination. The candidate preferences of the elite
participants in the campaigns are thus treated as a second set
of variation in linkages between political activists and political
supporters. The third is found in the circulation of the political
elites. The present analysis seeks further evidence that mobi-
lization and disengagement contribute to the waxing and wan-
ing of both intra- and interparty differences.
The extent of differentiation, both within and between par-
ties, is well represented by Table 1, which depicts mean scores
on the composite issue index used in the 1980 study. Given
the patterns of candidate preference across the three elections
of 1972, 1976, and 1980, it was possible to discern five major
candidate factions within the active Democratic elite in 1980.
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As the table indicates, factional mean scores on the issue index
ranged from a liberal 22 for the "left wing" of the Democratic
party (roughly represented by the pattern of McGovern-Udall-
Kennedy preferences) to a score of 47 represented by former
Carter supporters who opted out of campaign activity in 1980.
All five factions were visibly, if not always significantly, more
liberal than the Democratic rank-and-file, which had a mean
score of 49 on the same issue index. The mean score of Re-
publican counterparts in the mass electorate was a full ten
points higher—that is, more conservative—and their mean
position, in turn, was slightly more liberal than the most liberal
of the Republican elite factions (made up of those who pre-
ferred someone other than Reagan in both 1976 and 1980).
The gap between this representation of the most liberal Re-
publican wing (with a score of 61) and the stalwart conservative
faction, made up of those who preferred Reagan both years
(scoring 81), was virtually as great as that between the left and
the right wings of the Democratic party.
Without repeating and updating the earlier analysis, the im-
pact of the third factor influencing mass elite linkages can be
seen in Table 2. As of the 1980 campaign, the circulating
elements of the Democratic elite had produced a small drift to
the right simply through its changing composition. Our rather
detailed analysis of both net and gross estimates of change
among the Democrats argues that the move to the right did not
result simply from the high rate of disengagement of McGovern
and Udall supporters; in fact, those in their ranks who did drop
out after the 1972 election were among the more conservative,
not the more liberal, of their numbers. The Democratic move
to the right occurred because those who were mobilized after
the 1972 election, particularly for Carter's nomination in 1976,
were more conservative than the continuing core of activists
whom they joined in the 1980 campaign, or even the relatively
conservative dropouts whom they replaced.
A quite different consequence of elite circulation appeared
among Republicans: there, the drift to the right that paralleled
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Table 2. Mean Scores on Issue Index, 1980, for Circulating
Components of Party Elites
Mobilized Continuously Disengaged
after 1972 Active 1972-80 after 1972
Democrats 40 35 37
Number of cases 338 1344 415
Republicans 74 73 64
Number of cases 208 1088 140
Source: Warren E. Miller and M. Kent Jennings, Parties in Transition
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 137.
Index scores range from 0 (liberal) to 100 (conservative). Definitions of
circulating components may be found in Parties in Transition, Table 2.3,
p. 36.
the net move on the Democratic side was produced almost
entirely by the disengagement of the more liberal among the
Republican elite. The net result was a continuation of the po-
larization of partisan elites that had been developing over the
preceding eight years.
We are short on directly comparable data for earlier years,
but we would not expect a broader historical sweep to indicate
that the period of the 1980s is spectacularly unique. Certainly
intraparty differences among both Democrats and Republicans
have often been noted in the past. And despite those who
sometimes characterize the American two-party system as the
politics of Tweedledum and Tweedledee, there has long been
evidence that persistent party differences of substantial mag-
nitude have shaped our national political contests.15
Partisan Polarization
and Factionalism,
1980 and 1984
First interpretations of the 1984 Reagan landslide concluded
that the election had produced a mandate for continuation of
the national shift to the right on matters of ideology and public
policy. Second and third thoughts took into account the absence
of persuasive supporting data concerning any such ideological
intent of the mass electorate. First tentatively and then with
greater certitude, conventional wisdom shifted.
On the Democratic side the initial reaction had been that a
continued repudiation of the "New Deal"/"New Frontier"/
"Great Society" programs meant (in 1985) that the contest for
the presidency in 1988 must be pursued with centrist candidates
who could not be tarred with the big government, high-
spending brush. Among Republicans, the question seemed to
be largely which wing on the right, the secular or the religious,
would be better suited to continue the sponsorship of programs
that reduce the federal government's presence on the domestic
front while increasing support for a militarily oriented anti-
Communist foreign policy.1
Sober reexamination of the many and varied studies of pub-
lic opinion that followed the 1984 election altered these com-
plementary scenarios. Postelection analyses made clear that
attitudes on spending for defense and domestic social policies
had undergone dramatic reversals during the first four years of
the Reagan presidency. Public exposure to arguments between
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the Democrat-controlled House and the Republican Adminis-
tration over the size of the defense budget led to a clear-cut
plurality of preferences in 1984 for an absolute reduction, not
merely a slowdown, in defense spending. Although sentiment
concerning domestic spending changed less dramatically, there
was also a massive shift away from the earlier demand for
decreases in governmental spending and activity. On virtually
every front having to do with the role of the government in
the affairs of the society, 1984 saw an end to the demand for
more conservative policies and often witnessed substantial sup-
port for returning to more spending and greater governmental
activity.2
Measuring Change, 1980-84
The data base available for documenting simultaneous con-
clusions about both party elites and party masses, relevant to
the question of national ideological change, is less substantial
than we might like. As noted earlier, in the attempt to maximize
similarities between mass and elite in the 1984 data collections,
the overlap between the 1980 and 1984 elite collections was
severely truncated. Limiting the analysis to elite changes be-
tween 1980 and 1984 and limiting the inspection of change
among party followers to precisely comparable evidence leaves
only the eight specific indicators (see Chapter 1) for both years.
Nevertheless, because the patterns of change exposed by those
eight items fit all that we know more substantially about the
overall patterns of change in the electoral mass, we are con-
fident that we can extend those conclusions to summarize simi-
lar patterns of change among the presidential party elites.
The first four years of the Reagan presidency produced a
visible extension of the ideological polarization of the parties
that had taken place during the later 1970s (discussed at length
in Parties in Transition). In the first instance there was an
increase in the magnitude of difference separating Democratic
from Republican elites and Democratic from Republican rank
Partisan Polarization & Factionalism 17
Table 3. Intraparty Changes in Ideology and Policy Preferences,
1980-84
Ideology
Abortion
Moral Majority
Women's
movement
Blacks
Busing
Defense
Detente
Democratic Party
Elites ]
+ 11
+ 19
+ 7
+ 27
+ 1
+ 12
+ 74
+ 25
Rank & File
+ 6
+ 11
+ 1
+ 16
- 8
- 3
+ 58
+ 2
Republican Party
Elites ',
+ 1
- 8
+ 13
+ 13
- 1 9
+ 13
+ 32
+ 22
Rank & File
+ 2
- 4
- 1
- 2 9
0
+ 5
+ 10
- 2 1
Entries reflect percentage-point changes in group means between 1980
and 1984. A plus ( + ) indicates a net shift in the liberal direction; a minus
( —) reflects a shift in the conservative direction. Wording of items and
scoring of responses are described in Appendix B.
and file. This was the result of somewhat different changes
that took place within each of these four party groups.
As Table 3 reveals, there was substantial variation, item by
item, in the pattern of change among party rank-and-file sup-
porters. Nevertheless, among Republicans there is marginal
evidence of a limited overall shift of mass supporters to the
right, although changes in the sense of being a liberal or a
conservative do not fit the pattern formed by four of the other
seven specific items. Among rank-and-file Democrats, four of
the eight single-item indicators appear to reflect varying de-
grees of movement to the left, a movement that permeated all
but the racial domain. Although neither set of party supporters
appeared to undergo any very dramatic change between the
two years, the net result of two minor countervailing move-
ments produced a slight increase in party polarization among
the rank-and-file supporters of the two parties.
Within the presidential party elites, the picture of change
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among the Republican activists was not as ambiguous as among
the Republican rank and file. Although two items suggested a
movement to the right, four items indicated even larger move-
ments to the left; and the net result was a clear leftward drift
among Republican activists. Their Democratic counterparts
moved quite visibly, and somewhat further, in the same di-
rection. With only one exception, the indicators produced
marked evidence of increasing support for liberal sentiments
among Democratic elite activists.
Because the number of Democratic elites moving to the left
so thoroughly outnumbered the leftward drifting Republicans,
the net result at the elite level was an increase of interparty
differences of about the same magnitude as that witnessed
among the rank and file. Contrary to popular wisdom, there-
fore, it seems fair to characterize aggregate changes in ideo-
logical predispositions and policy preferences between 1980
and 1984 as having produced a general movement to the left,
accompanied by a small increase in the magnitude of Demo-
cratic and Republican differences, among both the party elites
and rank-and-file party supporters.
The differences across the various items indicating ideo-
logical or issue preferences are highlighted in Table 4. Clearly,
attitudes toward the Moral Majority made no contribution to
the overall increase in party polarization. Three other items
reflect increased polarization on one level but not in the other,
but the remaining four items indicate substantial increases in
Democratic-Republican differences on both elite and mass lev-
els.
The evidence of increased interparty differences is even
more persuasive if we relax our demands for strict compara-
bility across time. The four multi-item measures of generally
comparable substantive content in both years show that party
differences were accentuated on questions of domestic social
issues and foreign and defense policy; party differences were
maintained in both elite and mass assessments of traditional
partisan group associations; and only in their evaluations of
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Table 4. Changes in Interparty Differences, 1980-84
Ideological self-designation
Abortion
Moral Majority
Women's movement
Blacks
Busing
Defense
Detente
Average
Elites
+ 10
+ 27
- 6
+ 14
+ 20
+ 9
+ 42
+ 3
+ 15
Rank & File
+ 4
+ 15
+ 2
+ 45
- 8
- 8
+ 48
+ 23
+ 15
Entries reflect 1984 increases ( + ) or decreases ( - ) in the 1980 differ-
ences between Democratic and Republican groups. The scores therefore
reflect changes in ideological polarization of the parties between 1980 and
1984.
New Politics groups was there a decrease in party differences
between 1980 and 1984.
While differences between parties were accentuated by the
politics of the early 1980s, intraparty homogeneity increased
within both parties on both mass and elite levels between 1980
and 1984. The increase in intraparty homogeneity and the vola-
tility of the role of party factions in providing structure for dif-
ferences in ideological predispositions are captured in Table 5.
Taking the individual's ideological designation of self as our
illustrative indicator, we found that in 1980 the factional
schisms among the elites of both parties were little short of
astounding. The supporters of Edward Kennedy formed a small
but extreme left wing within the Democratic party, a faction
made up almost exclusively of self-declared liberals. Jimmy
Carter's support both in 1976 at the time of his nomination
and again four years later was, by Democratic elite standards,
relatively conservative. Although the Carter supporters in 1980
were predominantly activists who were liberal by their own
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Table 5. Intraparty Factionalism Reflected in Mean Scores on
Ideological Self-Designation
Elite Supporters Rank & File Supporters
DEMOCRATS
1980 Kennedy
Carter
Point difference
between factions
1984 Hart
Mondale
Point difference
between factions
Change in factional
differences
1980 Reagan
Others
Point difference
between factions
1984 Reagan
Others
Point difference
between factions
Change in factional
differences
+ 81
+ 34
47
+ 70
+ 67
3
44-point reduction
REPUBLICANS
- 9 4
- 4 0
54
- 9 3
- 5 5
38
16-point reduction
+ 15
+ 2
13
+ 19
+ 8
11
2-point reduction
- 4 3
- 4 0
3
- 4 3
- 3 0
13
10-point increase
Entries indicate plurality of liberals over conservatives ( + ), or conser-
vatives over liberals ( —). The measure of ideological self-designation is
described in Appendix B; measures of candidate support in Appendix C.
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lights, the gap between the two party wings was reflected in
a massive 47-percentage-point difference in the preponderance
of liberal over conservative predispositions.
The Republican elite of 1980 were comparably divided, with
virtual unanimity among Reagan supporters producing the aura
of unalloyed conservatism that characterized his candidacy if
not his subsequent presidency. Members of the Republican
presidential elite whose first choice for the nomination in 1980
did not include Ronald Reagan were not numerous, but they
were at least as different from the Reaganites as the Kennedy
supporters were from the Carterites.
In 1980 the elite polarization between intraparty factions as
well as between parties was the more notable because of the
relative homogeneity of the rank and file in both parties. Al-
though ordinary citizens who preferred Kennedy and Reagan
again constituted the polar extremes, they were neither as dif-
ferent from each other nor as different from the other factions
of their respective parties as was the case at the elite level.
By 1984 the gap between leadership factions had narrowed
on both sides. As a clear testimony to Reagan's leadership,
the loyal opposition of those members of the Republican elite
who did not prefer his candidacy had moved visibly to the right
and had reduced the interfactional gap by approximately 16
percentage points. Equally significant as an influence on na-
tional presidential politics in the 1980s was the fact that the
Reagan enthusiasts among the Republican elite were persis-
tently monolithic in their self-declared conservatism in both
1980 and 1984. This single-item indicator of change within
the Republican party elite suggests a movement to the right
that runs counter to much other evidence suggesting a modest
drift in the liberal direction. Given the multiplicity of indicators
available to us, it seems appropriate at this point to emphasize
the evidence of increased party homogeneity on the single mea-
sure that is most comparable for 1980 and 1984.
The most striking and perhaps the most surprising of the
indicators of change among elite factions is the evidence of
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the closing of the ideological gap in 1984 among Democrats.
Gary Hart and Walter Mondale replaced Kennedy and Carter
as the principal contenders, and there were certainly those ob-
servers who saw Hart as the inheritor of the left-leaning, New
Politics contingent that had favored George McGovern, Morris
Udall, and Ted Kennedy before him. The supporting evidence,
however, is exceedingly thin on this point. Both on the general
ideological indicator and on the other measures of policy pref-
erences, the elite activists in the Hart and Mondale camps were
scarcely distinguishable from each other. With both candidates
markedly more liberal than the dominant Carter faction of four
years earlier, the data reinforced our sense of a liberal Demo-
cratic leadership that continued to move to the left during the
1980s despite the resounding electoral victory of the conser-
vative Republican incumbent president.
Among the party rank and file there was a more substantial,
although still modest, indication that Hart supporters tended
to be somewhat more liberal than the Mondale followers. In-
deed, within the mass electorate the differences were of about
the same magnitude as those separating Kennedy and Carter
supporters in 1980. It would be making much ado about very
little to argue an increased homogeneity among rank-and-file
Democratic partisans; the factional wings remained marginally
different from each other and dramatically less "liberal" in
their sentiments than their party's activist elite. Nevertheless,
if there was even a small reduction in the distance between the
contending factions, this stands in at least minor contrast to
the increased differentiation within the Republican party. Just
as the Reagan elite stood unchanging on the extreme right, so
Reagan rank-and-file supporters showed no dilution of their
preponderant commitment to the conservative cause. On the
other hand, the rank-and-file supporters of more centrist Re-
publican candidates had actually moved a very small distance
toward the center. Since the evidence here is limited to a single
measure, and the evidence of intraparty changes could have
been produced by a shift from conservative to liberal on the
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part of only 5 percent of those not preferring Reagan, over-
interpretation of the data is a clear and present danger. Never-
theless, there may be real political significance in the fact that
the Republican rank and file at least did not follow their leaders
in the minimization of factional differences in the midst of the
Reagan presidency.
Just as the party elites provide the dramatic contrasts in
interparty ideological polarization, so they provide the more
dramatic evidence of intraparty dynamics that produce change
in factional alignments. The contrasts as well as the similarities
between 1980 and 1984 are evidence that candidacies may both
disclose and obscure the factionalism that is ever a part of
national politics. At the same time, the two centers of national
mass partisan strength stand as more or less pale reflectors of
the leadership's opinion, and suggest rather glacierlike move-
ment across limited periods of time. Elsewhere we have noted
a conclusion to which I shall return: namely, the ideological
revolution in American politics during the Reagan era was
primarily a revolution at the top of the Republican power pyra-
mid that was scarcely a consequence of change in the broad
base of partisan support.3
The Measurement of Group Differences
Thus far we have approached the topic of similarities and
differences among party masses and elites entirely by com-
paring and contrasting mean positions of different groups of
political actors. The mean is in many ways the most simple
and understandable base for comparison, and it is probably the
implicit measure used in ordinary political discourse. One can
emphasize simplicity, however, only at the cost of ignoring
other information that might provide some insight into how
similar and how different two groups of political actors are.
Every group mean, or average, is a summary of a "distribution"
that portrays each individual member's contribution to the
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group mean. The full distribution reveals whether the mean is
also the median—dividing the group into an equal number of
people above and below—or the modal value shared by the
largest proportion of the group being "measured." The same
mean may be produced by a sharply divided group in which
large concentrations of members at either extreme largely can-
cel each other out, or it may characterize a group in which
virtually everybody is at or near the average location on the
measure. And neither the concentration around the mean nor
the polarizations remote from it would be distinguishable from
a relatively flat "rectangular" distribution that produced the
same average. In comparing elites with rank-and-file voters,
we were interested in knowing more than that the various group
means were similar or different. Our interest included com-
parisons of the full distributions.
To capture information about differing distributions beyond
the differences of means, we turned to a somewhat more sen-
sitive and complex device—the correlation, a standard statistic
for comparing groups. If two groups are identical with regard
to means and the other statistical characteristics of an attribute
on which they are being compared, the full distributions of the
attributes will be very similar, and the differences between
them will approach the value of zero. As the groups diverge,
the correlation between the distinctions separating the groups
(Democrats from Republicans, for example, or elites from
masses) and their respective distributions on the attribute being
compared (attitudes toward New Politics groups, for example)
will increase up to the point where they are completely dif-
ferent. More often, there will be large but less than perfect
correlations between being a member of one group (Democratic
elite) characterized by a high score on attribute X (liberal pre-
disposition) and being a member of a second group (Republican
elite) characterized by a very low score on the same attribute.
By the same token, if the groups are not very different, there
may be a very low correlation between being a member of one
or another elite group (Hart supporters or Mondale supporters)
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Table 6. Dissimilarities between Activists and Rank and File,
Measured by Ideological Self-Designations
Democrats
1980
Overall
Supporters of Kennedy
Supporters of Carter
1984
Overall
Supporters of Mondale
Supporters of Hart
.31
.54
.18
.38
.38
.40
Republicans
1980
Overall
Supporters of Reagan
Supporters of others
1984
Overall
Supporters of Reagan
Supporters of others
.33
.50
.04
.36
.45
.07
Entries are correlations between ideological self-designation scores of
elites and rank-and-file party followers: the larger the correlation, the greater
the differences in the scores.
and having a unique sense of ideological self-designation (lib-
eral, moderate or conservative).
By examining the simple correlations produced by com-
paring the distributions of two groups, one obtains a somewhat
revised sense of the similarities deduced from the preceding
table. Table 6 shows that the net result of changes in distri-
butions of ideological self-designation among Republicans be-
tween 1980 and 1984 did very little to alter the similarities or
differences between Republican leaders and Republican fol-
lowers. In 1980 the comparison of all Republican elites with
the national Republican rank and file produced a measure of
dissimilarity—a correlation (r)—of .33, closer to complete
similarity (.00) than to maximum difference (1.00) yet distin-
guishable from identity. Four years later the degree of simi-
larity was virtually the same: .36 instead of .33. Subdividing
both elite and mass populations into party factions shows that
in 1980 elite Reagan supporters were markedly different from
rank-and-file Reagan supporters (r = .50), and four years later
there had been only a slight increase in similarity (to r = .45).
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By contrast, in both years the elite members of the non-Reagan
wing of the party were very similar to the rank-and-file Re-
publicans who shared their relative lack of enthusiasm for Rea-
gan. The change in the elites' mean positions noted in Table
5 did not seriously intrude on this similarity, and four years
later the great similarity of the mass and elite groups, reflected
in the 1980 correlation of .04, was still present in the correlation
of.07.
Changes in the mean positions of Democratic elite groups
had been much more dramatic than those on the Republican
side and, in turn, produced evidence of greater change in the
extent of mass-elite linkage. In no instance among Democrats
was there evidence of the close similarity observed between
non-Reaganite Republicans. The strongest indicator of mass-
elite rapport among Democrats was provided by the relative
similarity of ideological predispositions among Carter's sup-
porters when the correlation or dissimilarity score (mass and
elite in 1980) was only .18. In that year, just as the relative
extremity of the Reagan elite was reflected in a substantial
degree of estrangement from his rank and file supporters (r =
.50), the elite supporting Kennedy were at least equally dif-
ferent from his mass base of support in the electorate (r =
.54).
The closing of the factional gap among the Democratic elite
four years later produced two sets of candidate supporters that
were very much alike. The respective degrees of similarity
with their rank-and-file bases reflected much less rapport than
had been enjoyed in the Carter camp four years earlier, al-
though both Hart and Mondale were less distant from their
mass bases than the Kennedy elite had been in 1980.
Returning to the topic of intraparty factionalism, with the
new measure of group similarities and dissimilarities we can
replicate our earlier report of factionalism pertaining to the
single indicator of ideological self-designation and then extend
the analysis to the other seven single-item measures of policy
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Table 7. Changes in Intraparty Factionalism between 1980 and
1984
Ideological self-
designation
Abortion
Moral Majority
Women's movement
Blacks
Busing
Defense
Detente
Average
Within
Democratic
Elites
- . 3 7
.00
- . 0 5
- . 1 9
- . 1 2
- . 1 3
- . 1 9
.00
- . 1 3
Within
Democratic
Rank&
File
- . 0 3
+ .02
+ .10
+ .03
- . 0 3
+ .08
- . 0 2
+ .02
+ .02
Within
Republican
Elites
- . 0 8
- . 0 5
- . 0 9
- . 1 7
- . 0 7
- . 1 3
+ .01
- . 1 4
- . 0 9
Within
Republican
Rank &
File
+ .06
- . 1 1
- . 1 2
- . 1 2
- . 1 5
- . 0 3
+ .06
+ .07
- . 0 4
Entries are correlations based on differences in correlations between
scores for candidate preference groups in 1980 and 1984. Minus ( - ) in-
dicates a decrease in intraparty differences, therefore an increase in intraparty
homogeneity; conversely; plus ( + ) reflects an increase in intraparty fac-
tionalism.
preference common to our 1980 and 1984 investigations. As
Table 7 documents, the correlational measure supports our
earlier conclusions in all four comparisons of the single mea-
sure of liberal-conservative predispositions. Intraparty faction-
alism declined everywhere except among the Republican
masses, where factionalism increased. On the other hand, ex-
tending the analysis to include other indicators of policy pref-
erence produces a modification of our general description of
intraparty change, but largely where the Republican rank and
file is concerned.
We earlier noted and can now reaffirm a marked decline
in factionalism within the Democratic elite. The increase in
party homogeneity was greatest on the measure of liberal-
28 WITHOUT CONSENT
conservative predispositions, but although the magnitude of
this change was not matched on any other policy measure, five
of the remaining seven individual items also reflected decreased
factionalism among Democratic activists. Within the Repub-
lican elite, the overall pattern of change was very much like
that of the Democrats in all but matters of detail. The overall
pattern of reduced factionalism was more uniform among Re-
publicans, and—except for the one item reflecting ideological
self-designation—of the same magnitude as for the Democrats.
At the mass level the marginality of the earlier evidence of
reduced factionalism among Democrats is reinforced by the
overall pattern of marginal changes in varying directions on
the other seven indicators of party homogeneity. The overall
average suggests a minimal increase in factionalism, largely
the consequence of increased disagreement concerning the
Moral Majority and busing. However, the prudent conclusion
would still seem to emphasize the limited nature of overall
changes in the factionalism of rank-and-file Democrats.
Among the Republican masses the extension of our analysis
to include other content domains alters the conclusion that
Republican supporters defied the general trend toward less in-
traparty factionalism. The full array of eight measures of fac-
tionalism underscores the limitations of any single, simple
generalization. Where the new moral issues and the groups
relevant to social change were concerned, Republican rank-
and-file supporters reflected the more general pattern of
decreased intraparty factionalism. At the same time, their atti-
tude toward defense and detente fit the "deviant" pattern
of increased factionalism first observed on the measure of
liberal-conservative predispositions. The clarity of these latter
assessments undercuts any hasty acceptance of an overall "av-
erage" figure suggesting a pervasive decrease in factionalism
within the Republican masses.
In general, it would seem best to conclude that both sets of
party elites experienced a diminution of factionalism between
1980 and 1984, while neither set of rank-and-file supporters
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Table 8. Measures of Interparty Polarization
Ideological self-
designation
Pro-life1
Abortion
Moral Majority1
Gay rights1
ERA
Aid to women
Women's
movement
Blacks1
Busing
Inflation
Pollution
Defense
Detente
Central America
Average
1980
.72
.28
.64
.68
.62
.46
.53
.59
.51
.53
.48
.55
Elites
1984
.76
.43
.42
.69
.56
.62
.67
.51
.56
.72
.53
.70
.60
Change
+ 04
+ 14
+ 05
+ 05
+ 05
+ 03
+ 19
+ 05
+ 05
Rank&
1980
.34
.01
.06
.17
.17
.19
.21
.16
.14
.19
.07
.16
1984
.37
.11
.06
.10
.15
.21
.26
.09
.16
.28
.20
.17
.18
File
Change
+ 03
+ 05
+ 04
+ 09
- 1 0
- 0 5
+ 09
+ 13
+ 02
Entries are correlations (r) between Democratic and Republican scores:
the larger the correlation, the greater the difference. Plus ( + ) indicates
increased interparty polarization; minus ( —) indicates increased similarity,
decreased polarization.
'Scores based on "feeling thermometer" ratings; other scores are based
on single items; both are described in Appendix B.
revealed a like degree of change either enhancing or minimiz-
ing party cohesiveness.
Applying the same correlational measure of group similari-
ties to our analysis of interparty polarization produces a
straightforward confirmation of the more limited analysis based
on Table 4. Although there are some variations in the mag-
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nitude of the different measures, evidence of increased or de-
creased partisan polarization is matched item for item in Tables
4 and 8. Between 1980 and 1984 there was an increase in
interparty differentiation on all eight of the measures of policy-
relevant attitudes of party elites and on six of the eight measures
of the preferences of party masses.
Mass-Elite Similarities
By the midpoint of the Reagan presidency, the polarization of
Democrats and Republicans was sharply evident on all six of
the general multiple-item indicators of policy preferences and
issue positions derived from our 1984 data collection. Differ-
ences were, as in 1980, much sharper among elite activists
than among rank-and-file party supporters. And as Tables 9
and 10 indicate, there were substantial variations in the mag-
nitude of interparty differences among the six content domains
that we shall examine throughout this discussion.
Whether the pattern of differences across the six indicators
contains any surprises largely depends on one's expectations.
For instance, in retrospect, it does not seem surprising to dis-
cover that at both elite and mass levels, partisans are most
sharply differentiated by the traditional associations of eco-
nomic and ideological group interests that have long distin-
guished Democrats from Republicans. Our measure, based on
ratings of the traditional groups associated with partisan politics
(Democrats, Republicans, union leaders, business leaders, lib-
erals, and conservatives) reveals almost no overlap in the dis-
tributions of Democratic and Republican elite activists, with
respective means of 21 and 89 and a dissimilarity score of .89.
Partisan differences among rank-and-file party supporters are
not quite as sharp, yet there is no question that party identifiers
differ markedly in the appraisal of these groups. The means
for the mass samples of Democrats and Republicans are 37
and 66, respectively, and the dissimilarity score is .63.
Given the attention accorded many of the new political
themes concerned with moral and social issues in the early
Table 9. Distributions and Means of Elite Policy Preferences 1984 to
Liberal
Center
Conservative
Mean
Number of cases
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
11
32
29
21
7
2
—
32
996
Rep.
—
3
15
34
38
9
72
906
Social
Issue
Dem.
24
19
9
13
10
10
1
2
—
27
585
Rep.
1
1
3
15
12
17
28
27
5
70
469
Foreign
Policy
Dem.
57
16
16
6
4
1
1
15
1047
Rep.
4
4
11
14
23
16
28
67
946
Domestic
Spending
Dem.
7
11
17
18
18
14
7
4
2
1
1
29
1013
Rep.
—
1
2
4
10
13
19
18
14
8
9
56
912
New
Politics
Dem.
0
—
31
16
22
12
—
10
5
4
1
—
39
964
Rep.
0
0
2
4
9
12
3
21
27
21
4
1
64
862
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
22
14
23
11
11
6
3
2
1
1
—
—
21
946
Rep.
—
0
0
0
—
2
3
5
8
17
22
43
89
884
See Appendix B for descriptions of the measures. Means are based on a standard transformation of all measures to a scale
ranging from 0 (liberal) to 100 (conservative). Appendix B describes each transformation.
Table 10. Distributions and Means of Mass Policy Preferences 1984
Liberal
Center
Conservative
Mean
Number of cases
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
3
12
13
58
9
6
1
46
1063
Rep.
3
3
42
23
24
3
61
877
Social
Issue
Dem.
2
4
5
16
21
21
20
6
1
54
424
Rep.
1
9
9
19
25
25
15
4
64
378
Foreign
Policy
Dem.
16
—
12
23
-
25
15
7
3
40
1060
Rep.
4
15
7
15
25
25
14
10
57
871
Domestic
Spending
Dem.
6
1
20
20
18
13
3
2
1
—
—
25
543
Rep.
1
0
12
12
20
24
9
6
2
1
—
34
502
New
Politics
Dem.
0
0
15
16
22
17
15
7
4
2
3
46
771
Rep.
0
5
8
12
20
15
21
14
7
2
2
52
688
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
5
0
12
12
19
15
19
7
4
2
1
—
—
37
111
Rep.
0
—
—
1
4
8
19
13
17
12
13
6
8
66
703
-E
li
B
Jim
il
B.ies
See Appendix B for descriptions of measures and scores underlying the computation of means.
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1980s, it may come as a surprise to note that among our six
indices, partisan differentiation is least pronounced on the mea-
sure assessing positive and negative attitudes toward New Poli-
tics groups (including women's liberation, gay rights, Moral
Majority, and pro-choice groups). Both the differences of party
means and the correlation measures of party dissimilarity reveal
relatively limited interparty differences in this domain. The
policy questions providing a direct reflection of attitudes on
the new social issues produce somewhat greater differentiation
between Democrats and Republicans, but—particularly among
the mass supporters—the differences are minute when com-
pared to the clear agreement to disagree in assessments of
traditional partisan associations.
A second contrast with the political rhetoric of the 1980s is
the surprising lack of party differentiation on questions con-
cerning preferences for change in the level of governmental
expenditure for domestic programs. The indicator of attitudes
toward financial support for domestic programs proved to be
unique among the indicators in many of our subsequent analy-
ses. Mass partisans differed less in their attitudes toward spend-
ing than in any other of the six domains except regard for New
Politics groups. It is also of interest to note a deviation from
the usual pattern of elite activists being more extreme than
rank-and-file partisans. The very considerable support for do-
mestic spending that can be noted among Democratic elites
was exceeded slightly by support, or demand, for increased
expenditures on the part of the Democratic rank and file. The
topic of domestic spending was also the only one of the six in
which the Republican rank and file actually joined Democrats,
elite and mass, in a predominantly liberal preference for in-
creased expenditures.
As a final note of discontinuity with public rhetoric on this
topic, it can be seen that Republican elite activists were almost
evenly divided on the question of spending, with only a modest
plurality favoring reductions rather than increases. All told,
because of the strong support for increased spending among
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Table 11. Mean Scores for Policy Preferences, 1984
Policy Domain
Liberal/
conservative
Social issues
Foreign
Spending
New Politics
Traditional
groups
Dem.
32*
27
15
29
39
21
Elite
Rep.
72
70
67
56
64
89
Dem.
46
54
40
25
46
37
Mass
Rep.
61
64
57
34
52
66
The entries are taken from Tables 9 and 10.
rank-and-file Democrats and in the absence of Republican pref-
erences in step with the Reagan anti-spending rhetoric, attitudes
toward spending join attitudes toward groups associated with
New Politics and toward social issues in reflecting minimal
differences between rank-and-file partisans. Other relation-
ships between masses and elite groups are somewhat more
complex.
The general pattern of sharp interparty differences accom-
panied by clear-cut intraparty differences between masses and
elites reappears when we examine mean scores, or our cor-
relational assessments of dissimilarities, associated with our
indicators of liberal or conservative self-designation and atti-
tudes toward foreign policy. Both indicators join attitudes to-
ward traditional political groups in creating a picture of national
partisan politics that is sharply polarized, at both elite and mass
levels, over questions of basic political philosophy.
The similarities and differences in partisan polarization
among both activists and rank-and-file supporters are conveyed
in Table 11. There, one can also see at a glance the varying
magnitudes of interparty differences associated with each of
our six substantive domains. That information is further sum-
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Table 12. Interparty Differences in Policy Preferences, 1984
Policy Domain
Liberal/
conservative
Social issues
Foreign policy
Domestic
spending
New Politics
groups
Traditional
groups
Differences
Elite
40
43
52
27
25
68
of Means
Mass
15
10
17
9
6
29
Correlations
Elite
.76
.69
.72
.61
.58
.89
Mass
.37
.26
.31
.29
.15
.63
Means entries show the difference between columns 1 and 2, Table 11,
for elites; columns 3 and 4, Table 11, for mass supporters. Correlations for
the liberal/conservative measure are also found in the top row of Table 8.
All measures reflect Democrat-Republican differences.
marized and presented with a combination of data depicting
mean differences and correlations reflecting dissimilarity in
Table 12. The first two columns of the table reflect the arith-
metic summaries of intraparty differences in elite and mass
means presented in Table 11. The third and fourth columns
present the assessment of differences as correlational mea-
surements of dissimilarity. Although in general the same major
message of relative ideological polarization within a content
domain is conveyed by both measures, some notable exceptions
bear subsequent comment.
The Analytic Paradigm
The ultimate objective of our comparisons of elite activists
and mass partisans is to enable us to explore a variety of mass-
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elite similarities and dissimilarities. The first dramatic jux-
taposition of such comparisons was produced by Herbert
McClosky and his colleagues when they noted that in the
mid-1950s the leaders of the Republican party (represented by
convention delegates to the 1956 convention) had become so
divergent from mass opinion as to leave the Democratic elite
closer than the Republican elite to Republican mass partisans.'
Given the expectation that leaders and followers from a single
party should resemble each other more than should leaders from
one party and the followers from another, what McClosky
found was appropriately taken to be an important commentary
on the ideological structure of partisan politics in the immediate
postwar era. Two decades later Kirkpatrick replicated the
McClosky analysis and discovered that with the onset of party
reform, largely within the Democratic party, it was by then
the Democratic leadership that had so estranged itself from
mass opinion as to leave the opposition elite better matched
with its own Democratic followers (as well as with the Re-
publicans' own rank and file).2 The extent to which the dis-
similarity between Democratic activists and Democratic
supporters dramatized the consequences of institutional re-
forms in the Democratic party provided the foundation for the
Kirkpatrick thesis of the emergence of a "new presidential
elite."
In a sequel to the argument that a new set of ultraliberal,
issue-oriented amateurs had replaced centrist party profession-
als in dominating the Democratic party, the Miller-Jennings
analysis argued that, eight years later, symmetry had been
restored to the two-party system as Republican estrangement
came to equal that of the Democrats. Although our data did
not support the thesis of a return to the circumstances of 1956,
we did argue that the extremism of a very homogeneous ideo-
logical Republican elite had produced a situation in which
Democratic leaders were virtually as close to the Republican
rank and file as were the Republican leaders.3 We also sug-
gested that the stage may have been set for some further shift
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Table 13. Correlational Measures of Elite-Mass Dissimilarity,
1984
Policy Domain
Liberal/
conservative
Social issues
Foreign policy
Democratic
spending
New Politics
Traditional
Dem. Elite-
Dem. Mass
+ .34
+ .50
+ .46
- . 1 1
+ .18
+ .37
Dem. Elite-
Rep. Mass
+ .60
+ .64
+ .66
+ .15
+ .32
+ .76
Rep. Elite-
Dem. Mass
- . 6 0
- . 3 6
- . 4 4
- . 6 6
- . 4 5
- . 8 5
Rep.
Rep.
-
-
-
-
—
-
Elite-
Mass
.30
.13
.19
.52
.33
.57
Entries are correlations (r) between group differences (mass-elite) and
the preference distributions of the groups. Signs indicate whether the elite
group is more liberal than the mass ( + ) or more conservative than the mass
in party and policy preferences, which might well punish the
Republican extremists as their Democratic counterparts had
been punished before them. The election of 1984 proved oth-
erwise. Just as the centrism of Carter provided little electoral
protection against the extreme conservative appeal of Reagan
in 1980, so the estrangement of Republican leadership in 1984
seemed to carry few electoral consequences in the contest with
the centrist Mondale.
It is now clear that whatever else the changes in ideological
patterning of party differences produced between 1980 and
1984, they introduced an element of balance in the juxtapo-
sition of the partisan elites with their followers in the partisan
rank and file. In Table 13, which compares the similarity of
the preferences of the Democratic elites and of the Republican
elites with those of the two partisan masses in six different
domains, a neat picture of symmetry and balance appears in
the substantive domain of ideological predispositions. The
Democratic elites were almost exactly as much more like their
Democratic followers as the Republican elites were more like
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their followers, and there is no apparent difference in the extent
to which Democratic activists resembled Republican masses
and Republican activists resembled Democratic masses. In con-
trast to the sharp interparty differences noted earlier, the dis-
similarity scores on ideological location suggest a modicum of
absolute agreement between leaders and followers in both par-
ties.
This is quite different from the situation revealed by the five
other indicators of policy preferences. On questions of social
issues and foreign policy, Republican activists were much
closer to their rank-and-file supporters than Democrats were
to theirs. And, as seemed to be more generally true of the
juxtapositions of followers and leaders in 1972, Republican
elites were clearly more like Democratic rank and file on social
issues than were the Democratic elites, and they were virtually
tied with the Democratic elites in reflecting Democratic mass
sentiments in foreign policy.
Something close to a mirror image of these mass-elite link-
ages characterized attitudes toward spending and New Politics
groups. The configuration is particularly striking on the Reagan
administration's policy of reducing government spending for
domestic programs. The preferences of the Democratic elites
were remarkably similar to those of the Republican rank and
file, as well as to the Democratic mass-support group. And the
estrangement of the Republican leadership from national public
opinion on this issue put them at a very considerable distance
from their mass supporters as well as from ordinary Democratic
partisans.
Circumstances were less extreme where evaluations of New
Politics groups were concerned, but there, too, the Democratic
leaders equaled the Republican elite in matching Republican
rank-and-file sentiments, while their attitudes were an even
closer match with those of their Democratic followers. As has
been implicit in most such comparisons, this pattern suggests
a political advantage for the Democratic elite where assess-
ments of New Politics groups are concerned. This contrasts
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with the implications of a similar advantage for the Republican
elite in the social-issue domain, even though the individual
issues are political "causes" for four of the five groups included
in the New Politics measure. The differences in the patterns
associated with the two New Politics measures strike us as an
instance of the more general tension between "symbolic poli-
tics" and "real" politics. In an era in which political protest
has been accepted as legitimate on both the left and the right,
the symbolic politics of representing group interests may pro-
duce quite different responses than do disagreements over the
specific public policy issues involved. In this example, Re-
publican leadership has the advantage where the argument is
over public policy alternatives, but Democratic leadership has
the advantage if the contest is defined in terms of symbolic
group politics.
Finally, it is interesting to note that despite the parties' agree-
ment to disagree in their assessments of traditional partisan
groups, the spread between elite and mass mean scores in both
parties indicated a very real limit on intraparty rapport between
leaders and followers. Among Republicans the dissimilarities
of opinion between masses and elites were particularly notable.
On foreign policy matters, Republican leadership virtually
matched Democratic leadership in its similarity to the opinions
of the Democratic mass. This pattern was balanced, in turn,
where sentiments with regard to New Politics actors were con-
cerned. Here Democratic leadership resembled Republican
rank and file as much as did Republican leadership. The relative
similarity of the juxtaposition of liberal and conservative pre-
dispositions was roughly replicated in assessments of tradi-
tional political groups: once more, party leaders were more
like their own followers than like those of the opposition; and
by and large, although the Democratic elite may have had a
small edge, neither party leadership was remarkably closer to
the opposition's rank and file.
From this picture it is impossible to conclude as a general
matter that in 1984 the leadership of either party demonstrated
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greater rapport with national public opinion. Although do-
mestic spending and domestic social issues were nearly tied as
the least polarized of the issue domains, they represented sharp
contrasts in the extent to which there was interparty elite com-
petition for the same set of rank-and-file citizens. On social
issues, Republican leaders edged out Democratic leaders in
reflecting Democratic rank-and-file sentiments; on spending,
Democratic leadership had an even larger edge over Republican
leadership in representing the views of the Republican rank
and file. The apparently straightforward rank-ordering of par-
tisan groups (from Republican elite through to Democratic
elite) was replaced by a much more complex picture of simi-
larities and differences when we moved from the simple jux-
tapositions of means to the more comprehensive correlational
assessments of group similarities and differences.
Interyear Comparisons
A detailed comparison of the data from 1984 with measures
generated four years earlier discloses rather remarkable simi-
larities that are important on both substantive and method-
ological grounds. Despite the limited number of identical items
used in studying both masses and elites in both years, there
were multi-item measurements with high similarity across the
years. Thus, the 1980 study, like the 1984 data collection,
produced a multi-item measure of attitudes toward new social
issues, a measure of sentiments on foreign policy, a single-
item liberal/conservative measure, and measures of attitudes
toward New Politics groups and traditional groups. These were
all similar to the 1984 measures in the same domains, though
by no means identical. To the extent that they are functional
equivalents of each other, the several pairs of measures permit
some interesting cross-year comparisons.
Table 14 displays the means for party masses and party elites
for five indexes in both years. The data are notable primarily
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Table 14. Comparison of Mean Policy Preference Scores
Policy Domain
Liberal/
conservative
1984
1980
Social issues
1984
1980
Foreign policy
1984
1980
New Politics
1984
1980
Traditional
groups
1984
1980
Dem.
32
34
27
35
15
38
39
18
21
23
Elites
Rep.
72
64
70
69
67
77
64
59
89
89
Dem
46
48
54
49
40
59
46
32
37
42
Masses
Rep.
61
62
64
54
57
68
52
43
66
67
Entries are means calculated for indexes standardized to range from 0
(liberal) to 100 (conservative); see Appendix B.
for their indication of relative attitudinal stability among both
masses and elites of both parties. The 1980 differences across
the five domains are almost perfectly preserved in 1984, as are
the general magnitudes of both interparty and intraparty mass-
elite differences. At the same time, these data support the thesis
of modestly increased interparty differences—particularly
among the party elites—on the liberal/conservative measures,
on social issues, and on foreign policy. They indicate minimal
change in assessments of traditional partisan groups, and they
show reduced interparty polarization concerning New Politics.
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The interyear comparisons confirm the leftward drift for the
Democratic elite, but they suggest interdomain variations in
the change of the other three groups.
The general persistence of the attitudinal patterns is the more
remarkable because the 1984 study constitutes a totally inde-
pendent replication of 1980. For the national mass samples,
completely different respondents were selected from two en-
tirely different sampling frames, one created for the 1978 Na-
tional Election Studies and the second drawn in 1982 following
the 1980 census. The noted lack of precise identity in items
that make up the various indexes contributes to the separateness
and independence of the two pairs of data collections. The
1980 population of elites did contain some persons who would
repeat as delegates in 1984, and some 1980 delegates were
active in both years (although not as delegates in 1984); never-
theless, the 1980 elites were largely a different group from the
1984 elites, who were chiefly delegates from that year. Except
for this overlapping of the membership in the two elites, the
two sets of data used in this book set the foundation for a
textbook example of analytic replication. We began analysis
with the assurance that whatever differences we observed be-
tween 1980 and 1984, they were not the consequence of dis-
tributional differences imposed by the independence of our
statistical bases. And we can conclude with the assurance that
virtually all our conclusions (except those pertaining to inter-
year comparisons) are supported by a precise and detailed rep-
lication of evidentiary tests in 1980.
The contribution of the circulation of elites to linkage be-
tween elite and mass candidate preference groups is reviewed
briefly in Table 15. We sorted out three categories from our
universe of sometime delegates: those who were mobilized in
1984 after having been inactive in the 1980 presidential cam-
paign; those who dropped out of the presidential politics in
1984 after having been active delegates in 1980; and those who
were active in both years (differentiated by the three patterns
Table 15. Circulation of Elites and Changes in Mass-Elite Similarities
Activity Pattern
1980
Disengaged
delegate
Continually active
delegate
delegate
nondelegate
but active
Mobilized
inactive
nondelegate
Overall similarity:
1980
1984
1984
Inactive
nondelegate
nondelegate
but active
delegate
delegate
delegate
Mondale
.13
.33
.25
.37
.16
Democrats
Hart
.06
.33
.16
.37
.27
.31
.38
Total
.10
.33
.58
.40
.31
Reagan
.12
.41
.36
.42
.14
Republicans
Other
.04
.02
.02
.10
.03
.33
.36
Total
.06
.33
.30
.37
.13 in1O
U
T<
C }
O
onm
All entries are correlations between elite and rank-and-file policy preference scores: the larger the correlation,
the greater the difference.
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of delegate status that are the logical consequence of our clas-
sification scheme). Some of the same generalizations observed
in the analysis of the 1972-80 elite circulation (reported in
Parties in Transition) reappear. Somewhat paradoxically, in
both the earlier analysis (summarized in Table 2, Chapter 1)
and the present inquiry (reported in Table 15), the continually
active elites in both parties were less like their parties' rank-
and-file followers than are either those who were mobilized or
those who disengaged. There seems to be real irony in the fact
that delegates who dropped out of the role of campaign activist
were most "representative" of their party's rank-and-file sup-
porters. This is quite true for the entire set of party activists
in both parties in 1980 and substantially true for the subsets
who form the candidates' factions in 1984. A second gener-
alization seems to permeate these analyses: those who were
newly mobilized were more like the rank-and-file partisans than
those who were continually active, but slightly less repre-
sentative of rank-and-file distributions of sentiment than the
disengaged whom they replaced. Replenishment of the ranks
apparently helps maintain rapport with the masses, even though
in the short run it may not offset the relative estrangement of
the continually active elite participants.
Despite the similarities in the patterns of mass-elite rela-
tionship in the two analyses, it is appropriate to note that the
theme of replication should always be accompanied by atten-
tion to possible alternative interpretations. We know too little
about the role of leadership as it influences the mobilization
and disengagement of elite activists, and too little about the
circumstances under which individual change and composi-
tional change of elites develop, to be confident that sheer rep-
lication warrants an immediate conclusion. To put it another
way, the sharp differences in the nature of the nominations of
Carter, Mondale, and Reagan must have had different con-
sequences for their supporting elites, but the replication of
results has so far obscured our vision of what those conse-
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quences must have been. While we can proceed with confi-
dence that partisanship and political leadership play major roles
in shaping mass-elite linkages, the contribution of the circu-
lation of the campaign elites must remain a matter of at least
some uncertainty.
Linkage Mechanisms: Party
The importance of party in democratic government is matched
only by the multitude of forms in which party appears. The
one-time classic formulation of party as an entity embodied in
the mind of the elector, in the campaign organization, or in
the organizing structure of government has been outmoded as
it becomes more and more apparent that the manifestations of
party are almost infinitely varied both in form and in substance.
This became more obvious as we tried to locate empirical
evidence for the theoretical origins and consequences of the
various concerns about party that were involved in this study
treating presidential delegate campaign activists as party elites.
We pursued the analogue to party identification in the elec-
torate by asking our elite activists to specify the strength of
the enthusiasm with which they supported their parties: "Please
choose the number [from 1 to 7] that best describes how
strongly you support your political party." Although only small
minorities offered more than minor qualifications to their self-
portrayal as strong party supporters, those minorities add to
our understanding of how party structures ideology among the
political elite.
Our concern for the organizational manifestation of party
was reflected in a question asking the delegates to describe the
strength of the party organization back home: "Is the party
organization in your local community very strong, fairly
strong, not very strong, or not strong at all?" This question
provoked something like a 60-40 split between delegates from
strong organizational settings and those from weak organiza-
tional contexts.
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As an analogue to the traditional assessment of the impor-
tance of party in government, we asked the delegates to indicate
the relative importance of party as a guide to their convention
hall decisions.
As an extension of our interest in establishing the importance
that campaign activists attached to the political party, we asked
for the extent to which the support of party motivated their
campaign activities.
In yet another context we probed for information about the
assistance provided by party in helping the would-be delegate
achieve delegate status.
In most of these contexts it is less than totally clear what
the delegates understood the referent of "party" to be. Thus,
being helped by the party as one worked to become a delegate
may have meant formal support by a party organization, spon-
sorship by party leaders, or some other more amorphous sense
in which "party" provided help to one's candidacy. Even if
party was specified as the focus of campaign activity, it is not
clear whether the meaning was support of party leadership,
support of party principles, or support of party in order to be
on the winning side in the election.
What we have learned about party as a link between leaders
and followers rests on delegates' reported images of party.
Fortunately, it appears that commonalities in their associations
with party, and in their contrasts between party and other po-
litical referents, strongly imply a shared political culture in
which party has common meanings across partisan boundaries
and in many different decision-making contexts. Nevertheless,
one of the by-products of our attempt to understand more fully
the contribution of party to mass-elite linkages has been to
learn, in turn, more about the variety of ways in which the
nature of party is made manifest in the course of the presidential
selection process. Some of these ways will become apparent
as we proceed with our task of specifying the circumstances
or conditions under which there is greater or lesser similarity
in the policy-related attitudes of political activists and their
fellow partisans in the mass electorate.
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Elite Party Support
An examination of variations in linkage associated with dif-
fering degrees of intensity or strength of party identification
among elite activists immediately encounters what appears to
be a substantial paradox concerning the central role of party
as a mechanism for linking mass and elite sentiments. Com-
paring strong party supporters and weak party supporters pro-
vides pervasive evidence, for both parties, that a stronger sense
of party support limits the extent to which elites resemble
masses. The evidence is virtually unbroken, whether one com-
pares national means, mean differences of state level means,
or correlational indicators.
This is not to say there are not variations across our six
indicators. As Table 16 shows, the evidence that weak partisans
among the activists are more likely to resemble fellow partisans
in the electorate at large is ambiguous in our assessments of
1984 Democratic attitudes toward domestic spending.1 And
the findings are virtually null in 1980 for Republicans on ide-
ology and in 1984 for the Democrats with regard to social
issues. At the other extreme, the contrast between strong and
weak party supporters among the activists is clear in the as-
sessments of the traditional partisan groups, and scarcely less
evident in the other three indicators—liberal/conservative ide-
ology, foreign policy, and assessments of New Politics groups.
In five domains, strong party supporters in both parties were
consistently less likely to resemble party rank-and-file follow-
ers than were weak party supporters. This suggests, of course,
that despite the stark differences between the parties portrayed
in Chapter 2, strength of party identification somehow tends
to blur the same differences.
This conclusion is sharply and unequivocally supported on
the Republican side of the aisle. It may be that our line of
demarcation between "strong" and "weak" supporters is re-
sponsible for the party differences; our cutoff point left a
smaller, possibly more unique, set of Republican activists sepa-
rated from their peers than was true on the Democratic side
Table 16. Elite Party Support and Similarity of Mass and Elite Attitudes
Strength of Elite
Party Support
1980
Strong
Weak
Difference
1984
Strong
Weak
Difference
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
.38
.29
- . 0 9
.38
.22
- . 1 6
Rep.
.07
.04
- . 0 3
.35
.06
- . 2 9
Social
Issue
Dem.
.31
.21
- . 1 0
.50
.48
- . 0 2
Rep.
.36
.22
- . 1 4
.15
.02
- . 1 3
Foreign
Policy
Dem. Rep.
.36 .19
.25 .07
- . 1 4 - . 1 2
.47 .23
.33 .02
- . 1 4 - . 2 1
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
.09 .54
.18 .49
+ .09 - .05
New
Politics
Dem.
.33
.20
- . 1 3
.21
.09
- . 1 2
Rep.
.30
.18
- . 1 2
.35
.17
- . 1 8
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
.51
.24
- . 2 7
.45
.16
- . 2 9
Rep.
.61
.36
- . 2 5
.62
.28
- . 3 4
All entries in rows 1, 2 , 4 , and 5 are correlations between policy preference scores of party elites and party rank and file:
the larger the correlation, the greater the elite-mass difference. See Appendix C for the measure of party support. The arithmetic
differences between similarity measures associated with strong and weak party support are scored to reflect the decrease in
similarity associated with strong party support.
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Table 17. Strength of Elite Party Support
Strong
Weak
Number of cases
Dem.
70%
30
100%
828
1980
Rep.
83%
17
100%
520
1984
Dem.
73%
27
100%
1063
Rep.
83%
17
100%
964
See Appendix C for description of the measure of strength of party
support.
(see Table 17). In any event, both in 1980 and 1984, Repub-
lican elites who saw themselves as strong party supporters
were, on the average, more different—state by state—from
their partisan supporters and much more different as a group
from their national rank and file than were weak identifiers.
The suggestion of a national Republican party orthodoxy in
the 1980s is reinforced by our data, and the implications are
extended with the evidence of large gaps between the prefer-
ences and aspirations of the Republican rank and file and the
preferences and commitments of this portion of their party's
elite.
The Republican circumstance concerning the strength of
party loyalty is the more noteworthy because of the contrast it
offers to intraparty factional differences that I discuss at length
later on. As a preview, note that there are pervasive differences
to be observed between the pro-Reagan activists and the
"other" group of the Republican elite in both 1980 and 1984.
However that may be, Republicans even more than Democrats
document the conclusion that although parties provide the
dominant structure for ideological and public policy prefer-
ences of both masses and elites engaged in American politics,
a strong sense of party support on the part of elite activists
may actually be dysfunctional for linking mass and elite issue
preferences.
Table 18. Strength of Party Support and Mean Scores of Elites
Strength of Elite
Party Support
1980
Strong
Weak
Differences
1984
Strong
Weak
Differences
Liberal
Conservative
Dem.
33
34
- 1
31
36
- 5
Rep.
65
60
- 5
74
64
- 1 0
Scores range from 0 (most liberal)
Supporters' among
in Table 16.
the elites
Social
Issue
Dem.
33
38
- 5
27
27
0
to 100 (
are less like those
Rep.
69
64
- 5
70
66
- 4
Foreign
Policy
Dem. Rep.
37 78
40 73
- 3 - 5
14 70
18 56
- 4 - 1 4
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
28 56
31 56
- 3 0
most conservative). Differences indicate the
of the
New
Politics
Dem.
16
23
- 7
38
42
- 4
Rep.
60
55
- 5
65
60
c
extent to which
relatively centrist masses; therefore, the signs ihave the
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
20
32
- 1 2
19
29
- 1 0
Rep.
91
83
- 8
90
80
- 1 0
the scores Strong
same meaning as
g
o§
oo
W
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The crucial insight into the nature of the paradox is provided
by an examination of average or mean scores on our measures
of policy preferences of the elites. First of all, quite predictably,
the modal self-characterization of our delegates identified them
as, by and large, strong party supporters. As Table 17 indicates,
on a scale ranging from 1 (weakest) to 7 (strongest), three out
of four Democratic activists and slightly more than four out of
five Republicans placed themselves at 6 or 7 on the scale. For
1984 we are thus comparing 780 Democratic activists and 800
Republican activists who describe themselves as strong party
supporters with 285 Democrats and 160 Republicans who are
simply less strong, in varying degrees, in their support of party.
With the possible exception of two deviations in 1984—
among Democrats on social issues and Republicans on do-
mestic spending, where there were only very small differences
in the mean scores of stronger and weaker supporters—weak
supporters in both parties were uniformly less extreme in their
mean positions on all measures of policy preference. Thus,
strong Democrats were the most liberal, and strong Republi-
cans the most conservative; with weak Democrats and weak
Republicans being slightly more moderate than their peers. For
instance, Table 18 shows that the 1980 scores on attitudes
toward traditional partisan groups ran from a very liberal 20
for strong Democrats to a more conservative 32 for weaker
Democrats, and from 83 for weak Republicans to a very conser-
vative 91 for strong Republicans. Given the ubiquitous nature
of this pattern, the explication of the "paradox" follows: the
intraparty comparisons of elites with masses are comparisons
between more extreme elites and more moderate elites, each
with a still more moderately positioned party mass. A weaker
subjective sense of support for party elites is characteristically
associated not with ideological extremism but with moderation.
Deviation of weak elite party supporters from the statistical
mean of fellow elite partisans is therefore usually in the di-
rection of the mean position of party followers in the mass
electorate, producing the greater similarity between mass sen-
timents and those of weak party supporters within the elite.
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Descriptively, the lack of congruence of strongly partisan
elites with mass sentiment is not a matter of strong party sup-
porters deviating from a centrist mode to adopt extreme ideo-
logical positions that estrange them from party rank and file.
The situation is properly seen, rather, as one in which weak
party supporters deviate from "extreme" party modes by being
less extreme in their ideological persuasion, not more extreme,
and therefore being more like rank-and-file party supporters,
not less like them. Even though party differences provide the
basic structure for ideological differentiation within the elec-
torate, stronger partisanship on the part of elites separates them
from the modal position of the rank-and-file followers. Activ-
ists who are weak partisans are more similar to their partisan
masses.
It is not uncommon to have American political parties de-
picted as less ideologically polarized than their European bloc
counterparts. Indeed, American politics is frequently charac-
terized as essentially centrist politics. It is now clear that even
though this may be true in a comparative sense, within the
context of the American political system the elite of the two
parties are sharply differentiated and, in comparison with rank-
and-file supporters, the partisan elites can fairly be described
as ideologically polarized. As a consequence, any factor pro-
ducing elite subgroups that are less extreme than the modal
positions for party elites in general will generally produce
subgroups that are more similar to the centrist masses with
whom they are associated.
Party As a Guide to Action
A more easily anticipated contribution of party to mass-elite
linkage is its role as the focal point for guiding or organizing
the sentiments of those participating in nominating conven-
tions. As one part of our interest in the recruitment and mo-
bilization of political activists, we asked elites to describe the
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Table 19. Groups That Helped Delegates
Political party
Presidential candidate
The voters
Social issues groups
Traditional groups
Number of cases
Dem.
32%
18
30
5
16
100%
408
1980
Rep.
41%
40
11
1
7
100%
262
Dem.
25%
30
17
4
24
100%
569
1984
Rep.
59%
16
10
1
14
100%
458
"Other" responses and "not ascertained" are omitted from tables. See
Appendix C for a description of the measure.
sources of assistance to them as they were seeking to become
delegates. Party differences in the volunteered attribution of
sponsorship as depicted in Table 19 were clear and seemed to
fit both party circumstances and subsequent political commen-
tary.
In 1980, with competition for the nomination largely con-
fined to Republicans, Democratic delegates most often reported
that they were aided by party or by voters. Republican delegates
were twice as likely to recall assistance from contending can-
didates, although they also reported a high incidence of aid
from the party. Four years later the circumstances were re-
versed: candidate sponsorship was a weak second among Re-
publicans but dominant among Democrats.
Subsequently, we pursued our interest in the role of the
sponsors of delegates to inquire about which, if any, of the
major recruiting agencies were also the focus of delegate at-
tempts to represent others' points of view during the course of
decision-making in the convention. We pursued this line of in-
quiry in an attempt to recapture the evolving experience of
being a delegate, but with no particular interest in accounting
for the outcome of any convention decision beyond that of the
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nomination itself. Given the extent to which delegates were
"bound" in their pledged support of candidates for nomination,
the referent for our query about representing other points of
view was most likely concerned with the various procedural
or rulemaking activities of the convention. And to the extent
that the information about sponsorship—or representation—
was not focused on decisions with explicit policy implications,
our questioning apparently tapped some very persuasive ori-
entations that guide elite participation. This follows because
differences in attributed representational salience of the various
political phenomena were associated with ubiquitous differ-
ences in mass-elite similarities for both Republican and Demo-
crats, in both 1980 and 1984.
The two questions of delegate sponsorship and delegate rep-
resentation predictable drew highly correlated responses; how-
ever, systematic differences appeared in both parties. Among
both Democratic and Republican elites, but particularly among
Democrats, the question of the focus of representation iden-
tified larger proportions of those who saw themselves as rep-
resenting candidates than of those who reported having been
assisted by a candidate in their efforts to become delegates.
The extent to which candidates dominate presidential politics
is thus emphasized by the increase in the salience of candidacies
in both parties in both years—even after aspiring activists have
become delegates, often with help from some source other than
a candidate.
Among Democrats, from a fourth to a third of those who
reported that they were sponsored by the party subsequently
came to represent a particular candidate in the course of the
convention. In similar fashion, substantial numbers who en-
tered the lists on behalf of traditional issue interests later saw
themselves as representing a candidate in convention delib-
erations. And comparable fractions of those who described
their entry into delegateship as being supported by "the voters"
subsequently moved to represent a candidate. Similar changes
among Republicans produced somewhat similar variations be-
tween preconvention sponsorship and representation in con-
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Table 20. Groups That Delegates Represented in Convention
Political party
Presidential candidate
The voters
Social issues groups
Traditional groups
Number of cases
1980
Dem.
43%
49
8
6
13
100%
431
Rep.
29%
57
8
1
5
100%
275
1984
Dem.
17%
55
7
6
15
100%
594
Rep.
47%
33
8
2
10
100%
476
See Appendix C for a description of the measure.
vention proceedings. Table 20 represents the 1980 and 1984
distributions of responses to the query about representation. It
shows substantial similarities between the two parties with re-
gard to the incidence of representing voters, new social issues,
and more traditional issues. There is, however, a clear differ-
entiation between parties in the extent to which Democrats
reflected the preconvention struggle for the 1984 nomination
in their continuing commitment to candidates, while the Re-
publicans in the year of Reagan's renomination were much
more concerned with representing their image of the Repub-
lican party. Four years earlier, with Reagan undertaking the
challenge of the Democratic incumbent, it was the Republican
delegates who had concentrated on representing candidate in-
terests in the deliberations of the convention.
The correlates of the decisions to represent party rather than
candidates, constituents, or issue commitments present un-
mistakable evidence that party orientations are associated with
providing—or at least facilitating—the linkage between par-
tisan leaders and partisan followers. This stands in strong con-
trast to the role of party as represented by the subjective reports
of the strength of activist support for party.
Among the five alternative foci for representation presented
Table 21. Focus of Representational Efforts and Similarities of Mass-Elite Policy Preferences
Group Represented
1980
Political party
Presidential
candidate
The voters
Social issues groups
Traditional groups
1984
Political party
Presidential
candidate
The voters
Social issues groups
Traditional groups
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
.14
.36
.14
.25
.24
.15
.36
.07
.22
.20
Rep.
- . 0 4
- . 1 1
.00
—
.02
- . 2 0
- . 2 9
- . 1 2
—
- . 1 9
Social
Issues
Dem.
.09
.31
.12
.25
.18
.37
.55
.24
.41
.36
Rep.
- . 2 6
- . 4 0
- . 1 6
—
- . 1 7
- . 0 6
- . 2 3
- . 0 3
—
- . 1 5
Foreign
Policy
i
Dem. Rep.
.17
.34
.13
.25
.18
.22
.43
.17
.24
.26
.09
.21
.07
.12
.13
.27
.05
.15
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
- . 1 6 - . 4 7
- .08 - .54
- . 1 5 - . 3 6
- . 0 1 —
.02 - . 3 1
New
Politics
Dem.
.16
.36
.14
.24
.23
.08
.24
.03
.15
.12
Rep.
- . 2 1
- . 3 5
- . 1 4
—
- . 1 8
- . 2 7
- . 3 1
- . 1 1
—
- . 1 2
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
.28
.51
.25
.32
.37
.21
.37
.06
.23
.32
Rep.
- . 4 5
- . 5 7
- . 2 8
—
- . 2 6
- . 4 8
- . 4 9
- . 2 2
—
- . 3 1
Minus ( —) sign attached to a correlation shows that the elite group is more conservative than its mass partisans. fa
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in Table 21 (four for Republicans, because too few Republican
activists emphasized social issues to provide a reliable estimate
of their positions), among elites in both parties, and on virtually
all of our indicators of policy preferences, those who saw them-
selves as representing party interests in convention decisions
more closely resembled fellow partisans in the national rank
and file than did their numerous colleagues whose commitment
focused on candidate representation.
In a rather remarkable validation of delegates' depiction of
their own representational roles, there are only five cases in
seventy-seven comparisons in which delegates intending to rep-
resent the voters were less representative of their rank-and-file
partisans than was some other set of elite activists. With only
one exception, those representing candidates' interests were
less representative of mass sentiments than were the other
delegate groups. And between the boundaries set by those
representing candidates at one extreme and those directly rep-
resenting voters at the other, the representatives of party vir-
tually always matched or outdid the representatives of issue
groups in providing a match for mass policy preferences. Over-
all, whether the measure is one of attitudinal means or cor-
relational assessments of similarity, party interests as a focus
for convention decision-making were clearly associated with
strong mass-elite linkages.
Once again, the issue of governmental spending played a
somewhat deviant role in 1984. Among Democrats, represen-
tation of party or of voters was least effective in identifying
delegates who shared mass sentiments concerning domestic
spending. The very fact of moderation in policy preferences,
which usually produced greater linkage of elites with masses,
was once again dysfunctional for representation in a domain
in which the mass position was more extreme than the modal
elite position. The visibly more liberal protagonists of issues
and candidates provided a better match for mass preference on
the level of domestic spending than did the more centrist ad-
vocates of party and citizen interests. Apart from this deviation,
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Table 22. Elites' Motives for Presidential Campaign Activity
1980 1984
Work
To work for party
To work for an issue
To help a candidate
Number of cases
Dem.
43%
13
44
100%
313
Rep.
50%
6
44
100%
231
Dem.
37%
24
39
100%
440
Rep.
59%
5
36
100%
357
See Appendix C for a description of the measure.
however, party was apparently a most reliable institution in
enhancing mass-elite similarities.
In the analysis of still later stages in the presidential selection
process, an increasingly familiar set of findings emerges. Par-
ties in Transition paid considerable attention to the changing
salience of party as the inspiration for campaign activity. As
with the structuring of issue preference, noted in the first chap-
ter, it seemed that party, party faction, and the circulation of
party elites all contributed to variations in the importance that
could be assigned to party in 1980 as an entity involved in the
presidential election campaign. And some point was made of
the changes between 1972 and 1980 that restored party to a
position of preeminence among Democrats while largely pre-
serving its status among Republicans.
The consequences of interyear and interparty changes in the
focus of campaign activity in 1980 and 1984 are not radically
different from the changes just noted in representational re-
ferents for convention decision-making. As Table 22 illus-
trates, in 1984 Democrats were more likely to emphasize
candidates in their campaigning, and Republicans were more
likely to reflect the increased salience of party. However, the
relative salience of issues changed more in the context of elec-
tion campaigning than in the earlier, decision-making phase of
Party 61
the process. While Republicans did narrow the gap between
their limited representational interests in issues as against the
greater Democratic emphasis in 1980 (with a Republican dou-
bling of the proportion that represented issue interests by the
1984 convention [see Table 20]), they did not change the in-
cidence of their concern for issues in the campaign activities
of the two convention years. Democrats, on the other hand,
showed about the same level of effort to represent issue in-
terests in the convention of 1984 as in the convention of 1980,
but they were twice as likely in 1984 as in 1980 to report that
they campaigned on behalf of particular issue or policy com-
mitments.
Issues were salient for the efforts of twice as many Demo-
crats as Republicans in the campaign of 1980 (13 percent
against 6 percent). The ratio had increased to 5 to 1 by 1984:
24 percent of Democrats and only 5 percent of Republicans
reported that they campaigned primarily because they "wanted
to work for an issue or for some specific group" (other than
party or candidate). It is of more than passing interest to note
in Table 22 the extent to which Democratic activists quite
apparently reacted and responded to the ideological innovations
of the Reagan administration's first four years with a substantial
increase in their own preoccupation with issues. It may be of
equal interest, although of less obvious consequence, to note
how seldom Republicans characterized their efforts to reelect
Reagan in 1984 as a commitment to any of the issue groups
associated with the New Right in Republican party politics. In
any event, our understanding of the meaning and role of party
in the creation of mass-elite issue preference linkages is fur-
thered largely by the presence of Democrats concerned with
issues as a focus for campaign activity.
Given the importance of party and party faction in the struc-
turing of policy preferences within the national political elite,
it is more than simply "interesting" to observe that elite preoc-
cupations with issues provide the most striking foil against
which to emphasize just how important party is in the linking
Table 23. Motives for Campaigning and Similarities of Mass-Elite Policy Preferences
Liberal Social Foreign Domestic New Traditional
Conservative Issues Policy Spending Politics Groups
Motive Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
1980
Party .19 .00 .12 - . 2 7 .21 - . 1 0 .32 - . 3 6
Issue .28 — .21 — .24 — .27 —
Candidate .28 - . 0 7 .23 - . 3 4 .24 - . 2 0 .15 - . 1 9
1984
Party .14 - . 1 4 .36 - . 0 6 .25 - . 0 8 - . 1 6 - . 4 7 .03 - . 2 2
Issue .33 — .44 — .32 — - . 0 2 — .18 —
Candidate .21 - . 2 3 .37 - . 1 3 .31 - . 2 1 - . 1 4 - . 5 2 .11 - . 2 9
Minus ( —) sign indicates instances in which elites are more conservative than masses.
.46
.41
.21
.24
.29
.21
- . 6 2
—
- . 2 8
- . 4 0
—
- . 4 4 o
_ i
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of mass and elite concerns about ideology, policy, and issues.
First, however, a close scrutiny of the data in Table 23 reveals
that in 14 of 22 comparisons of mass-elite similarities, dele-
gates who campaigned because they were committed to "party
work" were quite clearly more like their rank-and-file coun-
terparts than were delegates who "wanted to help a particular
candidate." Four of the other eight comparisons, all in 1984,
revealed very small differences. The assessments of New Poli-
tics and traditional groups in 1980 produced all four instances
in which candidate support clearly exceeded party in enhancing
mass-elite similarities. The bulk of the evidence most directly
concerning issue preferences (liberalism/conservatism, social
issues, and foreign policy) thus supports the conclusion that
campaigners preoccupied with party more closely resembled
rank-and-file partisans' preferences on issues and ideology than
did campaigning elites preoccupied with their favorite candi-
dates.
Only Democrats had enough interest in issues as the focus
for campaign activities to give us possibly reliable estimates
of mass-elite similarities associated with issue-oriented cam-
paigning. Of the hundreds of elite activists in our sample, only
14 Republicans in 1980 and 19 Republicans in 1984 reported
campaigning primarily on behalf of an issue or a nonparty,
noncandidate group. Among Democrats, the raw numbers in-
our study were 42 issue-oriented campaigners in 1980 and 104
in 1984. In 1984 only the spending issue deviated (again) from
the ten other comparisons of mass-elite similarities. Domestic
spending provided the only setting in which the issue-oriented
Democrats were more similar to rank-and-file partisans than
was true for party- or candidate-oriented campaigners. In 1980
there were no instances in which the issue-oriented were ac-
tually less similar than both candidate- and party-oriented cam-
paigners; in 1984 the issue-oriented took honors in every
domain other than domestic spending for having policy pref-
erences least like those of the Democratic rank and file. Thus,
the spending issue in 1984 provided the only instance in either
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year in which issue-oriented campaigning was associated with
elite representation of mass policy sentiments.2
Although party and party faction may be the carriers of
standing individual differences on matters of ideology and pub-
lic policy preferences, delegates who wish to represent party
interests in the proceedings of the nominating conventions or
who are committed to doing party work more generally in
campaigning are also delegates who are most representative of
ordinary voters' issue positions and policy preferences. Party
indeed seems to provide a persistent linkage connecting the
issue preferences of the partisan citizen to the policy commit-
ments of the partisan elite.
In electoral analyses, party is often played off against issue
voting as a contrasting determinant of electoral decision-
making. That may be appropriate, particularly where new
policy alternatives disrupt established patterns of voting. How-
ever, it now seems quite evident that our understanding of the
role of party in the process of presidential selection must lead
to a generous recognition of the extent to which party binds
leader to follower and structures the policy content of national
political competition.
Party Organization
The role of party in linking mass aspirations to elite commit-
ments has, as previously noted, many manifestations in the
ongoing political process. One of these takes the familiar form
of an organizational presence. The organizational manifesta-
tion of party is present in our study largely through one piece
of information extracted from participating political activists:
their assessments of the strength of the local party organization
back home.
The referent for the appraisal differs in a number of ways
from other assessments of party with which we are concerned
but particularly in the specificity with which it suggests a link-
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ing mechanism connecting masses and elites. For instance, as
noted earlier, without further probing it is impossible to know
the precise referent for the elites' assertions of the strength of
their party support. Individuals may have had in mind com-
parisons with any of a variety of norms in deciding "how
strong" was their support for party, and the "party" that pro-
vided the focus for their campaign efforts may have been a
local party, a state party, or some element of the national party.
But such ambiguity does not pertain where "the party orga-
nization in your community" is concerned.
The geographic specificity of this query suggests another
perspective on the measurement of mass-elite linkages, com-
plementing the comparison of national means and the corre-
lation of national distributions. The possibility of specific
geographic linkage suggests the conceptual and analytic mode
of representational analysis specified by the concept of "dyadic
correlations."3 Central to the concept is the simple fact that
each delegate has some institutional links to one particular
constituency and, therefore, to a specific subset of mass par-
tisans. Given the institutional setting for the selection of dele-
gates, each delegate is in fact a member of a state delegation
that is uniquely linked to a state constituency.
The early representation studies in the mode of the original
Miller-Stokes design took the congressional district (rather than
the state) as the unit of analysis and analyzed the circumstances
under which congressional candidates resembled or failed to
resemble their district constituencies.4 Both in Miller-Stokes
and in the latest version of that design, the Converse-Pierce
analysis of representation in the French assembly,5 the fun-
damental concern was with the conditions that linked candi-
dates to their own constituencies. The basic analytic objective
in both studies was to discover conditions under which co-
variation in elite and mass attitudes was enhanced or inhibited.
The analytic technique was the computation of a correlation
based on the dyadic links between constituency and candidate.
In the literature on representation, the problem of measuring
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mass-elite linkages has been examined with some care, and a
number of alternatives have been proposed. At one time or
another, as in the present work, the analysis of representational
linkage has rested on analytic groups consisting of national
populations of political elites and national populations of rank-
and-file partisans, treated in the manner introduced in Chapter
2. The summary of their positions as reflected by aggregate
means is in common usage. Following the discussion provided
by Robert Weissberg,6 the comparisons of mass and elite have
also been explored through the correlational measure of "col-
lective representation" we have used here and that was also
used in Parties in Transition.
The leading methodological critique of approaches using
correlations based on dyadic comparisons of mass-elite link-
ages was provided by Christopher Achen.7 His analysis was
motivated by skepticism concerning the interpretation of the
correlations used by Miller and Stokes in the early 1960s.
Rejecting the use of such correlations because of fundamental
flaws inherent in their interpretation, Achen suggested at least
two alternative measures—which nevertheless took advantage
of the information that could be obtained by pairing particular
elite actors with specific subsets of rank-and-file constituents.
In the present study we took advantage of some of Achen's
suggestions. We treated the state as a basic unit of analysis,
and we inquired into the match between state "delegations" of
elite activists and state "constituencies" of rank-and-file par-
tisans. The interpretable results of this analysis, however, rest
on comparisons of state means and mean differences of mass
and elite means, not on dyadic correlations.
In many respects, and quite apart from our present interest
in local party organizations, it seems intuitively plausible to
use the state as a basic part of our measurement procedure in
exploring our version of mass-elite linkages. Although it is
clearly true that some aspects of presidential politics are thor-
oughly nationalized, given that the candidacies involved are
national, it is also true that the presidential selection process
is constrained by our federal system of politics. Whether dele-
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gates to nominating conventions are elected in a primary or
selected in a caucus or convention, they become part of a state
delegation. And those who are the direct participants in this
selection are at least nominally limited to choosing fellow resi-
dents of a given state.
Quite apart from the state of residence of the delegates, there
remains a real sense in which the existence of the electoral
college defines fifty separate state elections as the sites for the
ultimate choice between party nominees for the presidency.
Between the springtime selection of delegates and the fall elec-
tion of a president, much of the campaign activity centers on
individual state constituencies. It is clear that election strate-
gies, from the selection of delegates on, are shaped in some
substantial part to fit what are thought to be state-based dif-
ferences among voters.
As Converse and Pierce recognized, there is much merit in
the suggestions made by Achen—particularly when interstate,
compared with intrastate, variance is limited. As a conse-
quence, our analytic procedure was to pursue simultaneously
four modes of assessing the match or congruence between mass
and elite attitudes. As is already evident, (1) some of our
comparisons are comparisons of national means derived from
aggregating individual level data. The means we have reported
so far have been for groups of individuals, where the mean is
a group mean estimated by taking into account each individual
contributing to the distribution of scores within the group. In
similar fashion (2) the correlations we have used to assess
similarity and dissimilarity have been derived by correlating
individual data specifying status differences (such as elite ver-
sus mass) with individual attitudinal differences on each of our
six measures. Just as the magnitude of group differences is
reflected in the difference of their means, so the magnitude of
the same differences is reflected in the extent to which the
distributions of attitudes are correlates of the status differences,
large correlations having the same meaning as large differences
of means.
With the state as a subunit of aggregation for individual
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data, (3) we also computed state-by-state means for each ana-
lytic subset of elites and have examined the differences, state
by state, between those means and the means derived for the
aggregates of Democratic and Republican partisans in each
state. In our exploratory analyses we have compared mean
differences of the state level elite means and mass means.
Finally, (4) we have also correlated the state means for subsets
of elites with the state means for partisan populations within
each state. This has meant a dyadic correlation of state elite
means with state mass means: in 1984, with thirty states, the
correlation matrix for dyadic comparisons had thirty entries
(properly weighted by sample size).
We have then compared all four indications of mass elite
similarities and differences. Three of the measures have proved
to be remarkably comparable across all of our analyses. The
"collective correlations" between pairs of national groups of
individuals and their attitudes, the comparison of national
group means, and the comparison of mean differences of state-
level differences in mass and elite means consistently lend
themselves to very similar interpretations. The fourth measure,
however, the dyadic correlation of the state-level means of
elites linked to the mean attitudes of state rank-and-file popu-
lations, have often revealed the lack of interpretability sug-
gested by Achen.
In some analyses, all four measures of group similarities
and differences led to the same interpretation and the same
conclusions; in others, the consistency was limited to three
measures and did not include the dyadic correlation. Explor-
atory analyses have suggested that these were more often
than not instances in which the ratio of interstate variance to
intrastate variance was very low (eta's of less than .20),
suggesting instability in the estimates of state differences, par-
ticularly where the estimates were for populations of mass
partisans. Throughout the remainder of this book, our conclu-
sions are based on the consistency with which group means
derived from individual data, group differences assessed by
correlating individual level data, and state-based means and
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mean differences based on state-by-state comparisons of elites
and masses lead to uniform interpretation. We have not at-
tempted to reconcile these with dyadic correlations, and I will
not report the numerous instances in which dyadic correlations
appear to add further confirmation to the interpretation sug-
gested by the other three measures. (Because this methodologi-
cal decision was important to a number of our interpretations of
data, the basic information about the ratio of interstate to intrastate
variance is presented in Appendix A.)
In contrast to the sharp and rather uniform differences that
we have seen associated with being a strong party supporter—
emphasizing party in one's campaign efforts or representing
party interests in convention—the perceived strength of party
organization back home apparently makes only a modest con-
tribution to mass-elite differences in either party. This well
may be the case because in eliciting information about the party
organization, our inquiry centered on the question of local party
organizations. With the benefit of hindsight we would now
presume that state organizations would better fit the institu-
tional link between state-selected activists and bodies of state-
defined party supporters. In any event, the available evidence
does not suggest a significant role for local party organizations
in linking elite opinion to mass opinion.
Among Democrats, comparisons of state means do suggest
that strong local organizations link leaders and followers. We
say "suggest" because the analytic differences are small, as
are the differences in national aggregate means, which only
suggest a tendency for elites coming from strong organizational
settings to be more moderate and therefore more like the na-
tional Democratic rank and file. The correlational measures of
elite-mass similarities are comparably ambiguous; only on the
question of liberal/conservative identifications and on the in-
dicator provided by attitudes toward spending for domestic
programs do delegates associated with strong local party or-
ganizations clearly look more like the national Democratic con-
stituency.
Among Republicans the picture is even less clear. Where
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there are no instances of "contradictory" evidence among
Democrats, exactly nine of the eighteen tests (twelve com-
parisons of means and six of correlations) among Republicans
suggest that strong party organizations are dysfunctional for
the representation of mass partisan preferences. Given the na-
tional context described in Chapter 3, in which it seems that
those in control of the Republican party may have become
estranged from their rank-and-file supporters, it is tempting to
conclude that local Republican organizations as well as the
national Republican leadership have let ideological enthusi-
asms carry them afield from their base of electoral support.
Our data suggest that compared with the situation obtaining
for the Democratic party, this may be so—but the fragile nature
of our evidence and the absence of corroborating data foreclose
any firm conclusion. Local Democratic organizations may fa-
cilitate mass-elite linkages in some domains but not in others,
and local Republican organizations may inhibit as often as they
facilitate, but our evidence is limited on both counts.
Electoral Competition
If the representation of party electoral competition interests
in nominating conventions is an analogue to the representation
of party in government, and if party as organization is reflected
in the delegates' report on the strength of their local party
organizations, then party in the electorate may well be rep-
resented by the relative partisan competitiveness in electoral
strength. "Party in the electorate" usually refers to the inci-
dence or the salience of partisan loyalties as determinants of
mass electoral behavior, but our interest was in one of the
consequences or derivations of the incidence of partisanship
of the voters. To the extent that the partisanship of voters
determines the long-term or standing division of the partisan
vote, it sets the context for all political competition, intraparty
as well as interparty.
33%
11
56
100%
920
56%
11
33
100%
839
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Table 24. Elite Perceptions of Partisan Balance in Local Politics,
1984
Perception Democrats Republicans
Republicans dominant
Balanced competition
Democrats dominant
Number of cases
Data not collected in 1980.
In order to examine the relative dominance of the party of
the elites in local partisan competition, in 1984 (only) we asked
each delegate to describe the competitive balance in his or her
local party politics. Democrats and Republicans gave remark-
ably similar descriptions, as depicted in Table 24. Identical
proportions of slightly more than half the activists in each party
reported that they came from areas in which their own party
was dominant; an even third in both parties reported that they
came from areas in which their party was in the minority and
the other party dominant; and almost precisely one in nine in
each party reported coming from an evenly balanced, com-
petitive locale. Given these three alternatives defining the status
of each delegate's party, it is possible to define differences in
partisan context within which to examine similarities between
elites and masses.
One can look for two complementary but different sets of
results. First, a basic tenet of Democratic theory holds that
electoral competition should enhance the representativeness of
elected officials. Of course, other outcomes are possible. As
an example, one of the early investigations using the Miller-
Stokes paradigm for the study of representation in Congress
led to the conclusion that officials representing constituencies
in which their party was clearly dominant tended to resemble
their constituents precisely because, by virtue of their domi-
to
Table 25. Perceived Local Partisan Balance and Mass-Elite Similarities, 1984
Liberal Social Foreign Domestic New Traditional
Conservative Issues Policy Spending Politics Groups
Perception Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
Republicans dominant +.33 - . 2 9 +.53 - . 1 6 +.41 - . 1 9 - . 1 5 - . 5 7 +.18 - . 3 3 +.37 - . 5 6
Competitive party +.20 - . 1 5 +.40 - . 0 3 +.28 - . 0 8 - . 0 8 - . 3 9 +.12 - . 2 0 +.26 - . 3 4
strength
Democrats dominant +.32 - . 2 6 +.47 - . 1 5 +.41 - . 1 8 - . 1 0 - . 5 1 +.16 - . 2 7 +.35 - . 5 1
Dominant vs.
competitive
Minority vs.
dominant
+ 12
+ 1
+ 14
- 3
+ 07
+ 6
+ 13
- 1
+ 13
0
+ 11
- 1
+ 2
+ 5
+ 18
- 6
+ 4
+ 2
+ 13
- 6
+ 9
+ 2
+ 22
- 5
Signs in the upper portion of the table indicate that elites are more or less conservative than are masses. In the second row
from the bottom, the plus ( + ) signs indicate that elites from competitive areas are more similar to their party's mass supporters
than are elites from areas in which their party is dominant. In the bottom row, the plus ( + ) signs indicate that elites from areas
in which their party is dominant are more similar to their party's mass supporters than are elites from areas in which the opposition
is dominant.
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nance, the constituents made up very homogeneous constitu-
encies that were easily represented by fellow partisans.8
In the present analysis we were not necessarily looking at
elected officials, and our measures of interparty balance cer-
tainly had little to do directly with the intrapaity competition
that produced the selection of our elites. Nevertheless, it is of
more than passing interest that the evidence in Table 25 is
unmistakable—and particularly on the Republican side—that
activists from areas in which the parties are evenly balanced
were much more like their fellow partisans in the mass elec-
torate than were delegates elected from areas in which their
own party is clearly dominant.
It is not altogether clear why this should be so. In a rough
sense the evidence is consistent with the notion that competition
encourages responsiveness to constituent demands and thereby
enacts the Downsian law forcing political leaders to centrist
positions more likely to command broad support. However, it
is not completely obvious why Republican leaders from areas
in which their rank-and-file supporters were dominant should
resemble the national population of rank-and-file Republicans
less than did Republican leaders from competitive areas. And
yet with regard to all three measures employing both means
and correlations, the generalization held across all six sub-
stantive domains. It is as though a developed sensitivity to
rank-and-file demands, regardless of party, evokes more at-
tention to fellow partisans as well as to the opposition. The
uniformity of the findings may anticipate our next thesis and
suggest that the absence of competition breeds irresponsibili-
ty—or occasions freedom of conscience—whether in the com-
placent majority or the hopeless minority.
The second set of comparisons explored this possibility by
testing to see whether leaders selected in areas of their own
party's greatest weakness were less constrained to follow their
own party lines and were therefore less like their own rank
and file than leaders selected where their party dominated the
electoral scene. The evidence was different for the two parties.
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With one exception, again in the domain of domestic spending,
Democratic leaders from Republican-dominated locales exhib-
ited means that were slightly more liberal—not more conser-
vative—than those of other Democrats, and Table 25 shows
that mass-elite dissimilarities among Democrats were also
slightly greater in Republican areas on five of the six measures.
In contrary fashion, however, there was a tendency for Re-
publicans elected from Democratic districts also to be more
liberal—not more conservative—than Republicans from areas
in which their own party dominated (still excepting the issue
of domestic spending).
Although we have no additional evidence on the point, these
data are consistent with the thesis that Democratic party leaders
in enemy territory react to the policies of the opposition and
become somewhat more extreme advocates of their own party
positions when their opposition dominates the electoral scene.
It seems also to be true that Republicans from the most com-
petitive areas, where they are most like the Republican rank
and file, are marginally less extreme in their ideological po-
sition and score somewhat less strongly conservative than do
their counterparts from Republican-dominated areas. Another
difference between parties appears, however, because this
theme of competition-induced moderation underlying the
greater congruence did not hold for Democrats. On the Demo-
cratic side, leaders from competitive areas tended to be, if
anything, a bit more liberal (more extreme) than Democrats
from strongly Democratic locales. This leaves the possibility
that the pronounced impact of competition on the accentuation
of mass-elite similarities has more to do with a dominant culture
of political responsiveness and motivation stemming from in-
terparty electoral competition than it does with the direct
mechanisms involved in delegate selection.
Party, then, is not the enemy of ideology in mass electorates;
it is the principal carrier and organizer of mass issue preferences
and helps provide a structure for national politics that articu-
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lates and integrates the issue concerns of leaders and followers.
In its various circumstances and differing guises, it facilitates
the matching of elite policy preferences with mass support for
similar preferences. Sentiments prompted by personal feelings
of party loyalty among elites may not bind them to their sup-
porting masses, but elites who take their cues from party,
whether in convention or in campaign, do exhibit greater than
average rapport with the issue preferences of rank-and-file fel-
low partisans. The natural processes of ongoing presidential
politics in both 1980 and 1984 sustained the primacy of party
and its place in linking mass and elite policy preference.
Linkage Mechanisms:
Ideological Factions
and Issue Representation
Setting the discussion of the role of party in linking mass and
elite policy preferences prior to a discussion of the conse-
quences of elite representation of policy commitments provides
another bit of irony from the analysis. We began our inquiry
in 1972 wanting to learn more about what resulted from the
various recent reforms of the presidential selection process. As
our work evolved, we found evidence that reform priorities
pertaining to the importance of questions of public policy pro-
duced only a temporary reduction of the central importance of
party in Democratic presidential politics. This was part of a
larger conclusion that time-honored competition for political
power provides a marvelous countervailing force to efforts to
reform and redirect the institutions involved in presidential
selection.
In the previous chapter, we reviewed evidence indicating that
the resurgence of devotion to party within the presidential elite
is unmistakably relevant to the active promotion of mass policy
preferences. Now, the discussion comes full circle to examine
evidence produced by the basic dilemma facing political ac-
tivists who are motivated by a commitment to promote policies
and issue positions.
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Issue Representation
At least in the mid 1980s, those most concerned with pre-
senting or representing positions on matters of public policy
were those most out of step with the issue sentiments of the
partisan rank and file. This was particularly true, as one might
expect, regarding the newest issues from domains in which
leaders must almost by definition differ from a lagging, slow-
to-respond constituency. It was also true, however, of more
enduring, long-standing themes.
Our analysis began with two familiar arenas of political
action, the nominating convention and the campaign. In the
last chapter we commented at length on the correlates of spon-
sorship and representational forces in the nominating conven-
tion. Although our major concern was with party, we noted
the repeated pattern in which issues were relegated to a minor
place by most elite activists, particularly in the Republican
party. It is true that early in the selection process, according
to our reconstructions, delegates reporting sponsorship and as-
sistance as they sought to become delegates considered special
interests and issue groups virtually as prominent as the presi-
dential candidates. This was not true for Republicans in 1980,
when the contest for the nomination produced much more con-
vention activity by the candidates, overshadowing the inter-
vention of interest groups in the delegate selection process. In
both the 1980 and 1984 conventions, subsequent delegate ef-
forts to represent both party and candidates in convention de-
cisions decisively outpaced their representation of issue groups.
Although special-interest groups were second only to party in
shaping the selection of delegates, in both years they fell behind
in the incidence of influence as convention decision-making
followed delegate selection. And in both years, delegates' com-
parative assessments of the general importance of pursuing
party- or issue-oriented goals in the convention proceedings
gave an unmistakable priority to party concerns or the pref-
erences of the voters they represented.
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The handful of Democrats at the 1984 convention who did
represent the causes associated with such new social issues
such as abortion, homosexuality, and affirmative action were
not unique in reflecting a substantial lack of rapport with the
policy preferences of rank-and-file Democrats. As noted in the
discussion of Table 21 in the preceding chapter, in both 1980
and 1984 their peers who were representing candidate interests
at the convention exhibited even greater dissimilarity with the
issue preferences of the national population of Democrats.
Nevertheless, Democrats who represented the new social issues
were, in both years, quite remarkably more liberal than their
colleagues in convention (to say nothing of the Democratic
rank and file) and on all six indicators of ideology and policy
preferences.
Democrats representing more traditional issues—including
those pertaining to labor, agriculture, and education—were
predictably more moderate in their issue preferences, but they
provided only a modest improvement over the social-issue ad-
vocates when it came to matching partisan sentiments in the
mass electorate. Although they were more like the masses than
were the candidates' advocates, the data in Table 21 indicate
that they did not match those representing the voters or party
interests on any of our eleven indicators in 1980 and 1984—
save one.
Although virtually all the Democratic elite matched rank-
and-file sentiments concerning governmental spending for do-
mestic programs in 1984, delegates concerned with repre-
senting issues—whether new social issues or traditional social
welfare policies—were, by a good margin, most similar to
national Democratic rank-and-file sentiments on the spending
theme; they outdid all other categories of Democratic delegates
on all three of our methods of measuring similarity on the
question of domestic spending. Since the six-item measure of
attitudes toward spending was the only measure in either year
(1980 or 1984) on which the mass base of a party's support
took a more extreme position than did the party elite, it is
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perhaps not surprising that the views of the ultraliberal dele-
gates who were promoting issue causes turned out to be more
similar to mass sentiments on this issue than were those of
their colleagues.
In view of the prominence accorded the New Right in Re-
publican politics, it is important to note that neither in 1980
nor in 1984 did more than a scattering of Republican dele-
gates in our study report that their own quest for selection as
delegates, or their subsequent efforts at representation in con-
vention, involved the new social issues or the groups pro-
moting a position (presumably conservative) on such issues.
Indeed, there are not enough Republican representatives of so-
cial-issue groups in our study to permit even the most rudimentary
analysis. This accords with evidence indicating that despite the
1972-80 transformation of the Republican elite into a very
homogeneous ideological group, there seemed not to have
been a commensurate increase in their campaign emphasis
on the questions of public policy that united them in their
support of Reagan.'
Republican representation of traditional special interests also
lagged behind that of the Democrats, but there were enough
persons in our study to permit some interesting generalizations
about them in both 1980 and 1984. In 1980 the Republicans
provided a sharp contrast to their Democratic counterparts, as
can be observed in Table 21 (Chapter 4). Republicans repre-
senting traditional interest groups in the 1980 convention were
somewhat more conservative than the party norm; nevertheless,
the correlational estimates of their match with rank-and-file
Republican attitudes in our five policy domains showed their
preferences to be more generally similar to mass preferences
than was true for Republicans representing either party or can-
didate. With some exceptions, the same conclusion was sup-
ported by evidence drawn from state-by-state comparisons of
mass and elite differences. These pieces of evidence are at
least consonant with the conclusion of electoral research that
Reagan's election in 1980 was partially a consequence of na-
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tional preferences for his (and the Republican party's) emphasis
on more conservative national governmental policies.2
Four years later, circumstances had changed. Relative to the
norms set by other Republican delegates, special-interest rep-
resentatives in 1984 were much more conservative than the
rest of their colleagues. Only on the question of spending for
domestic programs were their attitudes visibly more moderate
than those of the other Republican delegates. Thus, by 1984,
issue-oriented Republicans found themselves in much the same
situation as issue-oriented Democrats. Although their conven-
tion behaviors were guided, at least in part, by their commit-
ment to represent organization points of view on questions
relevant to public policy, their own issue preferences, among
those we tapped for measurement, were not closely attuned to
those of others in the party, and they were quite out of line
with mass preferences. Only delegates preoccupied with rep-
resenting their chosen candidates were like them in reflecting,
or representing, mass opinions.
Proceeding chronologically from delegate selection to con-
vention proceedings and on to the campaign, we again en-
countered the limited incidence of Republican concern with
issues. In both 1980 and 1984 only one in twenty of the Re-
publican elite reported that they participated in a presidential
campaign "to work for an issue," as opposed to doing party
work or being committed to a candidate. Therefore, in neither
year is our base for analysis of Republicans very solid. It is,
nevertheless, of interest at the most general level because it
provides further support for some earlier conclusions.
In 1980, it seems that Republican activists who campaigned
on behalf of issues consistently held issue preferences more
like those of the Republican rank and file than was true either
for party workers or for candidate supporters. In contrast to
their peers who represented issue groups in convention, the
issue campaigners apparently achieved their rapport with the
Republican masses at least in part because they were visibly
more moderate in their policy preferences. In all five domains
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they were less conservative than either the party people or the
candidate people. Four years later, relative moderation had
been replaced by absolute extremism, and while rapport with
the rank and file did not dwindle into complete estrangement,
those working for issues had lost their claim to being the most
representative of the campaigners.
Among Democrats the record was clear and unchanging.
Those campaigning on behalf of issues in 1980 were radically
more liberal in each of the five domains. Overall, as a con-
sequence (see Table 23, Chapter 4), they were least repre-
sentative of mass Democratic sentiment. The campaign of 1984
produced a reprise except, once again, for the broad issue of
preferred level for public expenditure: there was an extraor-
dinarily close match between issue campaigners and the na-
tional Democratic rank and file in attitudes toward spending.
This was the only break in an otherwise uniform set of results
illustrating the gap between the issue preferences of the issue-
oriented Democratic elite and those of their partisan support
groups in the electorate.
The evidence for both parties in both years suggests an
important challenge to would-be leaders in the fact that party
regulars, against whom the issue-oriented reformers rebelled,
consistently provided the stronger links between masses and
elites, the greater incidence of representation of mass policy
preferences. Meanwhile, ideological rebels—such as those
who sought reform in the Democratic party, the better to rep-
resent "broad-based grassroots opinion"—may themselves be
substantially out of line as representatives of mass opinion. Of
course, the sins of those in the vanguard making new social
policy should not be visited on their predecessors of earlier
decades. Those who seek change in the name of the public's
interest hope to lead opinion, and we should not expect to find
them mirroring mass opinions about policies they are trying to
change. The evidence reviewed so far certainly illustrates that
representing public opinion involves a different relationship to
that opinion than is involved in changing it.
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This is not to say that the passive mirroring of public opinion
was characteristic of the political elites under investigation
here. Leaving the particulars of the elections of 1980 and 1984
and returning to the broader theme of inter- and intraparty
differences that introduced the discussion in the first chapter,
one immediately finds reflections of the dynamic nature of
contemporary party competition, with clear implications that
large changes are underway in the structuring of policy pref-
erences.
Ideological Factions
Historically, both parties have contained recognized ideo-
logical factions that have persistently defined internal struggles
for the power associated with party leadership. At a later point
we will explore some of the correlates associated with the wings
of each party defined by the party leadership of the past four
decades. First, however, we need to examine intraparty differ-
ences defined by the contemporary self-identification of elites
as liberals, centrists, and conservatives. The foregoing chapters
have used the basic information on ideological identification
as a "dependent variable," a criterion variable for assessing
mass-elite similarities. Adding to the self-description, how-
ever—amending the base measure by incorporating elite per-
ceptions of the ideological locations of other elite members of
the party—creates a new measure of intraparty elite differ-
ences.
In general, we define each party's left wing as made up
of self-designated liberals who (on a 7-point scale from liberal
to conservative) placed themselves at positions 1 or 2 or chose
a qualified liberal position, 3, but then located "the other dele-
gates at the convention" at 5, 6, or 7 on the scale. Centrists
are 4s or 3s who put their fellow delegates at 1, 2, or 4, or 5s
who assigned their peers to 6, 7, or 4. The right wing is the
mirror image of the left. Only minor fragments of the left or
Ideological Factions & Issue Representation 83
Table 26. Ideological Factions among Elites, 1984
Faction
Left
Center
Right
Number of cases
Democrat
41%
51
8
100%
991
Republican
4%
48
48
100%
834
See Appendix C for an operational definition of the factions.
the right were 3s or 5s; these we called moderates unless they
located their fellow partisans on the other side of the scale's
midpoint.
With this emendation, the resulting ideological distributions
within the parties remain remarkably dissimilar and belie the
oft-repeated image of the American parties as "umbrella" par-
ties. It is true that the distributions overlap, particularly in the
middle categories of self-labeling. However, even at this first
level of measurement (see Table 26) the different orientations
of the parties are reflected in the fact that a full 40 percent of
the Democrats but only 4 percent of the Republicans were self-
described liberals, while only 8 percent of the Democrats
shared the conservative label with almost 50 percent of the
Republicans (roughly 50 percent in each party were self-
designated centrists).
A more meaningful assessment of party differences is pro-
vided by summaries of the issue positions associated with this
apparently overlapping use of ideological labels. Table 27 il-
lustrates the general configuration to be found in the five issue
domains covered by the 1984 study. Centrist Republicans are
much more conservative on social issues than are centrist
Democrats; they are in fact more conservative in their attitudes
than are Democrats who call themselves conservative. Repub-
lican liberals, in turn, are scarcely distinguishable from Demo-
cratic centrists, and the other party groups—Democratic
Table 27. Policy Preferences of Ideological Factions among Elites, 1984
Social Foreign Domestic New Traditional
Issues Policy Spending Politics Groups
Ideological Faction
Left
Center
Right
Dem.
16*
32
57
Rep.
29
63
78
Dem.
6
19
37
Rep.
27
58
80
Dem.
23
31
41
Rep.
42
52
61
Dem.
29
44
63
Rep.
41
61
69
Dem.
11
25
54
Rep.
57
85
95
Entries are means for party factions; see Appendix B for index construction and scoring.
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liberals and Republican conservatives—simply have no "other
party" counterparts at all. This displacement in ideological
positioning of party factions is repeated in elite assessments of
New Politics groups, although the range of factional differences
is truncated by the relatively moderate positions of both Demo-
cratic liberals and Republican conservatives. Where the mea-
sures of foreign policy and domestic spending are concerned,
the interparty differences are considerably more dramatic: Re-
publican liberals score well to the right of Democratic centrists;
Republican moderates are much more conservative than Demo-
cratic conservatives; there is no Republican faction that even
remotely matches the Democratic liberals; and Republican
conservatives have a complete monopoly on right field. The
most extreme differences are found in the assessments of tra-
ditional partisan groups: all three groups are properly ordered
within each party, but liberal Republicans are actually a bit to
the right of Democratic conservatives.
Given the predominantly centrist locations of both sets of
mass partisan supporters, the patterns of mass-elite similarities
and dissimilarities associated with the elite means displayed in
Table 27 are roughly predictable. Accentuating the differences
first described in Chapter 2, liberal Democrats and conservative
Republicans exhibited the greatest lack of similarity with their
rank-and-file party partisans. There are a number of variants
on the theme, however, and enough additional regularities to
prompt scrutiny of the results in all five issue domains. The
data are displayed in Table 28. Intraparty comparisons show
that among each party's elite groups, liberal Democrats and
conservative Republicans were generally least representative
of their parties' mass followers. The one exception again con-
cerns domestic spending. It will be remembered that on this
issue alone the Democratic masses were more liberal (more
supportive of increased governmental spending) than were all
Democratic activists. It now appears that party followers were
much more liberal in their attitudes toward spending than were
either centrists or conservatives among the Democratic dele-
Table 28. Mass Similarities with Elite Ideological Factions, 1984
Social Foreign Domestic New Traditional
Issues Policy Spending Politics Groups
Ideological Faction
Left
Center
Right
Dem.
.66
.44
- . 0 5
Rep.
.29
.04
- . 3 6
Dem.
.54
.38
.03
Rep.
.21
.01
- . 4 0
Dem.
.06
- . 2 0
- . 3 2
Rep.
- . 1 3
- . 4 8
- . 6 4
Dem.
.38
.00
- . 2 6
Rep.
.11
- . 2 6
- . 4 7
Dem.
.59
.31
- . 2 5
Rep.
.09
- . 4 8
- . 6 7
Entries are correlations between scores of elite members of party factions and their national party mass; the
larger the correlation, the greater the difference in scores. Negative entries indicate the elite faction is more conser-
vative than the party mass; positive entries indicate the elite are more liberal.
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gates. However, liberal activists were very much like rank-
and-file Democrats (r = .06) and slightly more liberal.
As a consequence of this juxtaposition of views, domestic
spending was the only domain in which conservative Demo-
cratic activists were less similar to the Democratic masses than
were liberal activists. Although the mirror-image counterpart
to that generalization is sometimes muted on the Republican
side—perhaps by less-than-stable estimates from the very
small set of left-wing Republicans—the reverse generalization
also seems warranted. The views of the more liberal among
the Republican elite were more representative of Republican
rank-and-file sentiments than were the views of the dominant
conservative Republican leaders. Therefore, the generalization
that the prototypic factions in each party, liberal Democrats
and conservative Republicans, are not only less representative
of their parties' mass sentiments than are the centrists among
the elite; they are less representative of mass preferences than
are the minor fragments of leadership who form the ideological
opposition within each party's elite.
Given the limited size of the ideological opposition in each
party elite, it is perhaps more pertinent, and a sharper com-
mentary, to note that in all five domains and in both parties
the centrists provided more rapport with the party's rank and
file than did those in the dominant ideological wing.
In the basic interparty comparison, it is difficult to judge
where the bulk of evidence lies on the question of which party's
leadership is more representative of party supporters' senti-
ments. On social issues and foreign policy, conservative Re-
publican leaders are somewhat closer to their party's base than
are liberal Democrats to the Democratic rank and file. On the
same issues the very numerous centrists in both parties provide
a decisive edge for Republican elite leadership. The situation
is almost perfectly reversed for the other three policy domains;
Democratic liberals and centrists do better than Republicans,
sometimes by small margins, in providing representation for
the opinions of their respective party followers. A cautious if
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perhaps too cynical observer might conclude that the two par-
ties share the honors of providing ideological leadership that
does not match rank-and-file preferences. Given the ideological
polarization, or displacement from mass sentiment of both par-
ties, even self-defined centrists often reveal only limited rapport
with the masses. Ironically, the clear political losers within
each party elite provide the clearest representation for the pref-
erences of party followers.
Linkage Mechanisms:
Political Leadership
If the political parties may be designated as the carriers of mass
ideology, presidential candidates have long personified the
policy preferences and ideological postures of the parties. Of
course, the politics of the Reagan era can aptly be described
in the impersonal terms of the ideological conflicts of liberals
and conservatives or the contribution to the intellectual debates
over basic social policies made by ex-liberals turned neo-con-
servative. Whatever the terms, there is little question that the
quality of elite participation in presidential politics was fun-
damentally altered by the successful protests of the 1960s and
1970s. That turbulent period changed American domestic as
well as foreign policy. It warmed the chill of McCarthy ism
and the Cold War, and it eventually spurred the response of
the New Right to the successes if not excesses of the aroused
left. The ideological dormancy of the Eisenhower years, in
which intellectuals debated "the end of ideology," was suc-
ceeded by the sometimes strident articulation and confrontation
of arguments over new policies, over social issues in par-
ticular. l
The debates of the 1980s were not particularly abstract in
their origins. Gender and racial equality were sought in very
concrete terms. Religious concerns were made manifest in very
specific discussions of public policy concerning the basic in-
stitutions of the family, the church, and the schools. Beyond
a near panic over the control of drugs, an increasingly sensi-
tized population wrestled with the capacity of medical inter-
vention to terminate and to prolong life.
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Candidates for political leadership have inevitably been as-
sociated with the issues of the day: a woman candidate for
vice-president, and a black candidate for president; a George
McGovern championing the dispossessed and powerless; a
Ronald Reagan carrying the challenging banner of the New
Right; a benign Dwight Eisenhower reluctantly dealing with
racial conflict and voluntarily expressing concern over the rise
of a military-industrial complex shaping American national
policy; a Lyndon Johnson bullying the nation to accept his
vision of the Great Society.
Associations like these have made more public the fact that
politics is always highly personal, a contest of individuals seek-
ing and wielding power. Such contests are, indeed, much of
the substance of political history, even without a continuing
sense of impending crises. In the design of the 1984 study we
attempted to capture some portion of the recent history of na-
tional party leadership by asking our elite activists to assess a
series of partisan leaders, all candidates for or holders of na-
tional offices. We included all presidential candidates from
both parties since 1952; we added Democrats Geraldine Fer-
raro, John Glenn, Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson, and Ted Kennedy,
and Republicans George Bush, Robert Dole, and Jack Kemp
to represent figures of current interest. We did not attempt to
collect the detailed information that would have been necessary
to reconstruct particular patterns of candidate preference. In-
stead, we simply sought measures of current affect—of the
like or dislike for each leadership figure. The analysis of mass-
elite linkages reported here is based on one of the discernible
patterns of responses from our delegates.
Leadership Patterns
Within each partisan delegate group, Democrat or Repub-
lican, we examined the interrelationships of attitudes toward
the relevant set of partisan leaders. In each party there were
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two dominant clusters of evaluations, and among the Demo-
cratic elite two additional patterns appeared. First of all, among
the Democrats our analysis indicated two sets of four candi-
dates who were evaluated similarly by our delegates and who
thereby define the party's two dominant leadership wings. One
set consisted of Jimmy Carter, Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon
Johnson, and Walter Mondale; the other included Ferraro,
Jackson, Kennedy, and McGovern. Interestingly, both Adlai
Stevenson and John Kennedy were moderately associated with
both groups but clearly did not belong with either, were not
joined together by shared assessments, and were not treated
separately in the analysis. However, another pair consisting of
Glenn and Hart were joined together in a third distinct pattern.
Although evaluations of Hart showed a very mild negative
relationship to those of Democratic centrists and an equally
mild positive association with the Democratic left, while as-
sessments of Glenn exhibited exactly the opposite pattern, these
two losing candidates were linked together in our factor analy-
sis as a pair not included in either of the dominant wings of
the party.
With the two dominant wings identified, we then compared
individual delegates' average scores for all candidates asso-
ciated with each of the two wings. Delegates could be classified
as being more favorable to one wing or the other, or about
equally supportive of both. However, an inspection of the dis-
tributions of assessments led us to create a fourth group of
delegates consisting of all whose overall average appraisal of
the left-wing leadership was, in absolute terms, negative: that
is, a score of less than 50, where 50 indicates indifference and
anything higher than 50 indicates some degree of positive re-
gard. Hence, we have a left wing that preferred Ferraro, Jack-
son, Kennedy, and McGovern; a conservative wing that
absolutely rejected the left wing; a centrist wing that preferred
Carter, Humphrey, Johnson, and Mondale without rejecting
the left wing; and a left-of-center wing that was equally fa-
vorable to both the left and the center.
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Table 29. Democratic Ideological Factions and Leadership Wings,
1984
Faction
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Number of cases
Relative size
Left Wing
73%
26
1
100%
173
20%
Left of Center
51%
46
3
100%
291
33%
Centrist
30%
66
4
100%
221
25%
Conservative
3%
66
26
100%
197
22%
The distribution of each of the four resulting groups of dele-
gates on the measure of ideological factionalism (developed in
the last chapter) is presented in Table 29, where it appears that
our association of delegates with the leadership wings of the
party has identified four quite different groups. In the left wing
are those who not only preferred the leadership of the left but
who, in three cases out of four, also saw themselves as liberals
when asked to define their own ideological position. At the
other extreme are conservative Democrats who both rejected
the party's liberal leaders and constituted most (68 percent) of
the party's self-proclaimed conservatives. In between are the
left-of-center contingent—equally supportive of the left wing
and the centrists—and the centrists themselves, most of whom
(66 percent) located themselves at the center of the ideological
spectrum.
The classification of Democratic elites in terms of their at-
titudes toward various wings of the party's national leadership
is not simply different from the classification by ideologi-
cal faction; it provides an added perspective from which to
judge the party's ideological center of gravity. Until now the pic-
ture has been that of a Democratic party dominated by self-
proclaimed liberals who have continued to move to the left even
as the national presidential vote swings to the right. This char-
acterization is substantially modified if we note the very bottom
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Table 30. Republican Ideological Factions and Leadership Wings,
1984
Faction Moderate Centrist Conservative
Moderate
Center
Conservative
Number of cases
Relative size
8%
71
21
100%
293
35%
2%
42
56
100%
370
44%
1%
22
78
100%
171
21%
row in Table 29 and observe that the left wing of the Democratic
party attracts no more than one in five of the party's presidential
campaign elite; it is equaled in size if not outnumbered by self-
proclaimed conservatives. The conservatives, in turn, are joined
by another 25 percent in preferring something other than left-
wing leadership. Although liberals outnumber conservatives, the
left wing is not representative of the ideological balance within
the party; the party is, in fact, dominated by moderates and
centrists. None of this changes the earlier discussion of the con-
tinued move to the left; it does suggest a different dynamic to
be worked out as leadership groups next contest for power.
Among Republican elites the configuration of leadership pref-
erences is less complex (see Table 30). Republican delegates also
identify with one of two leadership wings: a moderate wing in-
cludes Eisenhower, Gerald Ford, Bush, and Dole; a conservative
wing joins Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, Reagan, and Kemp.
This clustering of evaluations was intuitively predictable, but the
results at the next stage, assigning delegates to one or the other
wing, were somewhat surprising. Although almost half of the
activist Republican delegates (44 percent) gave equally high
marks to both leadership wings, the magnitude of the dominance
of moderates (35 percent) over conservatives (21 percent) is quite
out of line with our previous estimate of the relative numbers of
ideological conservatives.
Table 31. Elite Policy Preference Scores for Leadership Wings, 1984
Candidate
Preference
Democrats
Left wing
Left of center
Centrist
Conservative
Republicans
Moderate
Centrist
Conservative
Entries are mean
Liberal/
Conservative
19
27
34
50
63
75
83
Social
Issues
19
22
30
44
60
72
81
scores for leadership wings;
Foreign
Policy
4
9
16
31
56
72
80
see Appendix B
Domestic
Spending
24
26
28
38
52
55
63
New
Politics
30
33
40
55
59
66
69
for index construction and
Traditional
Groups
15
16
18
39
83
91
93
scoring.
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The easy characterization of the Republican party as domi-
nated by a unified ideological right wing is thus sharply modified,
at least on the basis of the evaluations of party leaders who are
clearly aligned with either a centrist or conservative faction. The
moderate Eisenhower-Ford wing is almost twice the size of the
conservative Goldwater-Reagan wing, and it is as overwhelm-
ingly moderate or centrist (79 percent) as the supporters of the
right-wing leaders are ideologically conservative (78 percent).
Nevertheless, at first glance it seems that the differences in
the policy preferences and predispositions of delegates who have
been assigned to various leadership wings are very similar to the
differences among ideological factions observed in Chapter 5.
Given the implicit ideological differences of the two parties'
leadership wings, this is not surprising; indeed, it is reassuring
to have validation of the conventional conclusions about the ideo-
logical infrastructure of the intraparty contests for power.
Beyond this, however, differences between the juxtaposition
of ideological factions and among leadership wings provide im-
portant commentaries on the ideological structure of American
politics. In the first place, although the dominant leadership
wings—left wing and centrist for the Democrats, moderates or
conservatives for the Republicans—are clearly differentiated by
the policy preferences of their elite activists, the differentiation
is an attenuated version of the differentiation specified by the
ideological factions. Even if the conservative Democratic wing
is thought to anchor the non-left leadership ranks of the Demo-
cratic Party, the intraparty differences between them and the
Democratic left wing, as displayed in Table 31 (an average of
24 points on the six measures), are less than those between the
liberal and conservative factions in Table 27 (averaging 33 points
on the same measures). The contrast among Republican elites is
even greater. Across the six measures of policy preference, the
moderates' average scores are 40 points more liberal than those
of the conservative faction; the contrasting leadership wings differ
by an average of only 16 points.
With legitimacy as party elites deriving from loyalty to leaders
Table 32. Mass Linkage with Leadership Wings, 1984
Ideology
Social issues
Foreign policy
Domestic
spending
New politics
Traditional
groups
Left Wing
.48
.57
.46
.03
.30
.43
Democrat
Left of
Center
.42
.57
.48
- . 0 3
.27
.46
Centrist
.26
.42
.34
- . 1 1
.10
.41
Conservative
- . 0 8
.18
.12
- . 3 5
- . 2 5
- . 0 5
Moderate
- . 0 5
.11
.02
- . 4 7
- . 1 9
- . 3 9
Republican
Centrist Conservative
- . 3 4
- . 2 1
- . 2 6
- . 5 5
- . 4 0
- . 5 9
- . 4 1
- . 3 3
- . 3 2
- . 6 2
- . 3 8
- . 5 3
Entries are correlations between scores of elite members of leadership wings and their national party mass; the larger
the correlation, the greater the difference in scores. Negative entries indicate the elite wing is more conservative than
the party mass; positive entries indicate the elite are more liberal.
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rather than commitment to ideas, and with leaders being chosen
to contest in a Downsian context for national favor, the dif-
ferences between leadership wings are constrained more than
is true where ideology structures the coalitions. The average
difference of 16 points separating the moderate wing from the
conservative wing of the Republican party, and only 9 points
separating Democratic centrists from the Democratic left wing,
underscore the earlier comments about the relative homo-
geneity of each party's elite in 1984.
As a complement to these intraparty differences, the same
data document the extent to which party leadership channels
intra-elite differences of ideological outlook into interparty dif-
ferences. Where Table 27 presented evidence of some overlap
between the two parties—often with liberal Republican fac-
tions roughly matching the preferences of Democratic centrists,
and Republican centrists looking like Democratic conser-
vatives—there is absolutely no overlap where leadership wings
are concerned. In each of the six domains of policy preference
assessed in Table 31, the most liberal leadership wing of the
Republican elite is more conservative than the most conser-
vative Democratic wing. With the correlations between faction
and wing considerably less than perfect in either party, it seems
that both ideological commitment and loyalty to party lead-
ership influence the predisposition and preferences of the elite
activists. And the complementarity of their association with
policy preferences is reflected in their combined contribution
to party differentiation.
It also contributes to mass-elite linkages. The data describing
mass-elite similarities for the various leadership wings of each
party are presented in Table 32. The table is arranged differ-
ently from others in order to make two points more evident.
For all practical purposes there are two distinct patterns, pro-
totypically displayed in the top row, from left to right. The
first, evident for all preference measures except that pertaining
to domestic spending, emphasizes the greater similarity of elite-
to-party mass preferences in the center of the array (the lower
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correlations between group and preference differences) and the
evidence of maximum dissimilarities at the two extremes.
The second point concerns the directional differences as-
sociated with the comparison of leadership wings and party
masses. The largest positive correlations at the left of the table
signify the extent to which the elite group is more liberal than
its party's mass base; the point at which (moving from left to
right) one encounters a negative correlation is the point at which
the elite group is more conservative than its mass base. It is
rare for the most liberal wing of the Republican party to be as
liberal as the Republican electoral base; it is equally rare for
conservative Democrats to match the liberal center of gravity
of the Democratic rank and file. But both exceptions occur in
the important domains of social issues and foreign policy.
Beyond these indications of regularity in the structure of
elite, candidate-oriented differences, Table 32 also offers a
somewhat different perspective on the representativeness
within each party of the dominant wing. There is no major
modification of the previous description on the Republican
side, although the contrast between moderates and conser-
vatives is rather dramatically represented. Not only are the
moderate wing-Republican mass linkages much, much
closer, but in only three of the six domains is the moderate
elite notably more conservative than the mass.
On the Democratic side, however, one can recognize that
the linkage between the dominant centrist Mondale wing and
its mass base compares more than favorably with the dominant
conservative-mass linkage on the Republican side. Only on the
theme of contemporary social issues are the prime supporters
of the Democratic nominee of 1984 less in tune with their party
base than are the strongest supporters of President Reagan with
the Republican base. At the same time, the Democratic conser-
vative wing is clearly more representative of rank-and-file pref-
erences than is Mondale's center wing on four of the six
indicators, including social issues and foreign policy, where
even the conservatives are more liberal than the Democratic
mass.
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Party Leadership in the 1980s
The accumulated importance of the contests over party lead-
ership for the ideological structuring of presidential politics
becomes apparent when one looks at the major presidential
candidacies of the 1980s. The first chapters of this volume
opened the discussion by highlighting contemporary intra- and
interparty differences in mass-elite policy preferences. We de-
scribed, if no more than in passing, the sharp conflicts over
national policy that produced two decades of reform in the
process of presidential selection and set the stage for the ideo-
logically oriented elections of the 1970s and 1980s. When one
examines the presidential candidacies of the period in greater
detail, the context provided by the foregoing description and
discussion of the issue preferences of activists associated with
different wings of their respective parties gives a somewhat
different cast to one's commentary on the contemporary scene.
In essence, our conclusion is that even the highly ideological
candidacies of the 1980s did not always plumb the depths of
the divisions and schisms that permeate the contemporary party
system. They may have contributed to the perpetuation of some
interparty differences, and they may have accentuated some
intraparty differences, but many of the comparisons between
particular contemporary candidate support groups among our
elite activists were pale reflections of differences in policy
preferences and mass-elite linkages associated with the en-
during ideological factions or time-honored leadership wings
of the two parties. This was particularly true in 1984, albeit
for somewhat different reasons in each party. In that year the
intraparty divisions among Democrats were virtually unrelated
to underlying ideological schisms, and among Republicans the
Reagan incumbency obscured potential disagreements over
similar matters of basic policy.
In 1980 the sharp intraparty differences among supporters
of the leading contenders were clear reflections of traditional
disagreements of long standing. Although the leading candi-
dates, Carter and Reagan, won nomination quite handily, Ken-
Table 33. Issue Preferences of Candidate Support Groups, 1984
Democrats 1980
Carter
Kennedy
Democrats 1984
Hart
Jackson
Mondale
Republicans 1980
Reagan
Other
Republicans 1984
Reagan
Other
Liberal/
Conservative
39
23
301
28
31
68
55
74
69
Social
Issues
38
26
26
34
27
73
52
71
67
Foreign
Policy
42
28
13
15
14
81
64
71
63
Domestic
Spending
30
20
27
57
51
New
Politics
20
10
38
35
39
66
35
66
61
Traditional
Groups
26
13
23
24
16
92
80
91
86 no
'Entries are mean scores for candidate support groups among the elites; see Appendix B for index con- Z
struction and scoring. ffl
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nedy supporters disagreed as sharply with the pro-Carter
activists as left-wing elites disagreed with centrist elites in our
analysis of historical patterns; and Reagan supporters differed
from the John Anderson-Howard Baker-George Bush activists
by margins generally characteristic of enduring moderate-
conservative disagreements. At the same time, because the
Carter camp of 1980 was quite conservative as centrist Demo-
crats go, and despite the right-wing fervor of many Reaganites,
the Carter-Reagan differences were not more pronounced than
the more general differences between Democratic centrists and
Republican conservatives.
Four years later, as Table 33 reflects, Reagan's dominance
had virtually eliminated the articulation of opposition within
the Republican party. In the privacy provided by the act of
filling out our questionnaire, a minority of Republican dele-
gates chose another party leader rather than Reagan—but even
so, their issue preferences were much more conservative ver-
sions of the moderate (Anderson-Baker-Bush) preferences in
earlier years. The more general moderate-conservative differ-
ences that we earlier noted between historical leadership wings
at an average of 16 points (on the 0-to-100 scale) had persisted
in 1980 as an 18-point difference between the Reagan and the
Anderson-Baker-Bush people; the same measure of differences
in issue preferences dropped to the 5-point average in Table
33 for differences between those more and less supportive of
Reagan in 1984.
The disappearance of policy disagreements among Demo-
cratic candidate support groups in 1984 was equally striking.
Table 33 documents the virtual identity of the issue preferences
of the supporters of Hart and Mondale, and it discloses a per-
haps surprising lack of uniqueness in the policy preferences of
Jackson supporters. The liberal qualities that placed Jackson
in the left wing in the previous analysis are here apparent only
on the theme of governmental spending for domestic programs.
Elsewhere, the issue preferences of his supporters are distinc-
tive only in the social issue domain, which includes busing as
oto
Table 34. Mass Similarities with Elite Candidate Support Groups, 1984
Preferred
Candidate
Democrat
Hart
Jackson
Mondale
Republican
Reagan
Other
Liberal/
Conservative
.35
.23
.37
- . 3 3
- . 1 8
Social
Issues
.53
.26
.51
- . 1 7
- . 0 5
Foreign
Policy
.42
.23
.44
- . 2 5
- . 1 0
Domestic
Spending
- . 1 7
.10
- . 0 6
- . 5 8
- . 4 6
New
Politics
.19
.14
.18
- . 3 6
- . 2 3
Traditional
Groups
.31
.17
.50
- . 5 9
- . 4 7
Entries are correlations between scores of elite members of candidate support groups and their national party
mass; the larger the correlation, the greater the difference in scores. Negative entries indicate the elite wing is
more conservative than the party mass; positive entries indicate the elite are more liberal. noz
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one of four specific components. Despite that inclusion, the
elites supporting Jackson appear somewhat more conservative
than the elite supporters of Hart and Mondale. This superfi-
cially perplexing finding may be more understandable when
one remembers that Jackson is the Reverend Jesse Jackson with
a visible part of his support coming from church- and family-
oriented middle-class followers. Nevertheless, the Jackson
elite appears less liberal than might have been expected.
The strong impression of intraparty homogeneity on policy
preferences within both parties in 1984 is reinforced by mass-
elite comparisons (see Table 34). There were, however, two
notable exceptions of some possible political significance.
First, among the Democrats, Jackson's supporters showed up
quite consistently, and at times strikingly, as most like the
national Democratic rank and file in issue preferences and
policy predispositions. In particular, their relatively conser-
vative posture on social issues was accompanied by a dramatic
edge over other candidate support groups in their congruence
with mass preferences in this domain. At the same time, their
liberal stance on spending did not leave them disadvantaged
in matching rank-and-file preferences so much as it produced
the one situation in both parties in which an elite support group
was more liberal—more in favor of increased governmental
spending for domestic programs—than was the party rank and
file. In the other four domains the clear evidence of rapport
between Jackson's elite support group and the party's base of
mass support suggests more potential political strength than
his 1984 convention support might have indicated.
The Hart and Mondale support groups among the Demo-
cratic elite were as much like each other in relationship to the
Democratic voters as they were like each other in their issue
and policy preferences. One minor exception involves the
Mondale supporters' closer match with rank-and-file partisans
on the spending question—because of strong Mondale elite
support for spending; a more significant exception is found in
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the substantial remove of Mondale supporters' preferences
from popular attitudes toward traditional political groups.
Some vestige of the 1984 campaign charge against Mondale—
that he was involved with "special interests"—is visible here
because the differences in mass and elite attitudes toward labor
unions played a decided role in this disparity of mass-elite
opinions.
The comparisons of mass-elite similarities among Repub-
licans are notable largely in the extent to which the correlations
accentuate evidence of the persistence of intraparty schisms.
The measures of mass-elite similarities are, nevertheless, sim-
ply consonant with the differences in elite group means. Just
as the differences in mean scores among elite candidate support
groups were reduced from an average of 18 points in 1980 to
5 points in 1984, the difference in correlations measuring mass-
elite dissimilarity dropped from an average of 26 in 1980 to
13 in 1984; the Reaganites did not greatly change their level
of rapport with the Republican electorate at large, while the
non-Reagan minority moved slightly away from the party's
mass base.
Our reliance on data from 1984 to describe the diminution
of intraparty disagreements in comparison with 1980 is doubly
important precisely because the same 1984 data document the
persistence of interparty difference and the potential for the
articulation of factional disputes. Even though the data indicate
that few Republican elite activists would admit to a preference
for some party leader other than Reagan in 1984, and even
though the data suggest that Hart and Mondale supporters of
1984, in particular, almost appeared to have agreed not to
disagree, the ideological factionalism discussed in the previous
chapter and the differentiation of historic leadership wings in-
troduced in the first part of this chapter were both documented
with the same data from the same election period. And we
believe both general conclusions to be true: Any given election
may produce candidates for party leadership whose presence
gives the appearance of great party homogeneity; at the same
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time, basic differences in orientation, associated either with
independent philosophic and ideological origins or with tra-
ditional and established lines of party leadership, will persist.
Given the stolid nature of public opinion and the multiplicity
of causes of mass voting behavior, one can scarcely fault elec-
tion campaign strategies that emphasize or deemphasize a can-
didate's policy preferences and, therefore, the distinctiveness
of supporters' preferences. Or, with a different causal model
in mind, one must anticipate candidates rising in popularity
as different elite appraisals of the importance of ideological
distinctiveness dominate the extended process of presidential
selection. We have argued elsewhere that Carter's nomi-
nation followed the first of these strategies, resting on the
mobilization of new elites with distinctly conservative pre-
ferences, and that Reagan's nomination followed the second
model as he persuaded the core Republican elite of the ac-
ceptability as well as the desirability of his ideological pref-
erences.2 The lesson of 1984 is that the particulars of any given
election may be epiphenomena where the basic ideological
structure of the political system is concerned, but in the longer
run it will still be political leaders, not party bureaucracies or
political ideologies, that shape partisan ideologues and define
the national policy agenda.
Linkage Mechanisms:
Elite Orientations
Thus far in the discussion we have been restrained in our use
of the language of political representation to describe the results
of our study of mass-elite linkage—emphasizing instead the
more strictly descriptive themes of similarities or dissimilarities
between masses and elites. We have done so despite the fact
that the nominating process is clearly a political institution
designed to provide representation of a broad array of public
interests in the process of presidential selection. We have been
restrained because the selection of delegates is seldom made
according to procedures and within structures normally asso-
ciated with processes that are intended to create representation.
Delegates, who become campaign activists, are seldom dis-
cussed in either the popular or the academic literature with
regard to representational roles that go beyond representing
support for particular candidacies. Perhaps because they are
seen only as intermediaries in a process connecting the citizenry
to the elected representatives of the polity, little is said about
their role in representing concerns that are not directly iden-
tified with a specific candidate.
As Jeane Kirkpatrick points out in her insightful and im-
mensely instructive discussion of delegates as representatives,
even the efforts of the last two decades to reform the presi-
dential selection process paid little attention to questions of
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representation beyond the obvious concerns with broadening
participation to better "represent" various potential candidacies
or selected demographic characteristics of the electorate.1 Al-
though broadening participation and involvement in the presi-
dential selection process would seem filled with implications
for the representational role of the nominating convention de-
cision-makers, most discussion (other than Kirkpatrick's) has
had a very narrow concern with demographic and procedural
representativeness rather than substantive representation.2
Thus the Democratic party commitment to increase access and
broaden citizen participation in the process of presidential se-
lection focused very heavily on making sure that blacks,
women, and young people were present in "proper" propor-
tions, and that occasions for delegate selection were sufficiently
well publicized and so located as to permit all interested persons
to attend and participate.
From all accounts, it seems thoroughly reasonable to con-
clude that the presumably higher goals being sought in broad-
ening the base of participation, particularly in the Democratic
party, were in fact promoted because they were identified with
very specific candidacies. With the name of the game being
the competition for nomination, the rules of the game were
reshaped and reformed in the 1970s in order to alter the
opportunities for the demonstration of support for one or an-
other candidacy. Although much of the discussion of party
reform is couched in noble terms of equity and justice and
fairness, the acceptability of new rules—such as those estab-
lishing quotas for gender, race, and age, or establishing thresh-
olds for minority representation—was directly linked to the
consequences of advantaging or disadvantaging specific can-
didacies. For us, the point is less to argue whether the personal
contest for political power should be so openly translated into
new institutional forms than to note that so little of the dis-
cussion has been cast in terms of representation that is not
intrinsically defined by the competition of candidacies or, tra-
ditionally, by the quest for power of individual party leaders.
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Some Thoughts on Representation
The theoretical literature on representation in Democratic
institutions is largely focused on the relationship between the
rank-and-file citizenry and ultimate governmental decision-
makers. When applied to congressmen, presidents, or even
members of the judiciary, the very definition of representation
embodies a rich array of considerations. However, when ap-
plied to the process of selecting those who will then select the
decision-makers, rather than to the decisions themselves, it is
less common for notions of representation to be used beyond
treating with the political implications to be read into the results
of the candidates' contests for power. Again, where the dis-
cussion does return to the mass base of politics, it is usually
with a concern for ensuring that classes of individuals, such
as union members or party leaders or the young, are somehow
adequately represented (numerically) in the process of choosing
among candidates.
The fact that nominating conventions do not themselves
make final decisions about public policy should not limit dis-
cussion of the extent to which those who are nominated will
represent one or another policy or value. But the fact that it is
the presidential nominee who may make the ultimate decision
has largely obscured serious consideration of the extent to
which the nominators are themselves a link facilitating the
transmission of values and policy preferences from the bot-
tom to the top. Despite the absence of elaborated and well-
articulated representational roles for delegates that go beyond
submitting their candidate preferences to a decision-making
arena, our studies have shown that there are systematic varia-
tions in the degree to which differing sets of delegates "rep-
resent," if only inadvertently, the attitudes, evaluations, and
preferences of the mass electorate.
Kirkpatrick's discussion draws a distinction between rep-
resentation as the end product of a process and representa-
tiveness as a matter of similarity, whether deliberately sought
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or not. Representativeness is assessed by comparing distri-
butions of the relevant attributes exhibited by the elite and the
mass. This is very much like the ideas of similarity and dis-
similarity measured by our differences of means or our col-
lective correlations. Although her discussion does not treat the
questions explicitly, Kirkpatrick leaves the implication that the
outcome of an effective representation process should be the
creation of an elite that is representative of the mass. And
though she does not actually specify, it sounds very much as
though the process of creating representation must be a delib-
erate process "intended" to produce a match between the elec-
torate's preferences or demands and the elites' preferences or
decisions. Nothing is said about the possibility of processes
that inadvertently, or as a by-product, enhance the "repre-
sentativeness" of the elite. It is thus by implication a thesis
that democratic representation is the intentional outcome of an
institutionalized process.
The several ambiguities one encounters in trying to relate
the status and function of delegates to the literature on rep-
resentation can be traced to such theories of representation as
that presented in Kirkpatrick's admirable summary of the con-
cept:
In the democratic tradition the concept of representation is firmly
associated by theory and practice with the doctrines of consent3 and
accountability and the institutions of popular elections and political
parties. It is with that tradition that we are here concerned.4 The
basic tenets of the doctrine of democratic representation are:
First, that laws should be made not merely in the name of the
community, but by persons selected in periodic, competitive elec-
tions by some large, specified portion of the adult members of
the community (e.g., a majority or plurality) to represent them
in a specified context (e.g., Congress, a state legislature) for
the performance of some specified (and therefore limited) func-
tions.
Second, that political representation requires the representation of
the opinions of individual citizens.
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Third, that the responsiveness of representatives to the will of
citizens can be assured by frequent periodic elections which (a) limit
the tenure of representatives and (b) hold them accountable to those
who elected them or the quality of their representation.5
In primary elections, delegates may well obtain the limited
consent of those who select them. Apart from primary elec-
tions, those who anoint the delegates may in turn rest their
legitimacy on those who consented to their prior selection as
party leaders, caucus organizers, and the like; nevertheless,
the relevant consent at each level has to do primarily, if not
solely, with support for a specific presidential candidate. The
objective in broadening participation in delegate selection was
to ensure that more people—more interests—could voice their
consent (or denial) to the support of given candidacies. The
literature, including Kirkpatrick's discussion, is silent on the
precise question of whether those who consent to have a dele-
gate represent their candidate preference have really consented
to anything beyond that.
And if "consent" as a crucial element in theories of demo-
cratic representation is not articulated beyond the substantive
realm of candidate support, "accountability" as a second cru-
cial element has been similarly ignored in discussions of the
nomination process concerned with representation. Account-
ability apparently exists largely in the implicit threat of future
political sanctions to be levied on individuals by others—not
necessarily those who selected the delegate as their represen-
tative in the first place. Nevertheless, it is clearly a topic of
great concern to the rulemakers: witness the excitement gen-
erated by the Kennedy challenge to rule F(3)(C) in the Demo-
cratic convention of 1980. The rule had transformed any
uncertainty about accountability by making committed dele-
gates accountable to their preferred choices among the can-
didates; it authorized their chosen candidate to replace them
should their agreement falter under the pressure of new cir-
cumstances. But this, again, is clearly accountability only to
Elite Orientations 111
a candidate and to formal participation in the declaration of a
candidate preference. The candidate preference of those who
elect a delegate might change as winter passes into spring and
the campaign suggests a new candidate better able to carry the
flag for the issues that mobilized the delegate's support in the
first place. But none of the contemporary discussions about
presidential selection, and few of the rules governing the pro-
cess, are shaped for delegates who would switch candidates in
order to remain true to their ideological commitments or to
their representation of those who selected them.6
To the extent that these observations are valid, it is difficult
to describe and discuss convention delegates in the established
and familiar terms of representation theory. And yet, if one is
concerned to understand the processes that link the preferences
of the governed to the choices of the governors, the role of
the convention delegate as campaign activist is demonstrably
relevant to the effective functioning of presidential selection
as an institutionalized process of representation. It would seem
that our normative theories of representation should be ex-
panded to accommodate these, and perhaps other, demonstra-
tions of the inadvertent consequences of political action.
There is a second way in which the orthodox treatments of
representation, such as those of Kirkpatrick, seem constrained.
Representativeness seems to have to do only with the attributes
of the mass polity. Little consideration is given to the idea of
representing interests other than those of individuals. Kirk-
patrick does make reference to the extent to which current
democratic theory emphasizes the individual as opposed to the
organized social units that might be represented in corporatist
theory, but she discusses the matter as though the two are
incompatible or at least incongruent.7
It would seem reasonable to develop theories of democratic
society that emphasize the different representational functions
being performed in the name of quite different entities. These
could involve the party to be represented in the interest of
partisan success, or party to be represented in the interest of
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a party ideology based on process or structure rather than gov-
ernmental policy. The representation of candidacies might fo-
cus on those personal qualities of integrity or competence or
morality that need not be attributes of the party or of ideology
so much as attributes of national leadership. It should also be
possible to think of representing policy alternatives that are not
necessarily embodied either in party platforms or in specific
candidacies. In short, it would seem quite reasonable to de-
velop a democratic theory of pluralistic society in which dif-
ferent actors and groups of actors perform different essential
functions, all of which should be "represented" in the selection
of political leadership. If there are such roles for parties or
candidates or interest groups that are intended to serve societal
purposes beyond the immediate interest of the individual voter,
it could then follow that representation should involve a match
with something other than rank-and-file partisan sentiments in
questions of ideology or public policy.
In fact, in virtually all the empirical studies, representation
is taken to mean only the match of elite policy sentiments with
the issue sentiments of some aggregation of individual voters.8
In this analysis we have made no attempt to assess the relative
success or failure of those delegates who are attempting to
represent some aspect of party rather than voters' issue pref-
erences, or special-interest issue preferences rather than those
of party or voter; our only criterion of representativeness in-
volves the similarity or dissimilarities of elite sentiments and
rank-and-file sentiments.
From this perspective, one must interpret our analysis of
delegates' representational goals or their styles of convention
decision-making as producing variations in the extent to which
any attempt to represent party, candidate, issues, groups, or
voters ends up being associated with different degrees of rep-
resentativeness measured only in terms of representing voter
preferences. This limited portrayal of representation ignores
the goals that delegates may be seeking and assesses their
success with the singular criterion of providing representa-
tiveness for citizens' policy preferences.
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At this stage in our understanding of the role of delegates
in providing a link between the voters and the ultimate au-
thoritative allocators of value, it is timely to wonder whether
or not their representational roles should be judged beyond the
level demanded by a faithful numerical representation of pref-
erences for the nomination of candidates. In our studies of
delegates, both in 1980 and in 1984, we did seek out some
pieces of information precisely because they might be relevant
to a representational role other than that of support for preferred
candidates. We thought such information might be particularly
useful in such contexts as those provided by the nominations
of 1984, which were not contested in a manner to expose the
greater or lesser representation of interests other than the can-
didates' interest in nomination. At the same time, our thoughts
about representation did not go beyond the traditional modes
of defining it as something to be judged against rank-and-file
policy preferences.
In some earlier years, there were clear enough associations
of differences in rank-and-file policy preferences with differ-
ences among competing candidates to expose the extent to
which the success of one candidacy over another meant the
dominance (representation) of one set of values or policy pref-
erences over another. In 1976, for example, both parties had
viable candidacies representing very different ideological cen-
ters of gravity. One could speculate usefully about the extent
to which left-of-center preferences among Democrats were
adequately represented by the Udall candidacy in competition
with the centrism embodied in the Carter candidacy. On the
Republican side the sharp contest between the Ford incum-
bency (representing the moderate proclivities of Republican
rank and file) and the conservative Reagan challenge (repre-
senting what came to be the New Right) meant that candidacies
were vehicles of expressions for different values and different
political options. One could immediately join the issue as to
whether the nominating process was properly "representing"
voter sentiments on relevant topics. These contests, particularly
on the Democratic side, were doubly illuminating because they
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came in the aftermath of the post-1968 decisions to make more
certain that differing political perspectives would be equitably
represented in the course of the presidential selection process.
The analysis of the delegates' role in submitting competing
political perspectives to the candidate (who may become the
president) becomes possible when contests for nomination
carry with them implications beyond the popularity or elect-
ability of the candidates. The same role as a representative of
noncandidate values may be obscured where there is no can-
didate contest to expose factional differences. In 1984, for
example, the leading Democratic candidacies of Mondale and
Hart were not occasions for an ideological division of the
Democratic house, at the level of either mass voters or elite
campaigners. And indeed, we found that the candidacy of Jesse
Jackson did not constitute an important exception to this con-
clusion. Beyond assessing the adequacy of the nominating con-
vention as a reflection of the numerical division of candidate
preferences among rank-and-file voters, there was little to be
said about how "representative" the delegates were of rank-
and-file predispositions, values, and preferences.
It may well be that one should be content to read the findings
of the empirical regularities of the preceding chapters as a
commentary on the representational nature of some of our ma-
jor institutional forms associated with presidential selection.
Thus, one may conclude that the political party not only gives
structure to political ideology but provides a means whereby
political elites come to resemble the political rank and file.
Personal candidacies, on the other hand, perhaps as a conse-
quence of modern communications technology and the (per-
haps temporary) breakdown of party control over political
power, seem to be institutions that militate against the mobi-
lization of elites who represent in their own attitudes the at-
titudes of their party's rank and file. One may also conclude
that those institutional forms that promote single-issue poli-
tics—particularly in times of rapid, if not revolutionary,
change in social norms—are institutions even less well suited
to provide a complementary linkage between mass and elite.
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At the same time, side by side with institutions designed to
promote the goals of party candidate or interest group there
exist normative perspectives that take their institutional form
from theories of representation that specify different prefer-
ences for the ideal relationship between representatives and the
larger community.
Representative Roles
Both in 1980 and in 1984 we explored the possibility that
delegates carried with them, as we presume most politicians
do, a sense of whether it is more appropriate to act in accor-
dance with the wishes of others or in response to one's own
independent judgment. With a narrow focus on the nominating
convention as the setting for decision-making—although not
necessarily the setting for an independent decision as to the
nomination—we asked delegates and former delegates about
their approach to decision-making: "On a scale of 1 to 7, with
T being vote the way I believe is right, regardless of what
the people I represent believe, and '7 ' being vote the way those
people would vote if they were here, regardless of what I
believe, where would you place yourself in regard to your role
as a delegate decision-maker?" The choice was thus between
voting the way "I think" is right and voting the way "the people
I represent" would vote.
Although perhaps a leading question, in presuming that ev-
ery respondent had a referent in mind for "the people I rep-
resent," the query's scale of alternative responses did indeed
evoke distributions of sentiment suggesting substantial varia-
tion in delegates' images of themselves as independent deci-
sion-makers. Using a nominal division between delegates at
one extreme or the other and leaving the remainder in the
middle, one can distinguish "trustees" from "mandated dele-
gates." In both 1980 and 1984, the modal response clearly
favored the role of the trustee who would vote on conscience.
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Table 35. Elite Approaches to Decision-Making in Convention
Role Preference
Vote the way I think is
right (trustee)
Mixed
Vote the way the people I
represent would vote
(mandated delegate)
Number of cases
1980
Dem.
45%
34
21
100%
795
Rep.
43%
34
23
100%
494
1984
Dem.
46%
36
18
100%
1033
Rep.
42
36
22
100%
932
See Appendix C for description of the measurement of role preferences.
As Table 35 indicates, the distributions were remarkably alike
in both years and across delegates from both parties.
The correlates of these nominal self-classifications in our
analyses of similarities and dissimilarities between masses and
elites suggest that whether or not representation roles have been
articulated for delegates selected to support one or another
candidacy, delegates' attitudes reflect their role preferences.
Virtually without exception—in both parties, in both years,
and on all our measures of political attitudes and preferences—
the "trustees' " mean positions accentuated party polarization
by being extremely liberal among Democrats and extremely
conservative among Republicans. The mean of the intrastate
differences between the preferences of elite activists and their
rank-and-file constituency were greatest for the trustees and
least for the self-designated "mandated representatives,"
whose attitudes were visibly more moderate than the attitudes
of trustees. As a consequence, our correlational measures of
similarity and dissimilarity between elites and ordinary citi-
zens, presented in Table 36, reflect substantially higher indica-
tors of dissimilarity for Trustees than for their counterparts who
would act as delegates on behalf of their constituents.
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It is worth observing that in Table 36 the role-related dif-
ferences in predispositions, attitudes, and group assessments
all pertain to substantive questions quite different from those
involved in the context evoking the role differentiations made
by the delegates. In neither year were the topics demanding
delegate decisions in convention (the focus for our question on
roles) a direct reflection of the policy preferences and issue
attitudes that formed the basis for our analysis. This is more
than suggestive evidence that delegates who differ with regard
to their avowed preferences for representational roles differ
more generically in their propensity to attend to or ignore the
opinions of rank-and-file partisans. In other words, it would
seem that we have clear and direct evidence that our political
elites are accustomed to articulating their political performance
in terms of representational roles, and thus as individuals they
take part directly, if not self-consciously, in the representa-
tional activity of the conventions.
The general conclusion from the twelve mass-elite com-
parisons possible in 1984 (Table 36) and the ten comparisons
in 1980 is that trustees are less representative of party masses
than are elite activists who prefer to behave as instructed if not
as mandated delegates. In both years the role-related differ-
ences are much sharper among Democratic than Republican
activists. The reason for this is not apparent. There is no dif-
ference across parties in the incidence of role preferences that
might suggest differences in correlates, but in ten of the eleven
interparty comparisons from 1980 and 1984, role-related dif-
ferences in the representativeness of Democratic elites are
greater than among Republican elites.
We are now better prepared to understand the one exception.
It pertains to the 1984 topic of domestic spending. On the
question of governmental spending for domestic programs, the
usual pattern of role-related differences was present for Re-
publicans, but in contrast to the usually sharp differences
among Democrats, Democratic trustees exhibited slightly
greater similarity to the Democratic masses than did instructed
Table 36. Mass-Elite Similarities for Trastees and Mandated Delegates
Elite Role
1980
Trustee
Mandated/instructed
delegates
Difference
1984
Trustee
Mandated/instructed
delegates
Difference
Plus ( + ) indicates that
party's mass supporters
Liberal
Conservative
Dem.
.45
.15
+ .30
.42
.14
+ .28
Rep.
- . 0 5
- . 0 6
- . 0 1
- . 3 2
- . 2 4
+ .08
Social
Issues
Dem.
.34
.08
+ .26
.59
.29
+ .30
Foreign
Policy
Rep. Dem. Rep.
- . 3 5
- . 3 0
+ .05 +
- . 1 5
- . 0 6
+ .09 +
policy preferences of elites choosing
than are
.40 - . 1 9
.13 - . 1 2
.27 +.07
.45 - .24
.27 - . 1 2
.18 +.12
a "mandated
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
.09 - . 6 0
.11 - . 4 6
- . 0 2 +.14
delegate" role
the preferences of the self-designated "trustees."
New
Politics
Dem.
.35
.10
+ .25
.25
.03
+ .22
are more
Rep.
- . 2 9
- . 2 3
+ .06
- . 3 2
- . 2 7
+ .05
similar
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
.49
.27
+ .22
.41
.21
+ .20
to those
Rep.
- . 5 6
- . 5 1
+ .05
- . 5 5
- . 4 7
+ .08
of their
O
o
on
PI
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delegates. The differences are small on the correlational mea-
sure (.09 to . 11 in Table 36), but they are unmistakable on the
measure of differences in national means (differences of 2 and
5) or mean differences of state means (3.7 to 4.9). We now
know, however, that the more liberal Democratic activists were
more like the rank and file on this one topic than were the less
liberal Democrats (in contrast to the obverse in all other do-
mains); as a consequence, the more liberal trustees were more
similar to the masses than were the more moderate instructed
delegates.
The otherwise ubiquitous party differences may be used to
add to one of the earlier points of this chapter. Role differences
were much more evident among Democratic activists, but it
does not seem appropriate to conclude that Democrats who
took the role of instructed delegates were more inclined to
representational behavior that were their Republican counter-
parts; as often as not, Democratic instructed delegates were
less similar to mass Democrats than were Republican instructed
delegates to mass Republicans. Nor were Democratic trustees
less like their national rank and file than Republican trustees
were unlike their supporters. And yet both groups contributed
to a pattern in which evidence of representation is more pro-
nounced among Democrats than among Republicans. And so,
we have systematic party differences that certainly can be de-
scribed as associated with greater or lesser representativeness
of elites, but should they be described in terms of represen-
tation?
Local/National Orientation
The same ambiguity arises in interpreting the empirical con-
sequences of another inquiry in the 1980 and 1984 studies.
With an eye to determining something about the parochial/
cosmopolitan nature of the presidential selection process—is
it national politics or is it local politics on a national scene?—
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Table 37. National/Local Orientation of Elites
Orientation
National
Mixed
Local
Number of cases
Dem.
45%
5
50
100%
826
1980
Rep.
53%
5
42
100%
618
Dem.
45%
6
49
100%
987
1984
Rep.
41%
8
51
100%
902
See Appendix C for an operational definition of the focus of orientation.
we also queried our delegate subjects in both 1980 and 1984
about behaviors that might indicate a difference between more
parochial and more cosmopolitan orientations. To put the mat-
ter somewhat more prosaically, we asked our respondents to
describe the focus of their general political conversations: were
they concerned with national issues or with local issues? Their
responses are reported in Table 37. In terms of both the sub-
stance of the issues under examination and the analytic question
of congruence between elite and mass attitudes in their home
constituencies, the distinction between national and local ori-
entation proved to be another way of distinguishing greater and
lesser interconnectedness between mass and elite policy pref-
erences.
Although our interest in distinguishing the more parochial
from the more cosmopolitan was a direct offshoot of our search
for indications of local ties binding representatives to the rep-
resented, it turned out as an empirical matter that the two
indicators of orientation (role and focus of activity) were vir-
tually unrelated. Among activists with a national orientation,
trustees outnumbered instructed/mandated delegates 60 to 27;
among activists with a local orientation, the ratio was 53 to
31. Whatever difference there was, of course, was in the "ex-
pected" direction, the more parochial outlook being that of the
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instructed delegate and the national orientation slightly more
common to the trustee. However, the differences were very
slight.
As a consequence, it is of great interest to observe in Table
38 that local/national orientations seem to be almost as effec-
tive as are the indicators of role preference in separating out
elites whose attitudes are more or less similar to those of rank-
and-file partisans. In both parties, elite activists with a national
orientation held the more extreme issue positions and therefore
accentuated party differences, while their colleagues with a
more local orientation were visibly more moderate in their
policy commitments. These differences were then associated
with larger and smaller differences of means based on state-
to-state comparisons of elite and mass attitudes. As can be
observed in Table 38, the correlational measures of dissimi-
larity were generally larger for nationally oriented Democrats
and Republicans than for their colleagues who reported a
stronger orientation toward local matters.
In a comparison of the 1984 correlational scores of dis-
similarity associated with national and local focus for discus-
sions of politics, it is clear that the differences are not as sharp
as those associated with differences in activists' representa-
tional role preferences. The same distinction could be observed
in the 1980 data, although not as sharply there because the
national/local contrasts were somewhat greater in the earlier
year. These interyear differences may be worthy of future ex-
ploration, but for the moment it seems sufficient to conclude
that we have identified yet another arena of political behavior
that produces significant variation in the representativeness of
political elites.
In the present inquiry we have not returned to our original
curiosity as to whether national and local orientations make a
difference in the subsequent convention or campaign activities
of delegates. It seems quite possible that we have captured
some part of a distinction that, if more adequately defined and
measured, has many implications for the conduct of presiden-
to
Table 38. Mass-Elite Similarities and Delegate Orientation
Orientation
1980
National
Local
Difference
1984
National
Local
Difference
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
.41
.31
+ .10
.40
.27
+ .13
Plus ( + ) indicates that
supporters than ;
Rep.
- . 1 2
- . 0 3
+ .09
- . 3 5
- . 2 0
+ .15
Social
Issues
Dem. Rep.
.31 - . 41
.26 - .25
+ .05 +.16
.49 - . 1 9
.50 - .09
- . 0 1 +.10
policy preferences of elites
are the preferences
Foreign
Policy
Dem. Rep.
.37 -
.29 -
+ .03 +
.46 -
.39 -
+ .07 +
with a "local
.24
.10
.14
.25
.12
.13
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
.12 - . 5 8
.13 - . 5 3
- . 0 1 +.05
orientation" are more
of elites with a "national" orientation.
New
Politics
Dem.
.32
.27
+ .05
.20
.16
+ .04
similar to
Rep.
- . 3 6
- . 1 8
+ .18
- . 3 2
- . 3 0
+ .02
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
.46
.41
+ .05
.41
.33
+ .08
those of their part\
Rep.
- . 6 2
- . 5 0
+ .12
- . 5 6
- . 5 3
+ .03
/'s mass
O
C
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tial politics. Our instrumental use of the information suggests
that there is more to be derived from understanding patterns
of behavior not self-consciously directed toward elite repre-
sentational activity.
The inquiry into the representational roles and local or na-
tional focus of elite political interests highlights the possibility
that our different measures may have different meanings for
the explications of "linkage." In both of the analyses just re-
viewed, the differences of state-based means provided the clear-
est evidence of the effects of role preference and orientation
on mass-elite similarities. The correlations of national distri-
butions and the comparisons of national means supported the
same substantive conclusion, but the state-based measures pro-
vided by far the sharpest evidence. After the fact, the reason
seems intuitively clear.
Both those who prefer to make decisions as instructed dele-
gates and those who normally prefer to talk local politics have
implicitly identified mechanisms that could link their attitudes
to those of members of the mass population. The "locals," in
particular, have identified their "significant others" as other
locals. Only one of our three statistics, the national mean of
state-based differences in elite and mass means, explicitly links
the elite activist to a (more or less) local mass, whether or not
it is a constituency to be represented. The other two statistics,
the correlational measure of dissimilarity and the mean dif-
ference of national groups of individual numbers of the elites
and masses, do not rest on any such bond between elite and
specified subsets of the mass.
Now if the link creating similarities between elites and
masses is interpersonal contact, would it not be better to mea-
sure the similarity with a statistic comparing local means? In-
deed, unless there is some reason that the total set of elites
engaging in interpersonal contact with rank-and-file partisans
have systematically different attitudes from those elites who
do not contact rank-and-file partisans, there is no reason to
expect national statistics comparing each group of elites to the
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same national population of rank-and-file partisans to reveal
any difference. A measure based directly on local differences
would seem a more appropriate test of the presumed expla-
nation.
There are, of course, national differences between some
groups of elites who are to be compared with a given national
partisan mass. Where that is so—as among elites with more
extreme policy preferences who campaign on behalf of is-
sues—correlational measures and comparisons of national
means are both a proper base for the analysis. In the same
situation, states are but microcosms of the nation and, on the
average, reveal the same differences when the third measure—
the mean of state-based differences of means—is examined.
We are now acutely aware that the match between the geo-
graphic location of referents used in the questionnaire and the
geographic bases for examining mass-elite similarities is not a
strong point of our study design. We have matched elites and
masses analytically at the level of the state for purposes of
deriving statistics comparing issue or policy preference do-
mains. But in specifying conditions that might affect or con-
stitute linkage, the questionnaire asked about the strength of
party organization "in your home community," about party
competition at the "most local level," and about "people you
talk to" with no anticipation of a subsequent need to match
subsets of elites with statewide or districted populations. The
possible dividends of such an improvement in the design of
future studies is suggested by the extraordinarily large mean
differences of state-based elite-mass comparisons in our analy-
sis of local/national orientations. The notable accentuation of
state-based differences of means in this specific analysis
prompted these comments; we must reserve a systematic in-
quiry on this topic for future research. At this point we simply
note that despite the uniformity with which all three statistics,
in both years, support the substantive findings discussed here,
there seem to be instances in which the measures of mass-elite
similarity differ in a manner that suggests different levels—
Elite Orientations 125
micro and macro—for the linkages that create mass-elite simi-
larities.
Delegate Selection
Under the impetus of Democratic party reform, the rules
and procedures for delegate selection have undergone almost
constant revision since 1968. Much of the commentary, both
professional and public, has centered on the rapid expansion
of the use of the primary election as a device to democratize
delegate selection. This is not the appropriate place for a com-
prehensive review of the impact of the primaries on partisan
politics in the late twentieth century. The diversion would be
too great, and it would be complicated by the need to reconcile
public accounts with an interesting aspect of our delegates'
own reports of how they came to be delegates. For example,
although most reports specify that some 75 percent of all 1980
delegates were elected in the 1980 primaries, and 60 percent
of the 1984 delegates in 1984 primaries, the delegates' own
reports to a somewhat different question are instructive. In both
1980 and 1984, they were asked: "When you were selected as
a delegate to the national convention, were you selected as a
direct result of a primary? as a direct result of a state or district
convention or caucus? by a meeting of other delegates from
your state? by a preexisting party committee? or as one of the
'Super Delegates' for public or party positions?"
The intraparty distributions of their answers in each of the
two data collections are displayed in Table 39. Apparently only
minor fractions—in both parties and both years—agreed with
the "official" reports of the incidence of selection by primary
election. We have not as yet exhausted our exploration of this
striking difference. Our best hunch at this stage, however, is
that many delegates in our study saw as the crucial decisions
in their selection those that determined whether they would be
on a primary election ballot. (Defeated candidates, who are
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Table 39. Reported Mode of Delegate Selection
Primary
Convention or caucus
Other delegates
Party committee
Super delegates
Number of cases
Dem.
18%
65
6
4
7
100%
448
1980
Rep.
41%
46
3
10
100%
286
Dem.
30%
48
7
5
10
100%
618
1984
Rep.
22%
49
2
22
5
100%
499
See Appendix C for a description of the categories of delegate selection.
not represented in our study, might well have provided even
more reports that they were not delegates because they—or
their candidates—were defeated in primary elections.) The re-
sponses to our question belie the importance generally assigned
to primary elections and emphasize the importance of tradi-
tional party organizations in delegate selection. Upon closer
inspection, these reports may prove misleading as indicators
of the balance of power between party and candidate, but they
clearly diminish the status recently accorded the primary elec-
tion voter.
Before pursuing the representational correlates of the mode
of delegate selection, we examined the interaction between
mode of selection and reported status as representative. Tra-
ditionally, delegates in both parties are formally classified as
representing either congressional districts or state constituen-
cies at large. In addition, in both parties there are delegates
who, according to their own reports, are chosen because they
were elected officials or party officials, but this category was
not well represented in our study in either party. On the Demo-
cratic side, Super Delegates were notable underrepresented in
our sample of elite respondents; Republicans of high formal
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Table 40. Delegate Selection by Mode and Status
Elected Representing
in Primary
yes
yes
no
no
Super delegate
Number of cases
District
yes
no
yes
no
1980
Dem.
33%
5
38
17
7
100%
446
Rep.
17%
2
55
20
4
100%
284
1984
Dem.
30%
1
38
23
8
100%
591
Rep.
19%
3
52
26
—
100%
483
position were infrequent participators in our study as well. It
is also true that the Republican party has not matched the
Democratic party's emphasis on reform and has therefore not
felt the same need to create a counter-reformation by giving
special emphasis to the representation of their elected leaders.
Nevertheless, in our classification of modes of selection, the
high-status members from both parties were held out for sepa-
rate analysis.
Among the remainder it turned out that virtually all delegates
chosen in primary elections were chosen to represent districts.
Nevertheless, it is most economical and straightforward to pre-
sent data derived from five categories of delegate selection,
represented in national distributions from 1980 and 1984 in
Table 40. Among the five, delegates chosen at large by primary
election are so few in number as to defy reliable estimates of
correlates.
In both 1980 and 1984, patterns of differences in repre-
sentativeness of elite policy preferences were distinct and three
in number. In both years and on virtually all measures, Demo-
cratic Super Delegates were clearly the most representative of
rank-and-file policy preferences, as reflected in Table 41. This
finding is not necessarily a complete surprise—probably no
to
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Table 41. Delegate Selection and Mass-Elite Similarities
Elected
in primary
1980
yes
yes
no
no
Representing
district
yes
no
yes
no
Super Delegate
1984
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
Super Delegate
Liberal/
Conservative
Dem.
.13
.30
.26
.10
.27
.29
.29
.12
Rep.
- . 0 5
- . 0 5
- . 0 3
- . 1 4
- . 3 2
- . 1 7
Social
Issues
Dem.
.13
—
.25
.21
.11
.46
—
.46
.55
.38
Rep.
- . 2 9
—
- . 3 1
- . 2 2
—
- . 1 1
—
- . 2 0
.01
—
Foreign
Policy
Dem. Rep.
.16 - . 1 4
— —
.27 - . 1 7
.23 - . 0 9
.15 —
.34 - .08
— —
.37 - .26
.32 - . 1 1
.21 —
Domestic
Spending
Dem. Rep.
- .08 - .38
— —
- . 1 2 - . 5 3
.00 - . 4 5
- . 1 3 —
New
Politics
Dem. Rep.
.18 -
—
.28
.29
.14
.14
—
.11
.17
.09
.27
.29
.18
.24
.34
.21
Traditional
Groups
Dem.
.32
—
.45
.40
.22
.29
—
.35
.30
.20
Rep.
- . 4 5
—
- . 4 7
- . 3 6
—
- . 3 3
—
- . 5 4
- . 4 1
—
H
g
a
no
No entry is shown where the number of elite cases is less than 25. §
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surprise at all to the defenders of party as a crucial political
institution. There is, nevertheless, a nice irony in the fact that
Super Delegates were added to the Democratic convention to
counter the populist anti-party influences presumably intro-
duced by expanding the number of primary elections. The evi-
dence of close rapport between rank-and-flle partisans and
Democratic party and public officials is striking on all three of
our measures of representativeness. The correlational assess-
ments show relatively greater similarity between the national
distributions of sentiments in both years. Elected officials,
party and public, reflect public policy sentiments, whether or
not they also reflect informal judgments as to the candidates
best suited to produce party victory in November. The Super
Delegates may have given the traditional wielders of power
more representation in the selection of the nominees, but they
also inadvertently outdid the primary election winners in rep-
resenting public opinion.
As Table 41 illustrates, the irony is compounded by evidence
that delegates elected in primaries are second only to elected
officials in being in tune with given public sentiments. Com-
pared to delegates chosen by the traditional party mechanisms
of convention or caucus, delegates chosen by primary election
are more representative of the party's rank and file—just as
the advocates of primary elections hoped they would be. Irony
exists, of course, only in the context of reforms enacted in
the name of facilitating or inhibiting particular candidacies.
Presumably, Super Delegates were proposed to reestablish the
control of the professional politicians over the adventurism of
ideological, candidate-inspired amateurs—this in reaction to
the anti-party spirit that initiated the reforms to increase access
and broaden participation in the presidential selection process.
Whether or not the goals of party protectors or candidacy
advocates were served we cannot tell. Our only criterion con-
cerns the representation of mass sentiment on matters of policy
and issue preference. It seems apparent that the initial goal of
the reforms was to advance causes that were demonstrably not
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mainstream, rank-and-file goals. The established officialdom,
in turn, may have feared the unchanneled voices of the masses
in primaries—or may have been concerned only with the pro-
motion of viable and electable candidates. Our singular preoc-
cupation with the representation of mass sentiments does not
equip us to test the extent to which the process has met other
goals as it has been reshaped. We can simply note that delegates
elected in primaries are not themselves ideological extremists.
Compared to delegates selected by other processes—including
conventions, party caucuses, and meetings of other elites—
delegates selected by primary election are relatively in tune
with the centrist preferences of the rank and file. We can also
repeat that whether or not the Super Delegates are better
equipped to make wise and prudent nominations against the
popular will, they themselves are the most efficient represen-
tatives of that will as expressed in policy and issue preferences.
The third distinctive pattern visible in Table 41 is that
delegates chosen by convention or caucus to represent con-
gressional district infrastructures turn out to be the least
representative of public sentiments. Most interesting is the ex-
tent to which the difference between the role as district repre-
sentative and the role of delegate at large is consistently
associated with differences in the representativeness of the
delegates. In both years, in both parties, and in most substan-
tive domains, delegates chosen by caucus or convention to be
representatives at large are more representative of rank-and-
file citizen sentiments than are the delegates chosen to represent
the interests of a congressional district.
The pattern suggests limited and parochial perspectives on
the part of those controlling delegate selection at the district
level. Mean scores are neither at the ideological extremes of
those chosen at large nor the moderate scores of the Super
Delegates. They simply seem out of line with whatever rank-
and-file comparison is examined. The preservation of local
control does not appear to have facilitated or enhanced the
representation of rank-and-file policy preferences.
8Individuals, Institutions,
and Representation
Very few of the thousands of people, from ordinary citizens
to extraordinary leaders, whose attitudes and actions have been
reported in this book engage in politics as anything more than
a part-time, spare-time avocation. Except for the handful of
officeholders who are dependent on political office—public or
party—for their livelihood, political participation is a com-
pletely voluntary activity. As such, it attracts people with a
thousand and one different motives for becoming engaged. To
judge from motives for participation reported in studies of po-
litical activists, a concern with governmental representation of
popular issue preferences is not high on the list. Nevertheless,
we have found an extended variety of circumstances under
which voluntary political activists with policy preferences more
and less representative of mass preferences can be identified.
The results of the analyses reported here are evidence of the
existence of institutions that make the process of presidential
selection something more than an atomistic personal or even
partisan popularity contest. The "political system," including
many aspects not mentioned in the foregoing discussion, quite
apparently produces a representation of public policy prefer-
ences even where the formal rules and overt activities of the
participants are not designed primarily for such purposes. The
political analyst's usual concern with representation centers on
the legislative process, where the ultimate enactment of policy
that responds to popular demand is one of the normative tests
of the entire democratic system. There, all manner of insti-
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tutions—for example, frequent regular elections, in single-
member districts, of persons to represent contiguous consti-
tuencies—have been created in the name of the consent of the
governed and the accountability of those elected to govern.
Not so for the selection of delegates to the national nominating
convention: that process stands in sharp contrast, devoid of
any direct procedures concerned with the responsibility of the
delegates to anyone other than a candidate for nomination.
In the process of presidential selection the political party is
the principal institution responsible for bringing order out of
what would otherwise be the chaos of voluntary political ac-
tion. The party does not exist in order to provide an entity that
is responsible to the citizenry for obtaining consent and pro-
viding accountability; nevertheless, it performs equivalent
functions. In a very real sense, party defines orthodoxy of
political belief and legitimacy of political action. Parties are
slow to impose sanctions on the heterodox, and they are some-
times very slow to adapt the definition of the party line to fit
changing times. By the same token, much of the continuity in
the content of national political controversy comes from the
continuity provided by partisan ideology.
Taken as an absolute standard, the party line may inhibit
would-be leaders in their attempts to be responsive to public
opinion. But compared with other sources of guidance on issues
of public policy, party functions to link leaders to their base
of mass support. Candidacies for the presidency, if not can-
didates themselves, derive some of their distinctiveness from
their deviations from the party line, and those activists who
are motivated by the distinctive appeal of one candidate over
another appear to be less responsive to the existing opinions
of their fellow partisans in the electorate at large than are the
activists who consciously attempt to represent party interests.
The candidate who tries to represent the purity of ideological
conviction or, more simply, commitment to a specific policy
outcome from government stands as the virtual antithesis to
the representative of party, at least where the representative
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nature of policy preferences is concerned. Party as the mobi-
lizer of activists, the guide for activists' decisions, the shaper
of the local context for activists' participation, or the goal for
activists' efforts does more than candidate loyalty or ideo-
logical conviction to preserve the bond between the leaders
and the led.
The very certainty of this conclusion points to a major limi-
tation of the present inquiry into mass-elite linkages. Precisely
because virtually all our findings have been presented in rep-
licate for two electoral contexts, 1980 and 1984, we are as
devoid of new insights into the nature of political change as
we are confident of our increased knowledge about political
continuity. Political leadership would seem to be the essential
source of political change, but we have been limited in our
ability to point to evidence that this is so. Indeed, we note the
election and reelection of Reagan in the face of an ideological
stance among his elite supporters that had them persistently at
odds with the Republican rank and file, to say nothing of the
Democrats from which he drew vital electoral support. And
neither the greater representativeness of the relatively moderate
Mondale supporters nor the centrism of the Carter campaign
elite saved their candidates from massive popular rejection.
Moreover, we have found that elite activists representing or
promoting specific issues are among those least representative
of public opinion.
However, the period covered by our inquiry did not witness
any discernible change of mass opinions that appeared re-
sponsive to elite initiatives. In the comparable but less than
identical measures of similarities of mass and elite policy pref-
erences in 1980 and 1984 there is little evidence of increased
mass-elite rapport within either party. Indeed, among Repub-
licans, as we noted in Chapter 3, there is marginal evidence
of a widened gap between elite and mass opinion. This may
have occurred because mass opinion lagged behind in its re-
sponse to the new conservatism of 1980, or it may have been
the result of the actual failure of the Republican elite to lead
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their mass followers as they themselves shifted their prefer-
ences to the left between 1980 and 1984.
The basic obstacle to our learning more about the dynamics
of mass-elite interaction that produces change lies in the rela-
tive absence of changes in mass opinion during the period under
investigation. One major contribution of the present discussion,
therefore (and of that previously presented in Parties in Tran-
sition), may well be the recasting of the problem of opinion
leadership as a problem in reducing tensions induced by dis-
similarities in mass-elite policy preferences. Such a recasting,
in turn, may consist of emphasizing the structural facilitation
of change through the circulation of the elites, through the
modes of delegate selection, or through the engagement of any
of the structures or institutions that we have identified as pro-
viding better, or at least more, mass-elite linkage.
An interest in the study of political change exposes another
limitation of the present investigation. Although we have now
identified a series of circumstances or conditions associated
with greater or lesser similarity in mass and elite policy pref-
erences, we have not significantly contributed to better speci-
fication of the precise mechanisms that produce the variations
in linkage. For example, we are satisfied that an electoral con-
text defined by close interparty competition is associated with
tighter m^raparty linkage of mass and elite policy preferences,
but none of our evidence offers explicit explanation for the
phenomenon. Does the threat of loss to the other party induce
a conservative effort by partisan elites to ensure retention of
their own natural partisan base? Or does something more re-
lated to a culture of competitiveness induce moderation in their
outlook?
An even more perplexing example is provided by the as-
sessment of role preferences. Granted a generalized desire to
do as those you represent desire, how does the elite activist's
preference for the role of instructed or mandated delegate work
to enhance the extent to which his or her policy preferences
match those of the party's electoral base? Is the answer to be
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found in the reshaping of the activist's own preferences? What
is the mechanism or device that produces enough informa-
tion—the cognitive input—to make the efforts to be represen-
tative actually produce great representativeness? This question
is particularly perplexing when representativeness is measured
as a matter of similarities of national distributions, not just
special relationships with home constituencies.
In like manner, we have found that a local orientation on
the part of elites produces closer mass-elite linkage than does
a more national perspective. How does this come about? In
one of the few instances in which we attempted to test an
explanatory hypothesis, our intuitive logic failed us. Employ-
ing a 1984 question about the amount of activity in state and
local party politics, we hypothesized that a high level of local
activity would have the same meaning as a local orientation
in providing the explanation of mass-elite similarities in issue
preferences. This was not the case. Chapter 7 did not include
elite state and local activity as one of the components of speci-
fication precisely because of the absence of evidence that it
made any systematic difference to mass-elite similarities of
issue preference. Therefore, neither the interpersonal contact
nor the psychological engagement that such activity might im-
ply can be used to explain the clear and predictable evidence
that local orientations—or instructed delegate roles, for that
matter—are associated with tighter mass-elite linkages.
Although less perplexing, the data pertaining to the mode
of delegate selection also need further explication. If primary
elections do enhance mass-elite similarities in issue prefer-
ences, and if caucus or convention selection to represent the
congressional district minimizes such similarities, how does
this happen? Is it the voters' choices that select the delegate
candidates with congruent preferences? Are those who select
potential delegates as representatives of the state at large some-
how more public-minded than those who select delegates to
represent the more localized home district? And are Super Dele-
gates closely linked to mass opinion because of the moderation
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of their own preferences, or is there something about their
status or background and experience that makes them such
good representatives?
Without elaborating further examples, it is possible to enun-
ciate a general point: evidence that certain institutions or legal
constraints or psychological perspectives are associated with
greater or lesser degrees of similarity in mass and elite policy
preferences generally identifies a new puzzle—how do we now
specify the particular psychological or behavioral mechanisms
that make the difference? It is not difficult to conjure up hy-
potheses to account for much that we have observed. The task
of this book has been to identify the institutions that channel
and organize the volunteered activities of elite activists into
patterns that look like the results of a system or the intended
outcomes of a deliberately designed process. One of the un-
finished tasks is to seek the next level of explanation.
A portion of the waiting research agenda can be addressed
with the evidence at hand. The analysis in this effort has been
largely at the conceptual level of bivariate explorations.
Granted, we have dealt simultaneously with a multiplicity of
indicators of policy preferences, among two populations of
actors—elite and mass—in each of two parties and in two very
different electoral settings. These complexities aside, the basic
analytic mode has been to examine the impact of independent
variables, one variable at a time, on one mass-elite relation-
ship—and then to replicate that analysis.
Upon rare occasion we have made a simple check on pos-
sible confounding interpretations and have found, for example,
that national/local differences in orientation are only mildly
associated with trustee/delegate differences in role preference.
We were also prepared to juxtapose variations associated with
different candidates' support groups and variations associated
with institutional differences. We then discovered institutional
differences associated with different candidacies, but in most
instances the introduction of candidate preference differences
into analyses of institutional differences provided simply one
more instance of replicated findings.
Individuals, Institutions, & Representation 137
Despite these occasional forays into more complex analytic
models, we have not pretended to exhaust the possibilities
inherent in the data collections employed in the present study.
Moreover, both of the elite data collections contain a rich bat-
tery of biographical information on individuals' political ca-
reers in seeking, holding, and aspiring to both public and party
office. Despite the likelihood that the experiences and expec-
tations embedded in such records have real consequences for
the representativeness of policy preferences, limitations on our
resources—including time—have left this domain totally unex-
plored.
Yet another challenge for the future pertains to problems of
measurement. We pursued alternative modes of measuring the
similarity of mass and elite policy preferences far enough to
be persuaded that three of four measures produced analyses
that called for, or supported, virtually identical interpretations
at our level of exploratory description. As noted earlier, we
rejected the measure of dyadic correlations because of its ap-
parent instability. Yet it was the ingredients of that fourth
measure—state-level estimates of means for elite subgroups
and for rank-and-file partisans—that were used to create the
third measure: the mean differences of state means, which
produced results that matched the other two acceptable mea-
sures.
We relied on the differences in national distributions of in-
dividual-level data for illustrating most of our conclusions. One
measure reflected differences of national means; the other was
based on the correlation between issue preferences and group
(mass-elite) differences. The match between them was very
close with a very high correlation—but also a steep slope,
reflecting the fact that there was much greater variance in the
correlations than in the difference of means. As a consequence,
we made most use of the collective correlations because of the
greater clarity with which they reflected analytic differences.
We were surprised that the attempt to use state-based esti-
mates was not more fruitful. Given the generally limited in-
terstate variance of many of the measures of mass opinion, we
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were not surprised that the dyadic correlations proved to be
quite unstable; however, we had anticipated systematic dif-
ferences on the occasions when state-based means should
accentuate differences also observed in the comparisons of
national distributions. For example, it seemed likely that dele-
gates from areas with strong party organizations would resem-
ble their state constituencies even more than they resembled
their party's national mass constituency. Yet this seemed not
to be so. These and other ambiguities in the meaning to be
attached to alternative measurements must be resolved as a part
of the effort to provide evidence specifying the mechanisms
that produce the results we have observed.
This monograph is virtually unique as an examination of
essentially political factors that influence mass-elite linkages
in matters of policy preference. The uniqueness lies more in
the fact that two data collections were carried out to support
the investigation than in the substantive details of the study
design. As the plans for the studies—the 1984 study in par-
ticular—were developed, we simply constructed a question-
naire containing content of obvious interest to a host of political
analysts, observers, and participants. It is perhaps a comment
on the utility of such conventional wisdom that virtually all
the "obvious" questions we asked bore fruit. Of course, we
would have been bewildered if trustees had not differed from
instructed delegates in the faithfulness with which they rep-
resented public opinion. Now that we "know" they do, we
must explain how this is possible in national populations of
representers and represented who are voluntarily engaged in a
process structured by political institutions that are not intended
to do more than choose the most electable candidate for presi-
dent.
Both the design of the studies and the execution of the analy-
ses reflect our commitment to learn more about how our po-
litical system works. As a practical matter, better information
and more complete understanding of mass-elite linkages will
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be useful in guiding future efforts at the reform and redesign
of our electoral institutions. The recent history of political re-
form has been marked more by ideological conviction than by
expert understanding of the institutional forms being amended.
As a consequence, the electoral process has been plagued with
the unanticipated consequences of ill-considered changes. In-
quiries such as this one move us forward in identifying the
institutions, be they matters of legal prescription or behavioral
custom, that are relevant to particular outcomes. A more thor-
ough comprehension of the specific mechanisms responsible
for institutional consequences will presumably make the results
of future reforms a bit more predictable and, therefore, more
effective.
A second and more profound purpose is also served by the
present study: it permits fuller appreciation of our system of
government and thereby enhances our commitment to its norms
and objectives. In an age of cynicism it is important to have
evidence that the system works. Our research has adduced
evidence that institutional forms related to delegate recruitment
and role preferences, delegate perspectives related to local poli-
tics and regard for party, electoral competition, and the party
itself all make a difference in the enhancement or inhibition
of mass-elite linkages. We have not learned enough to make
normative judgments about how much linkage is ideal for what
purposes nor, at this stage, how best to alter a given degree
of linkage. Nevertheless, more such studies will both enrich
our understanding of the political system and influence the
ways in which we try to sustain or change institutions in order
to realize our normative commitments to democratic politics.
Appendix A. Data Sources
The basic design for analysis compares attributes of a partisan group
of elite activists with the same attributes exhibited by ordinary
citizens—voters and nonvoters alike—who constitute their partisan
supporters in the electorate. The mass electorate was represented by
national samples selected by the National Election Studies data col-
lections in 1980 and 1984. The partisan groups within the electorate
were identified through their responses to the standard NES question
on party identification: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of
yourself as a Republican, a Democratic, an Independent, or what?"
Those respondents initially selecting Republican or Democrat were
then asked: "Would you call yourself a strong [party name] or not
a very strong [party name]?" This yielded four categories. Those
replying "Independent" (or volunteering other or no preference) were
asked: "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or
Democratic party?" Those picking one of the parties were classified
as Independent leaners, thus yielding two more categories. Those
not selecting a party constituted the residual seventh group of In-
dependents. "Apoliticals" have been dropped from this analysis.
Each partisan group included all who identified with one party,
whether that identification was strong or weak, plus all non-identifiers
who expressed a preference for that party. In general, therefore,
independents and other nonpartisans—approximately 10 percent of
the electorate—were excluded from the analyses. The partisan groups
in the electorate are variously referred to as "rank-and-file sup-
porters," "mass supporters," "mass partisans," "ordinary citizens,"
and at times "the voters," even though nonvoters are always included
in estimates of mass partisan attributes.
The elite activists are represented by those delegates to the national
nominating conventions of 1980 and 1984 who returned mail ques-
tionnaires (sent out to the complete population of delegates) and who
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reported participating in the presidential election campaign of either
year. Their patterns of delegateship and participation are reported in
Table 15 (Chapter 3).
In both 1973 and 1981 a major effort was devoted to analyzing
the mail questionnaire respondents for their representativeness of the
universe of all delegates. Those efforts are reported at length in Jeane
Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite, and, more pertinently, in
Warren E. Miller and M. Kent Jennings, Parties in Transition. The
clear evidence that mail respondents were not a biased subset of the
universe of delegate activists of those years led us to undertake a
1985 data collection following the 1984 election.
The analysis of respondents following the 1980 election rested in
large part on comparisons of data from those "panel" respondents
who participated in both the 1972 and 1980 studies. In similar fash-
ion, the 1985 respondents included many who had been respondents
in 1981 and for whom comparisons of 1981 and 1985 data could be
made. The 1985 data collection used the same methods and proce-
dures as those used in 1981, and we have seen no reason to be less
satisfied with the quality and representativeness of the resulting file
of 1984 information than with the data from the 1972 and 1980
studies.
The data underlying our decision not to report dyadic correlations
as measures of mass-elite similarities are reviewed here not as a
comment on the representativeness of the data collection but in the
interest of explicating a measurement decision directly relevant to
the representativeness of mass-elite comparisons. Since dyadic cor-
relations rest on establishing the thirty states represented in the NES
sample as the units of analysis, it is worth noting that a laborious
reweighting of the 1980 data was carried out in order to correct for
over- or underrepresentation of partisan groups in individual states.
The results of that effort found no bias relevant to the representation
of states, and we do not believe the erratic patterns of dyadic cor-
relations observed in explorations of the 1984 data can be traced to
problems involved in the representation of states in our NES sample
design. It is true that exclusive reliance on the NES designation of
sample states would have eliminated elites of the other twenty states
from our inter-elite analyses (comparing marginal distributions of
different elite groups), but the decision to forgo reliance on the NES
sample (as providing proper representation of state populations)
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Table Al. Eta Values Associated with Six Variables and Four
Groups
Policy Domains
Liberal/conservative
Social issues
Foreign policy
Spending
New Politics
Traditional groups
Democrats
Mass
.09
.13
.14
.11
.15
.16
Elite
.06
.08
.03
.05
.06
.10
Republicans
Mass
.09
.18
.07
.16
.08
.11
Elite
.26
.17
.23
.16
.10
.27
Eta is a measure of the ratio of variances among states to the variances
within states. Smaller entries indicate limited variation among states com-
pared to within-state variation, and therefore suggest greater instability of
correlations based on state means.
stemmed only from the apparently limited interstate variance on our
crucial dependent variables.
Table Al indicates low values for the eta statistic, calculated to
reflect the relationship between interstate variance and intrastate vari-
ance. Although two or three estimates for the Republican elite ap-
proach levels that might indicate stability for correlations based on
interstate variability, eta's for the Republican mass partisans and both
groups of Democrats were so low that we rejected that option for
our measurement of mass-elite similarities.
Finally, the data used in defining the parties' leadership wings are
presented in Table A2. Factor analyses defining leadership wings:
rotated factor matrix from a Varimax Rotation using Kaiser's Nor-
malization.
Data Sources
Table A2. Data Base
Carter
Humphrey
Johnson
Mondale
Ferraro
Kennedy, E.
Jackson, J.
McGovern
Glenn
Hart
Kennedy, J.F.
Stevenson
Goldwater
Kemp
Nixon
Reagan
Bush
Dole
Eisenhower
Ford
for Party Leadership
Factor 1
DEMOCRATS
.60
.81
.75
.73
.47
.29
.06
.07
.32
- . 1 5
.43
.32
REPUBLICANS
.74
.78
.59
.83
.09
.00
.16
- . 0 8
Wings
Factor 2
.15
.14
- . 0 4
.40
.60
.70
.73
.83
- . 1 8
.43
.35
.28
- . 0 1
- . 2 1
.24
.13
.76
.68
.72
.73
143
Factor 3
.15
.03
.11
- . 1 7
.07
.01
.16
- . 0 1
.73
.76
.31
.22
Entries are factor loadings.
Appendix B. Measures
of Policy Preferences
The following dependent variables were examined.
I. Ideological Self-placement
A. Elite Samples
For both 1980 and 1984 the question was worded as follows:
"We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conser-
vatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely
liberal [1] to extremely conservative [7]. Where would you
place yourself on this scale?" In 1980 the missing data value
was 9; in 1984, 8, 9.
B. Mass Samples
For both 7950 and 1984 the question was worded as follows:
"We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conser-
vatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which political views
that people hold are arranged from extremely liberal [1] to
extremely conservative [7]. Where would you place yourself
on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?" The
missing data value in both years was 9.
For the purpose of standardization with other dependent vari-
ables, the response values for both questions were trans-
formed from 1 through 7 to 0 through 100: the most extreme
liberal response became 0; the most conservative response
became 100; and the midpoint, 4, became 50.
II. Domestic Social Issues Index
A. Elite Samples
In 1980 this index was constructed from three items:
1. Busing. "There is much discussion about the best way
to deal with racial problems. Some people think letting
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children go to their neighborhood schools is so important
that they oppose busing. Others think achieving racial
integration of schools is so important that it justifies bus-
ing children to schools out of their own neighborhoods.
Where would you place yourself on the following [7-
point] scale?"
1 keeping children in neighborhood schools
7 busing to achieve integration
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (5, 6, 7)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (1, 2, 3)
2. Abortion. "There has been much discussion about abor-
tion during recent years. Which one of the opinions listed
below best agrees with your view?"
1 Abortion should never be permitted.
2 Abortion should be permitted only if the life and
health of the woman are in danger.
3 Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal
reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring
for the child.
4 Abortion should never be forbidden.
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (4)
1 = moderate reponses (2, 3)
2 = conservative response (1)
3. ERA. "Do you approve or disapprove of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, sometimes
called the ERA amendment?"
1 approve strongly
2 approve somewhat
3 disapprove somewhat
4 disapprove strongly
9 missing data
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Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1)
1 = moderate reponses (2, 3)
2 = conservative response (4)
The index was constructed by adding the three items together
and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
In 1984 the domestic social index was constructed from four
items:
1. Busing. The wording of the question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980 (8,9, missing data).
2. Abortion. The wording of this question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980 (8,9, missing data).
3. School Prayer. "Some people think it is all right for the
public schools to start each day with a prayer. Others
feel that religion does not belong in the public schools
but should be taken care of by the family and the church.
Which do you think?"
1 Schools should be allowed to start each day with
a prayer.
2 Schools should be allowed to start each day with
a prayer, provided the prayer is silent.
3 Religion does not belong in the schools.
8, 9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (3)
1 = moderate response (2)
2 = conservative response (1)
4. Aid to Women. "Some people feel that the government
in Washington should make every effort to improve the
social and economic position of women. Others feel that
the government should not make any special effort to help
women because they should help themselves. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?"
1 Government should help women.
7 Women should help themselves.
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8, 9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
The index was constructed by adding the four items together
and then recoding the 0 through 8 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100: the most conservative
score.
B. Mass Samples
In 1980 this index was constructed from three items:
1. Busing. "There is much discussion about the best way
to deal with racial problems. Some people think achiev-
ing racial integration of schools is so important that it
justifies busing children to schools out of their own neigh-
borhoods. Others think letting children go to their own
neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose
busing. Where would you place yourself on this scale,
or haven't you thought much about this?"
1 bus to achieve integration
7 keep children in neighborhood schools
0 haven't thought much
8 don't know
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (4, 8, 0)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
2. Abortion. "There has been some discussion about abor-
tion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on
this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell
me the number of the opinion you choose."
1 By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2 The law should permit abortion only in case of
rape, incest, or when a woman's life is in danger.
3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other
than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life,
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but only after the need for the abortion has been
clearly established.
4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain
an abortion as a matter of personal choice.
8 don't know
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (4)
1 = moderate response (2, 3, 8)
2 = conservative response (1)
3. Equal Role for Women. "Recently there has been a lot
of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that
women should have an equal role with men in running
business, industry, and government. Others feel that
women's place is in the home.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't
you thought much about this?"
1 equal role
7 women's place is in home
0 haven't thought much
8 don't know
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (4, 8, 0)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
The index was constructed by adding the three items together
and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
In 1984 this index was constructed from four items:
1. Busing. The wording of this question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980.
2. Abortion. The wording of this question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980 (7,9, missing data).
3. Prayer in school. This variable was created from the
following two parts:
a. "Some people think it is all right for the public
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schools to start each day with a prayer. Others feel
that religion does not belong in the public schools
but should be taken care of by the family and the
church. Have you been interested enough in this to
favor one side over the other?"
1 yes
5 no
8 don't know
9 missing data
b. "Which do you think—schools should be allowed to
start each day with a prayer or religion does not be-
long in the schools?"
1 Schools should be allowed to start each day
with a prayer.
5 Religion does not belong in the schools.
7 other; depends
8 don't know
9 missing data
Ideological dimensions were constructed as follows:
0 = liberal response if item 3b above equals 5.
1 = moderate response if 3a equals 5 or 3b equals
7 or 8.
2 = conservative response if 3b equals 1.
4. Aid to Women. "Some people feel that the government
in Washington should make every effort to improve the
social and economic position of women. Others feel that
the government should not make any special effort to
help women because they should help themselves. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you
thought much about this?"
1 Government should help women.
7 Women should help themselves.
8 don't know
0 haven't thought much
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (4, 8, 0)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
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The index was constructed by adding the four items together
and then recoding the 0 through 8 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
III. Foreign Policy and Defense Index
A. Elite Samples
In 1980 this index was constructed from two items:
1. Defense. "Some people believe that we should spend
much more money for defense. Suppose these people are
at one end of the scale at point number ' 1.' Others feel
that defense spending should be greatly decreased. Sup-
pose these people are at the other end, at point '7 . ' And,
of course, some other people have opinions somewhere
in between. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?" The missing data value was 9."
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (5, 6, 7)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (1, 2, 3)
2. Detente. "Some people feel it is important for us to try
very hard to get along with Russia. Others feel it is a big
mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia. Where
would you place yourself on this seven-point scale?"
1 important to try very hard to get along with Russia
7 big mistake to try very hard to get along with Rus-
sia
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
The index was constructed by adding the two items to-
gether and then recoding the 0 through 4 range of scores
to 0 through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most
conservative score.
In 1984 this index was constructed from three items:
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1. Defense. "Some people believe that we should spend
much more money for defense. Others feel that defense
spending should be greatly decreased. And, of course,
some other people have opinions somewhere in between.
Where would you place yourself on this scale?"
1 greatly increase defense spending
7 greatly decrease defense spending
8, 9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (5, 6, 7)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (1, 2, 3)
2. Detente. The wording of this question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980 (8,9, missing data).
3. Central America. "Some people think that the United
States should become much more involved in the internal
affairs of Central American countries. Others believe that
the U.S. should become less involved in this area. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?
1 U.S. should become much more involved in Cen-
tral America.
7 U.S. should become much less involved in Central
America.
8, 9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (5, 6, 7)
1 = moderate response (4)
2 = conservative response (1, 2, 3)
The index was constructed by adding the three items together
and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
B. Mass Samples
In 1980 this index was created from two items:
1. Defense. "Some people believe that we should spend
much less money for defense. Others feel defense spend-
ing should be greatly increased. Where would you place
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yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about
this?"
1 greatly decrease defense spending
7 greatly increase defense spending
0 haven't thought much about this
8 don't know
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (0, 4, 8)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
2. Detente. "Some people feel it is important for us to try
very hard to get along with Russia. Others feel it is a big
mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you
thought much about this?"
1 important to try very hard to get along with Russia
7 big mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia
0 haven't thought much
8 don't know
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1, 2, 3)
1 = moderate response (0, 4, 8)
2 = conservative response (5, 6, 7)
The index was constructed by adding the two items to-
gether and then recoding the 0 through 4 range of scores
to 0 through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most
conservative score.
In 1984 this index was constructed from three items:
1. Defense. The wording of this question and recoding of
responses were the same as in 1980.
2. Detente. "Some people feel it is important for us to try
to cooperate more with Russia, while others believe we
should be much tougher in our dealings with Russia.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't
you thought much about this?"
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1 try to cooperate more with Russia
7 get much tougher with Russia
8 don't know
0 haven't thought much
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded in the same manner as
the 1980 version.
3. Central America. "Some people think that the United
States should become much more involved in the internal
affairs of Central American countries. Others believe that
the U.S. should become less involved in this area. Where
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you
thought much about this?
1 U.S. should become much more involved in Cen-
tral America.
7 U.S. should become much less involved in central
America.
8 I don't know
0 haven't thought much
9 missing data
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (5, 6, 7)
1 = moderate response (4, 8, 0)
2 = conservative response (1, 2, 3)
The index was constructed by adding the three items
together and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores
to 0 through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most
conservative score.
IV. Domestic Spending Index
A. Elite Samples
In 1980 there were no items from which to construct this
index.
In 1984 this index was constructed from six items within one
question:
"Listed below are some programs that the federal govern-
ment currently funds. If you had a say in making up the
federal budget this year, indicate for each of the following
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programs whether you think federal spending should be in-
creased, reduced, or kept at the same level."
a dealing with crime 1 = decrease
b aid to education 2 = same
c medicare 3 = increase
d science and technology 8, 9 = missing data
e assistance to minorities
f social security
Scores on this item were recoded to reflect ideological
dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (3)
1 = moderate response (2)
2 = conservative response (1)
The index was constructed by adding the six items together
and then recoding the 0 through 12 range of scores to 0
through 100. 0 equals the most liberal score; 100 equals the
most conservative score.
B. Mass Samples
This index was not created for 1980.
In 1984 this index was constructed from six items:
"If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year,
which programs would you like to see increased and re-
duced?"
1. "Should federal spending on dealing with crime be in-
creased, decreased, or kept about the same?"
1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
2. "Should federal spending on schools be increased, de-
creased, or kept about the same?"
1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
3. "Should federal spending on Social Security be in-
creased, decreased, or kept about the same?"
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1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
4. "Should federal spending on Medicare be increased, de-
creased, or kept about the same?"
1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
5. "Should federal spending on science be increased, de-
creased, or kept about the same?"
1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
6. "Should federal spending on aid to minorities be in-
creased, decreased, or kept about the same?"
1 = increased
2 = same
3 = decreased
8 = don't know
9 = missing data
Scores on all of the six items were recoded to reflect
ideological dimensions as follows:
0 = liberal response (1)
1 = moderate response (2, 8)
2 = conservative response (3)
The index was constructed by adding the six items to-
gether and then recoding the 0 through 12 range of scores
to 0 through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most
conservative score.
V. Social Issue Groups Index
A. Elite Samples
In 7980 this index was constructed from three feeling ther-
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mometers with possible responses ranging from 00 (unfa-
vorable) to 100 (favorable).
"For each of the following groups please indicate your feel-
ing toward them on what we call a 'feeling thermometer.'
Here's how it works: If you don't feel either particularly
warm or cold toward a group, then you should place them
in the middle of the thermometer, at the 50-degree mark. If
you have a warm feeling toward a group, or feel favorably
toward them, you would give them a score somewhere be-
tween 50 degrees and 100 degrees, depending on how warm
your feeling is toward that group. On the other hand, if you
don't feel very favorable toward a group—that is, if you
don't care much for them—then you would place them some-
where between 0 and 50 degrees. Remember, 50 degrees
means you feel neutral toward the group."
The missing data value is 99. for each thermometer.
1. Women's Liberation Movement
2. Moral Majority
3. Blacks
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
Women's Liberation Movement thermometer and the Blacks
thermometer were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (60 through 100)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (1 through 40)
The Moral Majority thermometer was recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (0 through 40)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (60 through 100)
The index was constructed by adding the three items together
and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
In 1984 this index was constructed from five thermometer
items. The stem was the same as in 1980.
1. Women's Liberation Movement
2. Moral Majority
3. Gay Rights
4. Pro-Life Groups
5. Blacks
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The missing data value is 99 for each thermometer.
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
Women's Liberation Movement, Blacks, and Gay Rights ther-
mometers were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (60 through 100)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (1 through 40)
The Moral Majority and Pro-Life Groups thermometer was
recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (0 through 40)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (60 through 100)
The index was constructed by adding the five items together
and then recoding the 0 through 10 range of scores to 0
through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conser-
vative score.
B. Mass Samples
In 1980 this index was constructed from three feeling ther-
mometer items, each of which had a range of responses from
0 through 100. The stem for each item read as follows:
"I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political
leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll
read the name of the person and I'd like you to rate that
person, using this feeling thermometer. You may use any
number from 0 to 100 for rating. Ratings between 50 degrees
and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm
toward the person. Ratings betwen 0 and 50 degrees mean
that you don't feel too favorable toward the person. If we
come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't
need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to
the next one. If you do recognize the name but don't feel
particularly warm or cold toward the person, you would rate
the person at the 50-degree mark. . . . And still using the
same thermometer, how would you rate the following?"
1. Blacks
2. Women's Liberation Movement
3. Evangelical Groups
The missing data values for each thermometer are 998 and
999.
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
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Women's Liberation Movement and Blacks thermometers
were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (56 through 100)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (0 through 45)
The Evangelical Groups thermometer was recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (1 through 45)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (56 through 100)
The index was constructed by adding the three items together
and then recoding the 0 through 6 range of scores to 0 through
100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conservative
score.
In 1984 this index was constructed from five thermometer
items. The stem for these items read as follows:
"I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political
leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I
will use something we call the feeling thermometer, and here
is how it works. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like
you to rate that person, using the feeling thermometer. Rat-
ings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel
favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0
degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't care too much
for the person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree
mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the
person. If we come to a person whose name you don't rec-
ognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and
we'll move on to the next one. . . . And still using the ther-
mometer, how would you rate the following?
1. Women's Liberation Movement
2 Evangelical Groups
3. Gay Men and Lesbians
4. Anti-Abortionists
5. Blacks
The missing data values for each thermometer are 997, 998,
999.
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
Women's Liberation Movement, Gay Men and Lesbians, and
Blacks thermometers were recoded as follows:
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0 = liberal response (56 through 100)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (0 through 45)
The Evangelical Groups and Anti-Abortionist thermometers
were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (1 through 45)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (56 through 100)
The index was constructed by adding the five items together
and then recoding the 0 through 10 range of scores to 0
through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conser-
vative score.
VI. Traditional Group Index
A. Elite Samples
In both 1980 and 1984 this index was created from six
items. The stem of these items was the same as that used
in the 1980 elite sample for the construction of the social
issues groups index. Six feeling thermometers were used:
1. Conservatives
2. Union Leaders
3. Liberals
4. Business Interests
5. Democrats
6. Republicans
The missing data value for each thermometer is 99.
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
Conservatives, Business Interests, and Republicans ther-
mometers were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (0 through 40)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (60 through 100)
The Union Leaders, Liberals, and Democrats thermometers
were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (60 through 100)
1 = moderate response (50)
2 = conservative response (0 through 40)
The index was constructed by adding the six items together
and then recoding the 0 through 12 range of scores to 0
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through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conser-
vative score.
B. Mass Sample
In both 1980 and 1984 this index was constructed from six
feeling thermometer items. The stem of these items is the
same as was used in the 1980 mass sample for items included
in the social issues groups index.
1. Conservatives
2. Labor Unions
3. Liberals
4. Business Interests
5. Democrats
6. Republicans
The missing data values for each thermometer are 998,
999 in 1980 and 997, 998, 999 in 1984.
In order to reflect ideological dimensions, scores on the
Conservatives, Business Interests, and Republicans ther-
mometers were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (0 through 45)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (56 through 100)
The Labor Unions, Liberals, and Democrats thermometers
were recoded as follows:
0 = liberal response (56 through 100)
1 = moderate response (46 through 55)
2 = conservative response (0 through 45)
The index was constructed by adding the six items together
and then recoding the 0 through 12 range of scores to 0
through 100: 0 equals the most liberal, 100 the most conser-
vative score.
The index was constructed in the same manner as the elite
index.
Appendix C.
Index Construction:
Measures of Political
Variables among Elites
The following measures were used to subdivide Democratic and Re-
publican elites.
I. Strength of Party Support
In both 1980 and 1984 Democratic and Republican elites were
asked to respond to the following seven-point item:
"Please choose the number that best describes how strongly
you support your political party."
1 not very strongly
4 midpoint
7 very strongly
8, 9 missing data
Weak Democrats and Republicans were those who responded
within the range of 1 through 5. Strong Democrats and Re-
publicans responded with a 6 or 7. The result was four cate-
gories of elite partisans:
1 strong Democrats
2 weak Democrats
3 weak Republicans
4 strong Republicans
II. Importance of Party at the Convention
In 1980 and 1984 this index was constructed from three items.
In both years the wording of the items was the same. In 1984
an introductory sentence (in brackets below) was included with
the stem portion.
"[All of you have attended at least one National Presidential
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Nominating Convention.] In thinking about decisions that are
made at conventions, which positions do you favor and which
do you oppose?"
(1) counting service to the party heavily in nominating can-
didates
(2) working to minimize disagreement within the party
(3) minimizing the role of the party organization in nomi-
nating candidates for office?
The range of responses for each item was as follows:
1 strongly favor
2 favor
3 oppose
4 strongly oppose
5 no position
8, 9 missing data
Responses were recoded to reflect the degree of importance
elites attached to their party at their conventions. Items 1 and
2 were recoded as follows:
2 = high importance (1,2)
1 = moderate (5)
0 = low importance (3, 4)
Item 3 was recoded as follows:
2 = high importance (3, 4)
1 = moderate (5)
0 = low importance (1,2)
The index was constructed by adding together the three items
and then recoding as follows:
1 = high importance (4, 5, 6)
2 = moderate (2, 3)
3 = low importance (0, 1)
III. Strength of Local party Organization
In 1984 local party strength was assessed from responses to
the following question:
"Is the party organization in your local community (city, town)
very strong (1), fairly strong (2), not very strong (3), or not
strong at all (4)?" Missing data values are 8, 9.
This variable was recoded as follows:
1 = strong (1, 2)
2 = weak (3, 4)
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IV. Importance of Issues at the Convention
In 1980 and 1984 this index was created from three items. The
stem was the same as for Measure II.
(1) standing firm for a position even if it means resigning
from the party
(2) playing down some issues if it will improve the chances
of winning
(3) selecting a nominee who is strongly committed to the
issues
The range of responses for each item was as follows:
1 strongly favor
2 favor
3 oppose
4 strongly oppose
5 no position
8, 9 missing data
Responses were recoded as follows:
Items 1 and 3 (1, 2 = 2), (5 = 1), (3, 4 = 0)
Item 2 (3, 4 = 2), (5 = 1), (1, 2 = 0)
The items were then added together and recoded so that
1 = high (4, 5, 6)
2 = moderate (2, 3)
3 = low (0, 1)
V. Partisan Competition
In 1984 local partisan competition was determined using the
following question (in conjunction with elite party identifica-
tion):
"How would you describe party competition within your local
precinct or ward (whichever is the smaller district in your com-
munity)?"
1 very competitive—balance between the parties
2 somewhat competitive—favoring Republican party
3 somewhat competitive—favoring Democratic Party
4 noncompetitive—Republican Party dominant
5 noncompetitive—Democratic Party dominant
8, 9 missing data
The competitiveness variable was created as follows:
1 = Democratic respondent; competition favors Republican
party (2 or 4 above)
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2 = Democratic respondent; competition is balanced (1
above)
3 = Democratic respondent; competition favors Democratic
party (3 or 5 above)
4 = Republican respondent; competition favors Democratic
party (3 or 5 above)
5 = Republican respondent; competition is balanced (1
above)
6 = Republican respondent; and competition favors Repub-
lican party (2 or 4 above)
VI. Mode of Selection and Delegate Classification
In 1980 and 1984 Democratic and Republican elites were sub-
divided into those selected as delegates as a result of primaries
and those selected by other means. In both years this subdi-
vision was based upon the following item:
"When you were selected as a delegate to the National Con-
vention, how were you selected?"
1 as a direct result of a primary
2 as a direct result of a state or district convention or caucus
3 by a meeting of other delegates from your state
4 by a preexisting party committee
5 * as one of the Super Delegates for public or party positions
8, 9 missing data
*In 1980 (for Democrats only) this response read: "as one
of the guaranteed 'add-on' delegates for public and party
positions."
In both years responses were recoded in each party to create
four groups:
1 Democrats—"primary" delegates
2 Democrats—"nonprimary" delegates
3 Republicans—"primary" delegates
4 Republicans—"nonprimary" delegates
VII. District or Other Classification
In 1980 and 1984 elites were asked: "What was your official
classification as a delegate in 1984?"
1 District Delegate
2 At Large Delegate
3 Party Official/Elected Officeholder
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8, 9 missing data
Democrats and Republicans were then subdivided:
1 those who were district delegates (1 above)
2 others (2, and 3 above)
VIII. District-Primary Status: 1980/1984
Based upon the "district" item and the "primary" item, a new
measure was constructed. For Democrats and Republicans the
following five classifications were developed:
1 primary, district delegates
2 primary, not district delegates
3 district, not primary delegates
4 not district, not primary delegates
5 Super Delegates (from Variable VII, response 3)
8, 9 missing data
IX. Role Preference
In 1980 and 1984 elites responded to the following question:
"During the conventions [in 1984 the question begins: 'During
the 1984 convention'] you may have been asked to make some
"important decisions. What was your approach, in general, to
decision-making? On a scale of 1 to 7, with T being 'vote
the way I believe is right, regardless of what the people I
represent believe,' and '7 ' being 'vote the way these people
would vote if they were here, regardless of what I believe,'
where would you place yourself in regard to your role as a
delegate decision-maker?" Missing data codes were 8, 9.
Responses were recoded to create the following six groups:
1 Democrat with trustee orientation (1,2)
2 Democrat with mixed role orientation (3, 4, 5)
3 Democrat with instructed/mandated delegate role ori-
entation (6, 7)
4 Republican with trustee orientation (1,2)
5 Republican with mixed role orientation (3, 4, 5)
6 Republican with instructed/mandated delegate role ori-
entation (6, 7)
X. Campaign Focus
In 1980 and 1984 Republican and Democratic elites were sub-
divided into those whose campaign focus was either: (1) party,
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(2) issues, or (3) a candidate. A new variable was created from
three items.
"We are interested in knowing the reasons for your political
involvement in recent election periods. For each campaign in
which you were involved, please indicate how much of your
activity was motivated by commitments to the party, to the
candidate, or to an issue position or special group. If you were
not at all involved in the campaign, please indicate this in the
first column."
1 I was committed to party work
2 I wanted to help a particular candidate
3 I wanted to work for one issue or for some specific group
Responses to each item were as follows:
1
2
3
0
8,9
The
1
2
3
a lot
some
none
not involved in the campaign
missing data
"focus" item was then
Party focus: item 1 =
candidate focus: item
issue focus: item 3 =
constructed as follows:
= 1, item 2 ?M, item
2 = 1 , item 1 ¥^ 1, i
; 1 and
, item 3
a) item 1 ^ 1 and item 2 ^ 1 or
b) item 1 = 1 and item 2 ^ 1 or
c) item 1 ¥" 1 and item 2 = 1
XI. Convention Representation
This measure was constructed in 1980 and 1984 by recoding
the following item:
"Which groups listed below come closest to describing the ones
you represented at the [1984] convention? Please rank the
groups in order of importance to you with the first as the most
important and so on."
In both years this item was recoded as follows:
1
2
3
4
party (code = 1)
candidate (code =
voter (code = 3)
social issues (code
55, 58, 59, 60, 65,
2)
=
66
10,
67
13,
69
19, 20, 25, 33, 39, 50,
86)
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5 mainstream politics (code = 21,26,27,28,40-45,49,
72, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90-97)
00, 88, 99 missing data
XII. Delegate's Sponsor
This measure was constructed in 1980 and 1984 by recoding
the following item:
"When you were being selected as a delegate, did you get help
from the following groups? Please rank the groups in order of
importance to your selection with the first as the most important
and so on."
The item was recoded as follows:
1 party (1980, code = 3; 1984, code = 1)
2 candidate (1980, code = 4; 1984, code = 2)
3 voter (1980, code = 2; 1984, code = 3)
4 social issues (both years, code = 10 13, 19, 20, 25,
33, 39, 50, 55, 58, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 69, 86)
5 mainstream politics (both years, code = 21, 26, 27,
28, 40-45, 49, 72, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90-
97)
00, 88, 99 missing data
XIII. Party Leadership Wings
In 1984 the feeling thermometers listed below were used to
create variables that reflect leadership wings within both par-
ties.
Among Democrats Among Republicans
W. Mondale R. Reagan
L. Johnson G. Bush
H. Humphrey R. Dole
J Carter G. Ford
G. McGovern R. Nixon
G. Ferraro B. Goldwater
E. Kennedy J. Kemp
J. Jackson D. Eisenhower
0 = cold
100 = hot
999 = md (missing data)
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The following program was used to create the leadership
wings within both parties:
(1) For Democrats:
Compute Demfl = (Mondale + Johnson + Hum-
phrey + Carter)/4
Compute Demf 2 = (McGovern + Ferraro + Kennedy
+ Johnson)/4
Compute score 1 = (Demfl — Demf2)
If (Demf2 It 50) Dwing = 1
If (Demf 2 ge 50 and score 1 ge 10) Dwing = 2
If (Demf 2 ge 50 and score 1 le 70) Dwing = 3
If (Demf2 ge 50 and [scorel gt - 1 0 and scorel It 10])
Dwing = 4
If Sysmis (Demfl) Dwing = 5
If Sysmis (Demf 2) Dwing = 5
As a result, the Democratic leadership wing variable has the
following values:
1 liberal party wing rated at 50 or lower
2 mainstream wing favored over the liberal wing by 10
points
3 liberal wing favored over the mainstream wing by 10
points
4 all other Democrats for whom there were responses
5 Democrats with missing data codes on the thermome-
ters
(2) For Republicans:
Compute Repf 1 = (Reagan + Bush + Dole + Ford)/
4
Compute Repf 2 = (Nixon + Goldwater + Kemp +
Eisenhower)/4
Compute Score2 = (Repf 1 - Repf2)
If (Score2 le - 10) Rwing = 1
If (Score2 ge -7 .50 and score 2 le 7.50) Rwing = 2
If (Score2 ge 10) Rwing = 3
As a result, the Republican leadership wing variable has the
following values:
1 most conservative party wing
2 middle group
3 moderate wing
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XIV. Party Ideological Factions
In 1984 ideological factions within each party were deter-
mined as follows:
Within each party the elite liberal/conservative self-place-
ment variable (V2142) was recoded as follows:
V2142 1 = liberal - 7 = conservative
RecodeV2142(l,2 = 1) (3 = 3) (4 = 4) (5 = 5) (6,
7 = 7)
For Democrats: the variable locating other Democrats at the
convention on the liberal/conservative scale (V2156) was
recoded in two ways:
Compute Ddelsl = V2156
Compute Ddels2 = V2156
Recode Ddelsl (1 thru 4 = 1) (5 thru 7 = 2)1
Ddels2 (1 thru 3 = 1) (4 thru 7 = 2)
The Democratic ideological factions were then determined
by using a combination of the self-location variable and the
other location variables as follows:
1 liberal: (a) V2142 = 1 or
(b) V2142 = 3 and Ddels 1 = 2
2 moderate: (a) V2142 = 4 or
(b) V2142 = 3 and Ddelsl = 1 or
(c) V2142 = 5 and Ddels2 = 2
3 conservative: (a) V2142 = 7 or
(b) V2142 = 5 and Ddels2 = 1
For Republicans, the same procedure was followed. First the
liberal/conservative location of other Republicans (V2155)
was recoded in two ways.
Compute RDelsl = V2155
Compute RDels2 = V2155
Recode RDelsl (1 thru 4 = 1) (5, 6, 7 = 2)/RDels2 (1,
2, 3 = 1) (4 thru 7 = 2)
The Republican ideological factions were then determined
by using a combination of self- and other ideological place-
ment:
1 liberal: (a) V2142 = 1 or
(b) V2142 = 3 and RDels
1 = 2
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2 moderate: (a) V2142 = 4 or
(b) V2142 = 3 and
RDelsl = 1 or
(c) V2142 = 5 and
RDels2 = 2
3 conservative: (a) V2142 = 7 or
(b) V2142 = 5 and
RDels2 = 1
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